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SUMMARY 
This thesis examines the main predictors of political involvement from a 
social identity perspective, thus the main questions addressed is when people decide 
to take collective action in relation to shared ideas. It is argued that group self-
definition should predict intentions to undertake political behaviours. Surprisingly the 
existing literature does not unequivocally show that the strength of subjective group 
membership is a good predictor of group behaviour in general, or political 
behavioural intentions in particular. The thesis proposes four key solutions to this 
problem. The first is that the relationship will tend to be strong when groups are in 
conflict: intergroup conflict seems to help organize behaviour into oppositional forms. 
Secondly, the group membership will be a stronger predictor when the groups are 
normatively relevant to the predicted behaviour. As social identity theorists have long 
argued, group behaviour is only predicted by group membership when that behaviour 
is consistent with a relevant norm for the group. Thirdly, the relationship will tend to 
be strong when relevant groups are chosen, and the focus here is on opinion-based 
groups: groups defined on the basis of a shared opinion. Fourthly, the relationship will 
tend to be strong when the degree or strength of self-categorization is measured 
appropriately. Here the argument is that measures of certainty of self-definition as a 
group member capture these constructs best for opinion-based groups. To sum up, 
self-definition as an opinion-based group member should strongly predict political 
involvement in conditions of intergroup conflict and when the behaviours involved 
are highly consistent with the norms of the specific salient group membership. 
In addition to the main prediction that group self-defmition should increase 
political group behaviour it was also expected that, in line with self-categorization 
theory, measures which better captured salience of opinion-based group membership 
XV 
should be stronger and more direct predictors of behavioural intentions than standard 
social identification measures. Consequently self-definition as an opinion-based group 
member was assessed using standard identification scales but also some new items 
which were aimed to capture salience of opinion-based group membership. In 
particular, it was argued that certainty of self-definition as a group member holding a 
certain opinion would be the best indicator of salience, but only especially so in 
opinion-based groups. 
These ideas were explored in a series of six studies (two surveys and four 
experiments). The results of the first two experiments using minimal opinion-based 
groups show that intergroup conflict had some impact on the main variables involved, 
and suggested the direction for the next studies in which the link between opinion-
based group self-definition and political behavioural intentions was directly 
investigated. Results from Studies 3, 4, and 5 strongly supported the hypothesis that 
the salience measure employed predicted political behavioural intentions over and 
above identification. However, Study 5 provided no evidence that conflict enhanced 
the expected relationship. Finally, the results of Study 6 suggest that the salience 
measure is highly sensitive to the normative context and is a good predictor of 
political behavioural intentions but only especially so for the highly normative and 
validated behaviours. 
The conclusion reached is that certainty of self-definition as an opinion-based 
group member is an excellent predictor of normatively relevant political behavioural 
intentions. The success of this measure stems for the fact that it captures the self-
categorization theory construct of salience more accurately than do standard measures 
of social identification and this is almost surely because these measures capture the 
(relatively) enduring aspects of salience that are associated with perceiver readiness. 
XVI 
In summary, self-definition as a group member is indeed a good predictor of validated 
normative political behavioural intentions in opinion-based groups, even where there 
is not explicit intergroup conflict. 
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CHAPTER I 
POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT AND ITS PREDICTORS 
Introduction 
In Romania in the late 1980s there were two long-standing currents of opinion, 
one supporting the communist regime and the other opposing it. Members of the 
public varied in their commitment to these competing opinions, but there was very 
little action associated with the broad anti-regime opinion. Following the violent 
repression of an anti-government rally in December 1989, however, there was a 
sudden increase in the strength of the belief that the regime had to go, and a massive 
increase in the degree to which people came to define themselves as being part of an 
opposition movement. This led to spontaneous and widespread collective action, 
ending in the downfall of the Ceausescu regime. This example shows that people can 
share beliefs and views and even be strongly committed to their views but this is not 
sufficient for them to become involved in collective action in support of these views. 
What is then, the final factor that determined whether people defined themselves as 
participants in an opposition movement and consequently to take part in the actions 
designed to end the repressive Ceausescu regime? Possible answer to this question is 
that the violent conflict with the outgroup (i.e., the regime) was the main factor that 
strongly influenced people to take collective action even when their own lives were in 
danger. Another is that people come to understand that taking action was an 
appropriate and desirable response. 
This example is illustrative for this thesis because the question I address here 
is when do people decide to take politically relevant action in relation to shared ideas. 
In answering this question I am primarily interested in refining and clarifYing the 
social identity approach to collective action. In particular, I will be exploring the 
subjective aspects of group membership, or self-definition as a group member. The 
more general term collective action is used here, in the sense of unified group action, 
aimed either to create social change or to preserve the status quo (Tajfel & Turner, 
1986). Taylor, Moghaddam, Gamble, and Zellerer (1987) made a distinction between 
individual and collective forms of action. This distinction is not made simply on the 
basis of whether one or more people is involved but rather a single group member 
engages in collective action anytime that a person is acting as a representative of the 
group and the action is directed at improving the condition of the entire group. 
Individual action, on the other hand, is behaviour that is directed at improving one's 
personal condition. Over and above these, a third important distinction is necessary. 
Martin (1986) made the distinction between action that either conforms to the norms 
of the existing social system, normative, or is outside the confines of the existing 
social rules and structure, non-normative. From these three distinctions, according to 
Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam (1990), five broad categories of behaviour arise: 
(a) behaviour which indicates apparent acceptance of one's disadvantaged 
position, 
(b) attempts at individual upward mobility through normative channels 
made available by the system, 
(c) individual action outside the norms of the system, 
(d) instigation of collective action within the prescribed norms of the 
existing system, and 
(e) instigation of collective action outside the norms of the system. 
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The actions described by these five categories have very different implications 
at the level of broad society. For example, collective non-normative action directly 
threatens the existing social order, whereas acceptance and individual normative 
actions serve to preserve the status quo (Wright eta!., 1990). However, for this thesis 
only the two categories (i.e., normative and non-normative instigations of collective 
action) are of primary interest. 
The Social Identity Approach to Collective Action 
3 
Social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1879, 1986) provides an answer to the 
question of when people decide to take collective action. Social identity theorists 
argue that people are more likely to act collectively when they are highly committed 
to their views; in other words collective behaviour is driven by social identification, 
so that, under certain conditions, people who are committed members of their groups 
(high identifiers) will be more likely to take action. Researchers such as Doosje, 
Ellemers and Spears ( 1999) focused on investigating the consequences of group 
commitment for intergroup behaviour. In general terms, their argument is that "people 
for whom a particular group membership is important are more likely to behave in 
accordance with their group's norms and values than people who are less involved 
with their group" (Doosje, eta!., 1999, p. 84). They define group commitment or 
in group identification as the extent to which group members feel strong ties with their 
group, thus implying that people may differ in the extent to which a particular group 
membership is important to them. In brief, social identity theory argues that group 
identification, in interaction with a range of other factors, should be a good predictor 
of group behaviour (see Figure 1.1 ). 
Identification 
or group 
commitment 
Action (or group 
behaviour in 
general) 
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Figure 1.1. The general main predictor of group behaviour 
Self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) 
argues more specifically that salience of group membership (i.e., the extent to which a 
social categorization becomes psychologically significant for perceivers, Oakes, 
1987) causes collective behaviour. Group behaviour (a more general term which 
includes collective behaviour) is produced only when that certain group membership 
is activated or salient. It is argued that " ( ... ) the awareness of common category 
membership is the necessary and sufficient condition for individuals to feel 
themselves to be and act as, a group" (Turner, 1982, emphasis added). 
Thus, social category salience, which is defined as a 'cognitive redefinition of 
the self from unique attributes and individual differences to shared social category 
membership and associated stereotypes (Turner, 1984, p. 528) should be the main 
factor determining group behaviour. As shared social identity becomes salient 
depending on the context, individual self-perception becomes depersonalized (i.e., 
individuals tend to define and see themselves more as interchangeable representatives 
of some shared social category membership and not as unique and differing 
individuals, Turner, 1999). 
Under self-categorization theory then, long-term identification is merely one 
determinant of salience (McGarty, 1999). Self-categorization theory explains 
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variation in salience as a function of the interaction between the relative accessibility 
of a particular self-category (later termed by Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1999, 
'perceiver readiness"), the readiness of a perceiver to use a particular categorization, 
and the fit between category specifications and the stimulus reality (the match 
between category and the reality). Perceiver readiness reflects past experience, present 
expectations, and current motives, values, goals and needs of a person and it is also 
influenced by previous identification with that category. That is, one important factor 
affecting perceiver readiness is the extent of identification with the group and the 
degree to which this is central, valued and ego-involving (Doosje & Ellemers, 1997; 
Gurin & Markus, 1988; Turner, 1999, p.l2). The self-categorization theory approach 
to the relationship between self-definition as group member and group behaviour/ 
collective action is perhaps best clarified in the following quote from Turner (1999): 
In sum, as an account of the psychological group, the theory's key 
ideas are that, first, the level and kind of identity used to represent self 
and others vary with one's motives, values and expectations, one's 
background knowledge and theories, and the social context within 
which comparison takes place; second, the salience of shared social 
identity leads to the depersonalization of self-perception: and, third, 
depersonalization produces group behaviour (i.e., collective action and, 
processes regulated by a shared social categorical self). (p.l2) 
In brief, self-categorization theory argues that group behaviour is predicted by 
self-definition as a group member as can be seen in Figurel.2. 
6 
behaviour 
Comparative 
and 
nonnative fit 
Figurel.2. The relationship between collective self-definition constructs and group 
behaviour (the shaded constructs are those that relate directly to collective self-
definition) 
In this figure the shaded concepts are all to do with the subjective aspects of 
group membership. As can be seen, the theory encompasses multiple concepts that 
could be involved in predicting group behaviour. Not surprisingly then there are some 
theoretical and methodological complexities to resolve. The terminology self-
definition as a group member theoretically includes several self-categorization theory 
constructs such as identification, salience, perceiver readiness, and so on, but when 
using this term I will usually be focusing on identification and salience. 
Some Empirical Evidence for the Social Identity 
Approach to Collective Action 
Although there is a large body of research regarding the relationship between 
self-definition as a group member (roughly speaking, identification and salience) and 
group behaviours, the empirical evidence to date is not as strong as might be 
expected. Many studies have tested the relationship between social identification and 
relevant group behaviours such as displays of ingroup bias: the correlations found 
have been relatively weak in some cases (e.g., Brown, Hinkle, Ely, Fox-Cardamone, 
Maras, & Taylor, 1992; Perreault & Bourhis, 1999) and stronger in others. 
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A smaller number of studies have explored the link between identification and 
intension to take action. For example, de Weerd and Klandermans (1999) 
investigated the relationship between group identification among Dutch framers and 
preparedness to take action and found correlations of small size. Terry, Hogg, and 
McKimmie (2000), have also shown relatively weak links between identification and 
intention to take action. 
However, there are researchers who have investigated the link between 
identification and the intention to take collective action and who have found stronger 
relationships. One such example is research done by Kelly and Breinlinger (1996). In 
line with social identity theory, they argued that people who strongly identify with 
their group are more likely to take part in political activities. They investigated 
women's readiness to participate in various actions and their social beliefs in relation 
to actual collective behaviour. Reported participation (among other variables) was 
related to identification as an activist. Kelly and Breinlinger found that identification 
in this case was a better predictor of intentions to participate in action and also 
reported participation than other variables such as identification with the broader 
category (i.e., gender identity), relative deprivation, efficacy and collective 
orientation. 
Work by Simon, Loewy, Stiirrner, Freytag, Habig, Kampmeier, and Spahlinger 
(1998) is also illustrative. In two studies these authors examined the determinants of 
collective behaviour suggested by social identity and self-categorization theories. 
Among other variables, they focused on willingness to participate in collective action 
based on the collective identification as an activist. They used identification with a 
broader category and identification with an action group as predictors of willingness 
to participate in collective action. In the first study they found that identification with 
an action group was a better predictor for collective behavioural intention than 
identification with a broader category (these studies and others will be presented in 
more detail in Chapter 2). 
One general conclusion that might be drawn from these studies is that there is 
considerable variation in the strength of the link between self-definition as a group 
member and participation in different forms of collective action. More specifically, 
there are situations where the relationship between self-definition as a group member 
and group behaviour holds and is quite strong and others where this is not the case. 
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Another striking point is that there is very little research on collective 
behaviour which has sought to operationalise the self-categorization theory constructs 
of perceiver readiness, salience and depersonalization. The focus has remained on 
social identification. 
In order to answer the general question of what makes people more ready to 
get involved in collective action in some situations it is useful to start by addressing 
some more specific questions. For example, is there a particular type of group where 
members are more prone to action? Or are there some specific behaviours more likely 
to be adopted by committed group members than others? And if so, what makes them 
more distinctive and more likely to be follow than others? Finally, are there specific 
social contexts which make people more likely to take action? These questions 
suggest a more refined general question for the thesis of the following form: when is 
the relationship between self-definition as a group member and decisions to take 
collective behaviour particularly strong. 
Overview of the Chapters to Come 
First, relevant evidence in relation to the question of when is the relationship 
between self-definition as a group member and different types of collective 
behaviours particularly strong is reviewed in Chapter 2. To anticipate what this 
literature review suggests I will present the following summary: 
1. Commitment to particular types of groups (e.g. artificial 
groups or broad social categories) is sporadically related to 
commitment to collective action (Brown, Condor, Mathews, 
Wade, & Williams, 1986; Hinkle & Brown, 1990). 
2. There may be some contexts where the relationship between 
self-definition as a group member and group behaviour is 
particularly strong, for example, in cases of relatively clear 
intergroup conflict, or when a particular social identity is 
threaten in some way. 
3. Commitment to groups only seems to be a good predictor of 
commitment to collective action when the action is 
normative for the group (see McGarty, 2001; Turner, 1999). 
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In Chapter 3 I will detail the generally accepted point that conflict between 
groups produces changes in behaviours of group members, often leading to strong and 
occasionally extreme actions. In particular, self-categorization theory explains these 
changes by postulating that intergroup conflict leads to increased salience which is 
expressed in increased commitment to the group position and norms and this is also 
anticipated in social identity theory. The literature review will outline different 
theoretical approaches of intergroup conflict focusing primarily on Sherifs (1967) 
realistic conflict theory and social identity (Tajfel, 1982; Tajfel, & Turner, 1979, 
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1986) and self-categorization theories' (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987) accounts on intergroup conflict. I will then focus on reviewing some empirical 
evidence of the effect of intergroup conflict on the relationship between self-definition 
as a group member and relevant group behaviour. The main hypotheses suggested by 
this review is that intergroup conflict should increase self-definition as a group 
member and the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group 
behaviour should be stronger under conditions of clear intergroup conflict. The first 
part ofthe hypothesis is tested in Chapter 7, and the second part in Chapter 9. 
In Chapter 4 I will elaborate my thesis on the importance of group norms for 
the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour by 
reviewing several relevant theoretical approaches and some empirical evidence. For 
instance, there is the argument by Terry and Hogg (1996) that, when a particular 
group membership is salient, people are inclined to construct norms with respect to 
attitudes, feelings and behaviours. These norms can become prescriptive, so that: 
"Group membership causes people to think, feel, behave, and define themselves in 
terms of group norms rather than unique properties of the self' (Terry & Hogg, 1996, 
p. 780). On the other hand, Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears (1999) argue that the extent to 
which people tend to act in terms of group norms may depend on: (a) the context, (b) 
the structural salience of group membership, and (c) the importance attached to a 
group membership. For example, people with low commitment will act less in 
accordance with group norms than people with high commitment and who attribute a 
great importance to the group membership. 
In Chapter 4 I will deal with the idea that if high identifiers are more likely to 
follow group norms, then it can be argued that an important role in the relationship 
between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be played by 
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the degree of normativeness of a specific behaviour. Following from this point, it can 
be inferred that the relationship between self-categorization as a group member and 
group behaviour will hold more strongly when the relevant behaviours are highly 
normative. The same relationship will be weaker, or fail to hold for non-normative or 
counter-normative behaviours. This hypothesis will be elaborated and tested in 
Chapter 10. 
Finally, in Chapter 5 I will take each of these points in turn and I will explore 
the possibility that a particular form of group is extremely useful for studying the 
relationship between self-definition as a group member and commitment to become 
involved in different forms of collective action. These are groups formed on the basis 
of a shared position of their members. Such groups, which I term opinion-based 
groups, include examples such as pro-animal right groups, anti-abortion versus free 
choice groups, pro or anti gay pride, anti-globalization, etc. These groups may be 
particularly likely to stimulate politically relevant action because unlike broad social 
categories and artificial groups, they may tend to have clear norms for behaviours 
associated with them. This is because they are often the vehicles that convert broad 
ideologies in collective action (for a related argument see Klandermans, 2000). In 
order to explore the relevance of such opinion-based groups for political action, I have 
used a variety of different types of opinion-based groups in the studies I conducted. 
The opinion-based groups used include minimal opinion-based groups (Study 1 and 
2), strictly political opinion-based groups formed around the preference for one 
political party over another during election (Study 3 and 4), and broader political 
opinion-based groups formed around issues such as financial reparation to be paid by 
the Dutch goverrunent to the descendents of slaves in the colonial period, and 
implementation of a new law proposal in Romania regarding same sex relations 
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(Study 5 and 6). Additionally, it is worth noting that the data collection for this thesis 
took place in a variety of cultural contexts: Romania, Australia and the Netherlands. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, in this chapter I have outlined the principal question ofthe thesis 
and some possible answers offered by the literature. To reiterate, this thesis focuses on 
finding the central conditions where self-definition as a group member predicts 
involvement in different forms of collective action (in particular, involvement in 
political actions). The main ideas that appear important are the ways in which self-
definition as a group member is conceived and measured, the norms of the groups in 
relation to the collective actions envisaged, the conflictual (or non-conflictual) context 
of intergroup relations and the type of group considered. In Chapter 2 I will consider 
evidence of the relationship between collective self-definition and collective action in 
more detail. 
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CHAPTER2 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SUBJECTIVE GROUP MEMBERSHIP 
AND COLLECTIVE BEHAVIOUR 
The adaptive function of social identity ... is to produce group 
behaviour and attitudes ... it is the cognitive mechanism which makes 
group behaviour possible. (Turner, 1984, p.527) 
Introduction 
The general question of this thesis is: when do people decide to take politically 
relevant action in relation to shared ideas? One first step in answering this question is 
to outline the theoretical framework ofthe relationship between subjective group 
membership and group behaviour (ranging from ingroup bias to collective action). 
The refined question which will be addressed in this chapter is how and why the 
perception of oneself as a group member impacts upon group behaviour. 
Consequently this chapter is concerned primarily with introducing some key concepts 
such as self-definition as a group member (as per the concepts of social identification 
and salience), and articulating what I mean by group behaviour. The second part of 
the chapter is focused on fleshing out the theoretical framework for the relationship 
between social identification, salience and group behaviour and on reviewing some 
empirical studies investigating this relationship. 
Conceptualizing Social Identity: Identification and Salience 
as Aspects of Subjective Group Membership 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) define a group as a "collection of individuals who 
perceive themselves to be members of the same social category, share some emotional 
involvement in this common definition of themselves, and achieve some degree of 
social consensus about the evaluation of their group and of their membership in it" 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 40). In this view, the use of social categorizations is not 
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only to systematize the social world but also to provide a system of orientation for 
self-reference. Consequently, the term social identity was introduced to refer to those 
aspects of an individual's self-image that derive from the social categories or groups 
to which he or she perceives himself or herself as belonging together with the value 
and emotional significance attached to that category or group membership (Tajfel, 
1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the basis of this original definition it can be 
assumed that there are three components of someone' s social identity: a cognitive 
component (awareness of the membership in a particular group), an evaluative 
component (a positive or negative connotation attached to the group membership), 
and an emotional component (a sense of emotional involvement with the group). 
Likewise, self-categorization theorists see social identity more as self-definition in 
terms of particular social category memberships. Every group is associated with a 
social identity which defines a person's shared similarities with members of a 
particular social category or group in contrast with others (Turner, 1999). 
The intergroup nature of the social identity concept is emphasised by self-
categorization theory when Turner and colleagues define social categorization as 
"cognitive groupings of oneself and some class of stimuli as the same ( ... ) in contrasts 
to some other class of stimuli" (Turner et al., 1987, p.44) pointing out that measures 
of social identity need to consider "the specific nature of the group and its social 
history of relations with other groups" (Turner et a!., p.98). 
In support of this view, van Knippenberg and Ellemers (1993) say that 
theoretically at least social identity is "established thought comparisons with other 
relevant social categories" (p.87). Brewer's (1991, 1993) optimal distinctiveness 
theory also argues that social identity comprises a tension between inclusion and 
distinctiveness, with the latter being obtained though intergroup comparisons. Brewer 
and Gardner (1996) emphasize the importance of the ingroup for self-definition as 
well as for social comparison with the relevant outgroup: 
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in-group membership plays different roles in the formation and 
maintenance of the self-concept at different levels. On the one hand, 
in-groups provide the frame of reference for self-evaluation at the 
individual level and for selection of significant others at the 
interpersonal level. Shared in-group membership is one important basis 
for determining relevant sources of social comparison ( ... ). The other 
role that in-groups play in defining the individual's self-concept derives 
from comparisons between characteristics shared by in-group members 
in comparison to relevant out-groups. This is the essence of social 
identity. (p.85) 
Researchers investigating the ethnic social identity also conceptualize identity 
in terms of ingroup/outgroup relations, stating that ethnic identity "is not an issue 
except in terms of a contrast group" (Phinney, 1990, p. 509). In line with various 
conceptualizations of social identity, ethnic identity was defined as "an enduring, 
fundamental aspect of the self that includes a sense of membership in an ethnic group 
and the attitudes and feelings associated with that membership (Bernal & Knight, 
1993; Phinney, 1990). 
Jackson and Smith (1999) also focus on the intergroup nature of social identity 
but add another three dimensions in an attempt to organize and integrate the 
conceptualisation of social identity. In their view the four dimensions considered to 
comprise the essence of social identity are: 
1. perception of the intergroup context (the extent to which an 
outgroup is salient and perceived to have competitive rather than 
cooperative relations with the outgroup ); 
2. in group attraction (positive affect toward ingroup ); 
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3. interdependency beliefs or common fate (the future wellbeing of the 
individual and the ingroup are bound together); 
4. depersonalization (thinking of the self in terms of a group member 
rather than in terms of a unique individual). 
Other researchers such as Cameron and Lalonde (200 1) also point out the 
multidimensional nature of social identity. They support the original view ofTajfel 
that social identity or identification can be "appropriately regarded as a 
multidimensional construct that incorporates both cognitive and affective elements" 
and proposed a three-component identification scale. Based on Gurin and Townsend's 
(1986) ideas, Cameron and Lalonde argue that the principal components of 
identification are: a) ingroup ties (i.e., perceived similarity and bond); b) cognitive 
centrality (i.e., the amount of time in everyday life spent thinking about belonging to a 
certain category); and c) ingroup affect (i.e., positive and negative feeling associated 
with group membership). In particular, these researchers explored gender identity in 
these multidimensional terms. In order to assess gender-derived social identification, 
they used an expanded set of items derived from the social identity literature (Brown 
eta!., 1986; Hinkle, Taylor, Fox-Cardamone, & Crook, 1989) but also from research 
on social identity of women (Gurin & Markus, 1989; Gurin & Townsend, 1986), and 
from scales used to measure collective self-esteem (Luhtanen & Crocker, 1992). They 
found evidence that gender-derived social identification can be meaningfully 
conceptualized along at least three dimensions which are ingroup ties, cognitive 
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centrality, and ingroup affect. Moreover, this tridimensional model of social 
identification was shown to be relevant for other group memberships including ethnic, 
national, and university-derived identification (Cameron, 2000; Cameron, Sato, 
Lalonde, & Lay, 1997). 
Finally, based on the original definition ofTajfel (1978) that maintains that 
social identity is"( ... ) that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his 
knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value 
and emotional significance attached to that membership" (p.63), Ellemers, Kortekaas, 
and Ouwerkerk (1999) also elaborated a three-dimensional model of social identity. 
More specifically, they distinguish between a cognitive awareness of one's 
membership in a social group, that is self-categorization (cognitive component), a 
sense of emotional involvement with the group, that is commitment to the group 
(affective component) and finally a positive or negative value connotation attached to 
this group membership, that is group self-esteem (evaluative component) as different 
aspects of group members' social identity (p.372). These authors argue that this 
distinction is important and it is necessary to be made as to the extent that people 
identifY with a particular group they will also behave in terms of this group 
membership. Thus: 
( ... )self-categorisation (the cognitive component) as well as affective 
commitment to a specific group (the emotional component) can be 
distinguished from group self-esteem derived from the value 
connotation of that particular group membership (the evaluative 
component). More importantly, we want to argue that this distinction 
should be made, to be able to understand how they are affected 
differentially by specific characteristics of the group or the social 
context. ( ... ) Furthermore, we predict that these components are 
differentially related to displays of in group favouritism in evaluative 
responses or outcome allocations. (p. 373) 
Although there is a range of interpretations of the components of the social 
identity construct there is little dispute that people can identify as group members. 
Most attention has been directed to social identification and salience. 
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Social identification was defined as the internalisation of individuals' group 
membership as an aspect of their self-concept, that is, individuals should be 
subjectively identified with the relevant ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). On the other 
hand, researchers such as Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears defined social identification as 
the extent to which group members feel strong ties with their group. In this sense it is 
roughly analogous to commitment to the group: "social identification can be defined 
as the extent to which individuals identify and commit themselves to a social category 
as a whole" (Spears eta!., 1997a, p.541). Doosje and colleagues argue that people 
may differ in the extent to which a particular group membership is important to them, 
and they make the distinction between 'die hard' fans (high identifiers) and 'fair 
weather' fans (low identifiers) depending on the degree of identification with the 
group (Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). 
Concluding these findings, social identification was defined by McGarty 
(1999a) as someone's feeling ofbelongingness in a certain social group, which is 
conceptually different from seeing oneself as being the same as some class of persons 
(i.e., social categorization) and feeling good about oneself as a group member (i.e., 
social self-esteem). Social categorization is the necessary precondition for both social 
identification and social self-esteem. That is, as McGarty (1999a, p.l90) explains in a 
discussion of the Doosje et al.'s paper (1999), someone cannot feel that he or she 
belongs to a group and is proud about this group membership without accepting 
membership in that group. 
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Salience of social identity is a more dynamic concept than social identification 
and it refers to the extent to which a social categorization becomes psychologically 
significant for perceivers, switched on or activated. By a salient group membership, 
self-categorization theorists refer to "one which is functioning psychologically to 
increase the influence of one's membership in that group on perception and 
behaviour, and/or the influence of another person's identity as a group member on 
one's impression of and hence behaviour towards that person" (Oakes, 1987, p.l18). 
Although there are clear theoretical differences between identification and 
salience the concepts are often confused. Perhaps the most concrete difference is that 
identification has a more long-term nature than does salience. That is, identification is 
a relatively stable variable whereas salience is more context-dependent. As McGarty 
(1999b) argued, the relationship between identification and salience is analogous to 
the relationship between climate and weather. In the same way that climate reflects 
relatively stable and repeatable characteristics of some geographic region and weather 
reflects what is happening at any instant, identification can be thought of as a long-
term variable which should be strongly related to, but not identical to, salience. 
Self-categorization theory argues that cognitive activity in the form of 
previous knowledge and perceived similarities and differences influences the use of 
certain categories instead of others. That is salience depends on the interaction 
between two other variables which are fit and perceiver readiness. Fit in tum has two 
components: comparative and normative fit. 
Comparative fit was initially called 'structural fit' (Oakes, 1987) and it refers to 
the influence of perceived equivalence of stimuli on category use. More exactly, in 
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any situation involving a set of psychologically significant stimuli, any collection of 
stimuli is more likely to be categorized as an entity or a class to the degree that the 
differences between these stimuli are perceived to be less than the differences 
between that collection and other stimuli (McGarty, 1999a; Turner et al., 1987, p.47). 
In other words, intraclass differences must be less than interclass differences (the 
meta-contrast principle). Thus, when in a room where there are women and men, if 
the women tend to act in one way and the men tend to act in another way it would be 
easier to perceive two groups because the differences between women in the room are 
less than the differences between women and men. To take another example, when 
there is a debate, supporters of one position (e.g., a certain political party) tend to 
make arguinents leading to one conclusion and supporters of the other position argue 
in a way that leads to the opposite conclusion. Then, because the average difference 
between groups is larger than the average difference within groups, this comparative 
fit enables us to detect these two different groups in this context. 
The other component of fit, normative fit, can be understood as the constraints 
of prior knowledge on perceived similarities and differences between stimuli. It is 
based on the social meaning of behaviours and thus refers to the match between 
category and reality in terms of content and not just the comparative fit of the 
dimension (McGarty, 1999a; Oakes et al. 1994). For example, in a political debate, 
supporters of a left-wing party will tend to argue using ideas which are associated 
with a left-wing ideology and respectively supporters of a right-wing party tend to use 
right-wing arguments. If this were not the case (i.e., left-wing supporters using right-
wing arguments and vice versa) the normative fit would be low. 
Perceiver readiness, (initially called 'relative accessibility' by Turner eta!., 
1987) refers to the constraints of prior knowledge on category use (i.e., salience), that 
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is the way in which perception is influenced by the perceiver to reflect the his or her 
vantage point at a particular time (McGarty, 1999a). A major component of perceiver 
readiness is the "degree of internalization of or identification with an ingroup-
outgroup membership, the centrality and evaluative importance of a group 
membership in self-definition" (Turner, 1987). Put simply, a certain category which is 
central to self-definition has probably been used in the past by the perceiver so this 
makes the category more likely to be a basis of identification in the future. For 
example, for a white supremacist supporter, for whom the category white plays a 
central role in self-definition, it is probable that he or she will define themselves in 
terms of this category more often in everyday life, than some other category (e.g. 
music lover), which is not so important to them. In these cases, strength of 
identification and the degree of internalization of a certain group membership 
determine the future readiness to perceive oneself in terms of that group membership. 
In addition, salience of a specific group membership depends also on the 
immediate social context as a particular self-categorization can be meaningful in one 
context but not in others. For example, it is more likely that a male-female 
categorization would occur when in a room males and females discuss the issue of 
abortion or rape, than in a case where they discuss drug abuse (Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001). Thus, if taken into account the importance in context in self-
categorization, the model proposed by self-categorization theory is: 
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Perceiver readiness ~ (including long-term identification) Future 
Salience Long-term perceiver 
identification • readiness 
Fit ~ 
Figure 2.1. Determinants of salience and social identification (from McGarty, 1999a) 
In this section I have defined social identity and examined the processes by 
which people define themselves in terms of a particular social identity. In the next 
section the behavioural implications of social identity are examined. 
Definition and Types oflntergroup Behaviour: 
from Ingroup Bias to Collective Action 
Sherif provided a classic and very straightforward definition of intergroup 
behaviour which states that "Whenever individuals belonging to one group interact, 
collectively or individually, with another group or its members in terms of their group 
identification, we have an instance of intergroup behaviour" (Sherif, 1966, p.l2). 
Similarly, social identity theorists suggested that social behaviour refers to "all the 
behaviour of two or more individuals towards each other( ... ) determined by their 
membership of different social groups or categories (i.e., by group affiliations and 
loyalties to the exclusion of individual characteristics and interpersonal relationships)" 
(Turner, 1999, p.9). 
In real social life the situation is though to be more complicated than this. 
Tajfel (e.g., 1978) suggested that intergroup behaviour is a matter of degree. That is, a 
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piece of social behaviour can be more or less an instance of intergroup behaviour 
depending on its position on a dimension. This idea does not contradict Sherifs 
suggestion that intergroup behaviour occurs whenever individuals belonging to 
different groups interact but it does qualify it. Tajfel was the first to make the 
observation that social behaviour varied along a continuum from interpersonal to 
intergroup. At the interpersonal extreme there is any social encounter at the personal 
level, where the interaction is determined by the personal relationships between 
individuals and their individual characteristics, and not at all affected by various 
social groups or categories to which they might belong. At the other extreme, there 
are "interactions between two or more individuals (or groups of individuals) that are 
fully determined by their respective memberships in various social groups or 
categories, and not at all affected by the interindividual personal relationships 
between the people involved" (Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p.8). In both cases, 
interpersonal and intergroup behaviour in pure forms are very rare in real life. 
A wide diversity of phenomena are covered by the heading of intergroup 
behaviour, ranging from apparently isolated actions of individuals such as displays of 
ingroup bias as in the minimal group paradigm, through to organized and planned 
collective activities of groups or even nations (i.e., collective action). 
Intergroup discrimination can appear as a result of mere categorization and 
this had been supported by a large amount of empirical work using the minimal group 
paradigm. Intergroup discrimination or ingroup bias is the tendency to favour the 
ingroup over the outgroup in evaluations and behaviours (Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As 
Tajfel and Turner (1986) pointed out, ingroup bias is "the laboratory analogue to real-
world ethnocentrism( ... ) and the mere awareness of the presence of an out-group is 
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sufficient to provoke intergroup competitive or discriminatory responses on the part of 
the ingroup" (p.13). 
Collective action (see also Chapter 1) can be seen as a specific case of 
intergroup behaviour that is strategic in that it is intended to improve the 
circumstances of the ingroup (Wright, 1999). Definitions of collective action refer to 
it as "an action taken by a group member when she or he is acting as a representative 
of the group and the action is directed at improving the conditions of the entire group" 
(Wright, Taylor, & Moghaddam, 1990a), or as "a group of people acting in concert" 
(R.H. Turner, & Killian, 1972). 
However, both intergroup discrimination and collective action are interpreted 
by social identity theorists as being based on the single process of the need of group 
members for positive distinctiveness. Tajfel and Turner (1979) argue that there is a 
shift along the interpersonal-intergroup continuum which is a function of an 
interaction between psychological and social factors. The motivation of individuals to 
achieve and maintain a positive social identity is the cause of people engaging in 
social comparisons with relevant outgroups. If social comparisons result in a negative 
social identity, according to social identity theory, there are a number of strategies 
people adopt: a) social mobility (e.g., changing the ingroup for a higher status group); 
b) social creativity (e.g., engaging in social comparisons on dimensions which are 
favourable to the ingroup); and c) social competition (e.g., direct attempts to elevate 
the status of the ingroup). Social identity theory's perspective on collective action is 
that collective action is mainly due to the existence of a social change belief system 
(i.e., a view that people cannot resolve their identity problems, or that they cannot 
achieve a positive distinctiveness, through individual action and mobility, but can 
only change their social situation by acting collectively in terms of their shared group 
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membership) and also to the impossibility or difficulty for social mobility due mainly 
to perceived impermeability of group boundaries. This is very well summarized by the 
following quote from Turner (1999): 
In social identity theory, then( ... ) it was impermeable group 
boundaries and the social change belief-system that were seen as the 
key factors in shifting behaviour along the continuum towards the 
intergroup pole. They played a central role in determining collective 
reactions by group members to insecure status in the social system. (p. 
10) 
All the forms of intergroup behaviour including in group bias and collective 
action are closely related to the subjective group membership or the social identity of 
the perceiver. Consequently, the next step will be to focus on the theoretical 
framework explaining the influence of social identity variables on intergroup 
behaviour. 
The Relationship between Group Self-definition 
and Intergroup Behaviour 
There are mainly two views in the literature concerning the implications of 
social identity for group behaviour. One is represented in principal by Brown and 
colleagues (e.g., Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade, & Williams, 1986; Hinkle & 
Brown, 1990) and it argues for a direct causal link between identification and 
intergroup behaviours such as displays of ingroup bias. Their reading of social 
identity theory is that the theory predicts a positive correlation between identification 
and ingroup bias or differentiation. They base their argument on the social identity 
theory idea that positive social identity is mainly based on favourable intergroup 
comparisons, so it is assumed that there should be a positive correlation between 
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strength of group identification and the amount of positive intergroup differentiation 
or ingroup bias (Brown, 2000). However, Brown (2000) also reported that there was 
poor empirical support for this hypothesis (see p.17). Brown and colleagues maintain 
that support for this hypothesis should be stronger, but only under certain conditions. 
They proposed a taxonomy of groups including an individualism-collectivism 
dimension and a comparative ideology dimension (see Brown, Hinkle, Ely, Fox-
Cardamone, Maras, & Taylor, 1992) and hypothesized that the identity-differentiation 
link would be stronger when looking at collectively inclined individuals in situations 
where a comparative ideology (i.e. the outgroup ideology) is salient. 
On the contrary, the other view represented by Turner and colleagues (e.g., 
Turner, 1999; see also McGarty 2001), maintains that social identity theory never 
implied such simple positive correlations between identification and intergroup 
behaviour, but there are three main classes of variables which influence intergroup 
differentiation or ingroup bias in real social life. These classes of variables are: 
1. internalization of group membership as part of the self-eoncept 
(identification); 
2. the existence of relevant evaluative and relational aspects for 
intergroup comparison; 
3. the relevance of the outgroup for comparison (Tajfel & Turner, 
1979, see McGarty, 1999b ). 
Social identity theory emphasises the importance of subjective group 
membership for displays of group behaviour, including ingroup bias or differentiation, 
implying that the need to achieve positive distinctiveness would explain 
discrimination in minimal group paradigm situations where there are not other factors 
involved. However the situation can be quite different in real social life. Of course, 
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the need for positive distinctiveness is a universal variable and group identification is 
one factor predicting group behaviour but there are other factors such as comparative 
context and the relevance of the out group for comparisons which play an important 
role in the process. 
Moreover, according to self-categorization theory, the predicted relationship is 
actually more complex. First, the base of intergroup behaviour is assumed to be the 
process of depersonalization. That is, when there is a depersonalization of the self or a 
"cognitive redefinition of the self from unique attributes and individual differences to 
shared social category membership and associated stereotypes" (Turner, 1982, p. 
528), individual behaviour changes into collective or group behaviour as people come 
to perceive and act in terms of a shared, collective conception of the self (Turner, 
1999). The theory states that: 
depersonalization of self-perception is the basic process underlying 
group phenomena (social-stereotyping, group cohesiveness, 
ethnocentrism, co-operation and altruism, emotional contagion and 
empathy, collective action, shared norms and social influences 
processes, etc.). (Turner eta!., 1987, p.50) 
Social identity salience is determined by the interaction between fit and 
perceiver readiness (as explained above), but one important factor affecting perceiver 
readiness is the level of identification with the group. That is, if someone strongly 
identifies with a certain social category then they will be more likely to use this 
category for self-definition in the future. In this way, long-term identification impacts 
upon group behaviour. 
In tum, the salience of a social categorization leads in turn to depersonalized 
self-perception and this should impact upon group behaviour. Identification, through 
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its impact on perceiver readiness, is merely one determinant of salience which in tum 
leads to group action (McGarty, 1999a), perhaps especially in specific contexts such 
as those involving intergroup conflict (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997; Veenstra & 
Haslam, 2000). According to self-categorization theory, salience rather than 
identification should be a more direct predictor of group behaviour. Consequently, the 
actual relationship proposed by self-categorization theory is as seen in figure 1.1 
(Chapter!). 
Building on these ideas, there are other theoretical developments of self-
categorization theory which offer explanations of different forms of group behaviour. 
In the next section I will focus on two specific accounts of group behaviour which 
shed light on the group behaviour of interest in this thesis- politically relevant 
collective action. 
Discussion of Two Group Behaviour Accounts Developed from Self-
categorization Theory: Social Identity Model Of Crowd Behaviour and the Model of 
Politicized Collective Identity 
Group behaviour and especially collective action can take the form of crowd 
behaviour which generally occurs when big social movements take place (as in the 
example about the downfall of Ceausescu regime in Romania detailed in Chapter I). 
It is particularly useful then, to discuss the social identity analysis of crowd behaviour 
developed by Reicher and colleagues (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1984, 1987, 
1996a,b; Stott & Drury, !999, 2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998a,b). The social identity 
analysis of crowd behaviour is primarily based on two assumptions. The first one is 
that crowd members act in terms of a common social identity. Secondly, the content 
of crowd behaviour will be limited by the nature of the relevant social category 
(Reicher, 1987, 1984). Thus, the social identity model (SIM), developed initially by 
Reicher to explain crowd behaviour started from the idea that individuals in crowds 
are not behaving as separate individuals but they behave in terms of contextually 
relevant shared social identities. Crowd members do not lose control over their 
behaviour, but they act in terms of the norms prescribed by the particular social 
identity made salient by the given intergroup context. This model was supported by 
research investigating behaviour of people involved in riots which reflected their 
shared definition of a certain collective identity. 
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This model was further developed in the elaborated social identity model of 
crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 1999, 
2000; Stott & Reicher, 1998). This model highlights the role of intergroup context 
making the point that collective identity must be understood as a dynamic two-ways 
process whereby the self is not just 'cognitive' but it is embedded in an outgoing set 
of dynamic social relations. That is, the nature of social relations between ingroup and 
out group should shape the nonnative dimensions of the social category which drives 
collective action. Following from this dynamic understanding of collective identity, 
the authors make the argnment that salience should not be only understood as an 
outcome of the relationship between perceiver readiness and fit. Rather, salience 
should be seen as an outcome of the power relations in the intergroup context, as 
salience also represents the achievements of one group to define the context for the 
another (Drury & Reicher, 1998; Stott & Drury, 1999). This account is particularly 
informative here as it points out the important role played by the dynamics embedded 
in the intergroup context, in determining the relationship between group self-
definition and collective behaviour. In the next section I will focus on research which 
explores this relationship. 
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The second account of particular relevance in the context of this thesis is the 
model of politicized collective identity (PCI) developed by Simon and Klandermans 
(2001). This model is especially informative for explaining massive collective 
movements involving large numbers of individuals who attempt to bring about social 
change. In other words, when a politicized social identity is salient, people are 
involved in a struggle for power on behalf of their group in a given societal context. It 
is considered that in the case of politicized social identity: 
( ... )group members should intentionally engage, as a mindful and self-
conscious collective (or as representatives thereof), in such a power 
struggle knowing that it is the wider, more inclusive societal context in 
which this struggle takes place and needs to be orchestrated 
accordingly. ( ... ) it is politicized collective identity that turns the social 
group from "a group of itself'( ... ) into "a group of and for itself'( ... ) 
in the political arena. (p. 323) 
The authors further argue that when a politicized collective identity is 
activated, people need to be aware of their shared group membership, their common 
enemy or opponent, and of the wider societal context that affects the struggle and is 
affected by it. There are three stages in which this process takes place. First, people 
become aware of their "shared grievances", then an external enemy is blamed for 
them and claims for compensation from this enemy can arise, (Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001, p.324). If the expected compensation is not received the struggle 
for power continues. Collective identity completely politicizes when the group 
involved in the struggle seeks to win the support of the third more powerful parties 
such as the national government. At the same time, when the group tries to involve 
authorities, the issue automatically becomes of public interest and, 
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this final step results in a transformation of the group's relationship to 
its social environment because involving a third party implies 
recognition of society or the larger community (e.g., the city, region, 
country, or European Union) as a more inclusive in-group membership. 
(p. 324) 
In the authors' view, thus, there are three "critical ingredients" of politicized 
collective identity: awareness of shared grievances, adversarial attributions to blame 
opponents, and the involvement of the broader society. They also note that in reality, 
the three stages presented as well as the processes associated with each stage might 
overlap and interact but the model is still extremely valuable for a systematic 
understanding of the antecedents of politicized collective identity. 
At a general level, politicized social identity has consequences for the way 
people perceive and act in the social world, that is, for processes including 
stereotyping prejudice, conformity, discrimination, etc. It is argued next that, because 
the politicizing steps discussed above often feed back positively on collective identity 
and strengthen it, the politicization of collective identity should intensify all these 
consequences. 
In addition, it is proposed that there are more specific consequences of 
politicization of collective identity. In particular, the authors suggest two categories of 
consequences. The first category concerns the psychological functions of politicized 
collective identity such as "understanding and agency functions" (p.327). In other 
words, politicized collective identity, through furthering reasoning about the social 
world (e.g., through increasing the awareness of shared grievances), provides group 
members with a more meaningful perspective on the social context they live in. On 
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the other hand, the agency function refers to the active struggle of group members for 
social change or even for preserving a status quo. 
The second category of consequences includes the behavioural consequences 
of the politicized social identity which are linked to the third parties which usually 
become involved in the struggle between the ingroup and outgroup. Thus, "( ... ) 
politicized collective identity should ( ... ) motivate not only collective action that is 
aimed at opponents but also attempts to directly or indirectly enlist third parties as 
allies". This makes politicized group members more likely to engage in "collective 
action directed at the government or the general public to force them to intervene or 
take sides" (p. 328). This model is then particularly relevant to the behavioural 
consequences of the politicized collective identity as strategically aimed at involving 
third parties in the struggle between the ingroup and outgroup. 
Review of Studies Investigating the Relationship 
between Self-definition as a Group Member and Intergroup Behaviour 
Although there is a large body of research concerning the relationship between 
self-definition as a group member and group behaviours, the empirical evidence is not 
as strong as might be expected. Most interested was surrounding the phenomena of 
ingroup bias or favouritism and collective action. Considering the type of group 
behaviour investigated and identification with the group, research focused on this 
topic can be divided into three main categories (see Figure3): 
1. Studies which have tested the relationship between social 
identification and relevant group behaviours such as displays of in group 
bias. 
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2. Studies which have tested the relationship between social 
identification and commitment to group-relevant behaviours, including 
collective action. 
3. Studies which have tested the relationship between social 
identification as an activist and particular forms of commitment to 
collective behaviours. 
Table 2.1. Examples of studies investigation the link between identification and 
collective behaviour. 
Group behaviour 
Identification Ingroup bias Commitment to 
action 
Identification with e.g., Perreault & e.g., de Weerd and 
a group or category Bourhis, 1999; Klanderrnans, 1999; 
Terry, Hogg, & 
McKimmie, 2000; 
Veenstra & Haslam, 2000. 
Identification with e.g., Kelly & Breinlinger, 
an activist group 1995; Simon, Loewy, 
Sturmer, Weber, Freytag, 
Habig, Kammeier, and 
Spablinger, 1998; Simon, 
Sturmer, & Steffens, 
2000; Stiirrner, Simon, 
Loewy, & Jerger, 2003 
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First, the focus will be on those studies which have tested the relationship 
between social identification and ingroup bias. This direction of research is based on 
Brown and colleagues' argument that, because positive social identity is mainly based 
on favourable intergroup comparisons, it could be assumed that there should be a 
positive correlation between strength of group identification and the amount of 
positive intergroup differentiation or ingroup bias (Brown, 2000). However, the 
correlations found are not uniformly positive and often tend to be weak and variable. 
For example, Mullen, Brown and Smith's (1992) meta-analytic integration of the 
results of 137 tests of the in-group bias hypothesis using the responses from 5,746 
participants, showed that the effect of ingroup bias was highly significant but of 
moderate size. They concluded that ingroup bias was stronger when the ingroup was 
made salient. 
In addition, Hinkle and Brown (1990), in a review investigating the 
relationship between identification and ingroup bias, across the 14 studies surveyed 
found that the overall correlation between identification and ingroup bias was close to 
0 (.08). While the majority (64%) of associations were positive, the mean correlation 
was not very strong (.24). 
To take one recent illustrative study based on the ingroup bias hypothesis, 
Perreault and Bourhis, (1999) tested the idea that stronger identification with the 
ingroup would be linked to stronger discriminatory behaviour in a minimal group 
paradigm setting. They also investigated the influence of other intrapersonal 
orientations such as ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and personal need for structure 
on discriminatory behaviour toward the out group. They tested if ethnocentrism, 
authoritarianism, and personal need for structure were related to greater identification 
to the ingroup and ultimately to greater discriminatory behaviour. In a two-phase 
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study, the authors first asked participants (N = 121) to complete scales assessing their 
ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and personal need for structure. In the second phase, 
the same participants were involved in a minimal group paradigm study in which an 
us-them categorization was either assigned by the experimenter or chosen by the 
participant. Thus, the researchers manipulated the degree of ingroup identification by 
giving group members the opportunity to engage in discriminatory behaviour by 
either assigning respondents to their group (the usual minimal group paradigm 
procedure) or by allowing them to choose their group membership. 
They expected that participants who chose their group membership would 
identify more strongly with the ingroup than those who were assigned to the group, 
and also that stronger identification with the ingroup would predict stronger 
discriminatory behaviour. They also aimed to test whether ethnocentrism, 
authoritarianism, and personal need for structure measured in the first phase (before 
the actual minimal group paradigm study) were related to greater identification with 
the ingroup and hence to greater discriminatory behaviour. The study also tested 
whether a combination of situationally induced ingroup identification (assigned versus 
voluntary) would interact with the individual difference orientations (i.e., 
ethnocentrism, authoritarianism, and personal need for structure) as joint predictors of 
degree of ingroup identification and discriminatory behaviour. 
The results showed that individuals who chose their group membership indeed 
identified more strongly with the ingroup and engaged in more discriminatory 
behaviour than participants who were randomly assigned to their group. However, 
they found a relatively weak correlation of .20 between the degree of in group 
identification and discriminatory behaviour. They also found that ethnocentrism 
predicted degree of identification with the ingroup, which in tum was positively 
although weakly related to discriminatory behaviour. 
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However, the weak correlations are not entirely surprising when considering 
arguments by Turner and colleagues' that a direct causal link between ingroup 
identification and ingroup bias was never advanced by social identity theory. Indeed, 
as already indicated in social identity theory, this relationship is qualified by a number 
of moderator variables. Similarly, according to self-categorization theory, it is also 
mediated by the theoretical distinct variable of salience. 
The second class of studies which are relevant involved those studies which 
tested the relationship between social identification and group behaviour including 
action or, more correctly, intention to take action. Researchers such as de Weerd and 
Klandennans (1999) focused on the relationship between group identification among 
Dutch farmers and preparedness to take action, in particular, the decision to 
participate in a political protest. They assumed that higher levels of group 
identification would stimulate participation in the protest on behalf ofthe ingroup. 
They decomposed identification into an affective component (degree of attachment to 
the ingroup which was assessed by asking farmers whether they identified strongly 
with other farmers) and a behavioural component (i.e., voluntary choice of being a 
group member which was assessed by asking farmers about their participation in a 
farmers' organization). They hypothesized that factors such as perceived permeability 
of group boundaries and the stability and legitimacy of intergroup relations would 
modifY the role of group identification. However, they found correlations of small 
size (r = .20) between identification and preparedness to participate in protest. 
Identification with farmers in the European Union did not have any impact on protest 
participation but identification with farmers at the national and regional level did 
predict protest participation (even if the correlation was of small size). Perceived 
characteristics of the intergroup situation such as the permeability of group 
boundaries, and the stability and legitimacy of intergroup relations did not have any 
impact on group identification. 
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Work by Terry, Hogg, and McKimmie (2000) showed similarly weak links 
between group membership and group behaviours. In a paper examining the effects of 
ingroup norms, salience of group membership and mode of behavioural decision-
making on attitude-behaviour relation, they tested the hypothesis that attitudes would 
be more likely to predict behaviours when they were supported by congruent group 
norms. In this research they actually assessed the salience of group membership as 
strength of identification with the group membership and investigated its effect on 
behavioural choice (i.e., career choice in psychology). They found no significant 
effects involving identification on behavioural choice. However, they found that 
participants who identified strongly with the psychology student category were more 
likely than low identifiers to be willing to engage in activities related to finding out 
more about their preferred career choice. 
Other researchers such as Ellemers, Spears, and Doosje (1998) have tested the 
link between identification and group behaviour, also showing that high identifiers 
display more group-oriented behaviour than low identifiers. They argue that the 
general pattern is that social identification or commitment will enhance conformity to 
group norms (e.g., Doosje et a!., 1999; Ellemers et a!., 2002; Veenstra & Haslam, 
2000), which results in group behaviour. Ellemers and colleagues (1998) measured 
levels of identification with their participants' major among psychology students, 
divided the group into low and high identifiers and then measured different types of 
group-oriented behaviours. They found that high identifiers displayed more group-
oriented behaviour than low identifiers. In this particular case, however, the 
behaviours observed were not collective action type behaviours but more general 
group behaviour (e.g., socialising with friends, Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1999). 
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In an industrial relations context, Veenstra and Haslam (2000) investigated the 
impact of group identification and social context on willingness to participate in 
industrial protest. In a survey-based study they manipulated the social context by 
using three types of questionnaire corresponding to the three conditions they had: a) 
referring to the conflict between the union and the present goverrnnent (conflict 
condition), b) referring to this conflict together with the goverrnnent's threat to the 
union (conflict plus threat), and c) presenting no additional infonnation (control 
condition). They anticipated that a person's willingness to participate in collective 
action would vary depending on the level of identification with the in group and they 
also expected that willingness to participate in collective action would vary as a 
function of identification in interaction with response context. They found that high 
identifiers with the trade union were more willing than low identifiers to participate in 
collective action when issues were defined in conflictual terms. The effect they found 
was highly significant but of relatively small size. Veenstra and Haslam's conclusion 
was that "collective action is not simply a product of identification, but is also shaped 
by the distinct meaning which such action assumes for high and low identifiers within 
a given context" (Veenstra & Haslam, 2000, p.l53). 
The third broad class of research involves studies which tested the relationship 
between social identification as an activist and particular forms of collective 
behaviours. An example is the paper by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995), which built on 
Milbrath and Goel's (1977) idea that group identification can become a belief system 
leading to greater political activity. In line with social identity theory, they argued that 
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people who strongly identify with their groups are more likely to take part in political 
activities. They investigated women's readiness to participate in various actions 
related to feminist issues and their social beliefs in relation to actual collective 
behaviour (they asked the same women one year after the initial investigation, how 
much they participated in political action over the last 12 months). They measured 
both identification with women as a group and identification as feminists. They 
investigated different types of action ranging from individual acts of protest (e.g. 
signing a petition, contacting media, etc), and joining and participating in a women's 
group to collective protest (e.g., breaking the law by blocking the road with a street 
demonstration, taking part in a rally or demonstration, and attending demonstrations, 
protests or rallies about women's issues). They found that reported participation 
(among other variables) was related to identification as a gender equality activist. 
Moreover, identification in this case (i.e., as a gender equality activist) was a better 
predictor of intentions to participate in action (fJ = .62), and also reported participation 
(fJ = .50) than other variables such as gender identity (i.e. identification as woman), 
relative deprivation, efficacy and collective orientation. 
Another paper of interest here is that by Simon, Loewy, Stiirmer, Weber, 
Freytag, Habig, Kammeier, and Spahlinger (1998). In two studies these authors 
examined the determinants of collective behaviour suggested by social identity and 
self-categorization theories. Amongst other variables (i.e., collective, social and 
reward motives), they focused on willingness to participate in collective action based 
on collective identification as an activist. The purpose of their research was to 
accentuate "that beyond the collective, social and reward motives usually considered 
in social movement research, collective identification is a unique predictor of group 
members' willingness to participate in collective action" (p.628). 
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Simonet a!. measured two levels of identification which were identification 
with a broader category (identification with older people in a first study and with gay 
people in the second) and identification with an action group (respectively Gray 
Panthers, and the gay movement) as predictors of willingness to participate in 
collective action. 
It was expected that identification with the social movement itself would be a 
better predictor than identification with the broader category. Their argument was that 
this must be the case because identification with the movement itself is more directly 
tied to an activist identity which typically was considered as having more specific 
implications for action. This is also consistent with Ajzen and Fishbein's (1977) 
principle of compatibility which states that attitudes predict behaviour to the extent 
that the predictor and the criterion are matched in terms oflevel of specificity or 
generality. Simonet a!. anticipated that identification with the specific group should 
be a better predictor for a specific activist behaviour, or of the willingness to engage 
in such behaviour, than the identification with the broader category. 
In the first study indeed they found that identification with an action group is a 
better predictor of collective behavioural intention (r = .57) than identification with a 
broader category (r = .31 ). In the second one the findings were consistent (r = .40), 
for identification with gay people, and for identification with the gay movement (r = 
.64). 
Simon, Stiirmer and Steffens (2000), also conducted a correlational study in 
order to investigate helping behaviour such as AIDS volunteering from a self-
categorization theory perspective. They tested the hypothesis that people should be 
more likely to display more helping behaviour toward ingroup members when their 
collective identification is strong and less when their individual identification is 
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strong. More specifically, they assessed identification with homosexuals and 
heterosexuals and additionally, identification with a particular AIDS volunteer service 
organization. They expected that for homosexual participants collective identification 
would increase willingness to help ingroup members, while the individual 
identification would decrease it. For heterosexual participants, collective 
identification would decrease willingness to help outgroup members, while the 
individual identification would increase it. Finally, the authors also predicted that 
organizational identification (i.e., identification with the AIDS volunteer service 
organization) would predict volunteerism regardless of respondents' social category. 
They also assessed some other individual motivations that might account for AIDS 
volunteerism. 
The authors found strong support for their hypotheses. As predicted, 
homosexual participants showed more willingness to volunteer when collective 
identification was high (/3 = .41) than when the individual identification was strong (/3 
=- .29). Also in line with predictions, heterosexual participants were more wiling to 
volunteer when they perceived themselves more in individual (/3 = .24) than in 
collective terms (/3 =- .20). Regardless of the sexual orientation, identification with 
the AIDS volunteer service organization predicted willingness to volunteer for both 
homosexuals (/3 = .30) and heterosexuals (/3 = .31). The total R2 for homosexual 
participants was .25 and for heterosexuals .16. It is also worth noting that for the 
overall data, the strongest predictor for willingness to volunteer was identification 
with the AIDS volunteer service organization (/3 = .23). 
More recently still, Stiirmer, Simon, Loewy, and J6rger (2003) focused on the 
U.S. fat acceptance movement and examined two possible pathways to social 
movement participation. The first possible pathway examined involved the calculation 
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of the costs and benefits of participation. Based on Klandermans' (1984, 1997) review 
of the social movement literature, the authors distinguished three motives for 
involvement in such movements. These are collective, normative, and reward 
motives. The collective motives are conceptualized as the multiplicative function of 
subjective value of the social movement specific collective goals and the expectation 
that these goals will be reached. The normative motives are conceptualized as the 
multiplicative function of the subjective quality of the expected reactions of other 
people and the personal importance of their reactions. Finally, the reward motives are 
conceptualized as a multiplicative function of value and expectancy aspects (e.g., 
losing money or time or having good time with friends). 
Of most interest here, however, is the second pathway for predicting social 
movement participation. Based on social identity theory ideas in relation to social 
movements participation (Tajfel and Turner, 1986), Stiirmer et al. (2003) argue that: 
( ... ) the willingness of members of a disadvantaged group to engage in 
collective action in behalf of their in-group increases with increasing 
collective identification. This should be the case particularly when 
group boundaries are impermeable and when status-based group 
relations are perceived to be unstable and illegitimate. (p. 72) 
More specifically, identification with a social movement organization should 
specifically increase will in guess to participate, but the authors further argue that this 
relationship should be mediated by people's inner obligation to participate. In short, 
they expected, the three motives and collective identification processes (in particular 
identification with the social movement organization of fat acceptance) to both 
contribute independently to the prediction of willingness to participate in social 
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movement activities, and also the effect of identification on willingness to participate 
would be mediated by the inner obligation to participate. 
Following multiple regression analysis with the three motives and 
identification included simultaneously in the model, it was found that, as predicted, 
collective, normative, reward motives and identification with the social movement 
organization made unique contributions to the prediction of willingness to participate 
in action. The total R2 of the model was .32. In addition, the hypothesis that the 
relationship between identification with the social movement organization and 
willingness to participate should be mediated by an inner obligation to behave as a 
good group member, was confirmed. 
It is difficult to draw a clear pattern from what is not an extensive number of 
studies. It seems however, that, those researchers who have specifically investigated 
the link between identification with an action group and collective action have found 
stronger relationships than those who have measured identification with a broad social 
category. 
There are two principal reasons for this apparent lack of support for the 
relationship between collective self-definition and group behaviours. The first is 
theoretical: social identification should be an indirect predictor of group behaviour 
and therefore particularly strong links should not be expected. The second is both a 
methodological and theoretical point: in order for social identification to be connected 
to behaviour, the group in question must be relevant to that action. 
As we have seen, the first point follows from self-categorization theory 
(Turner, 1985; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). A weak 
relationship between identification and behaviour is not surprising because social 
categorization salience, and not identification, is hypothesised to be the proximal 
cause of group behaviour. 
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The second point about the relevance of groups to action can be illustrated by 
a comment by Klandermans (2000) who noted that, even where mass action is taken 
by members of ethnic groups, this action is actually taken by people who hold shared 
opinions and are committed to the action rather than everybody who shares the 
particular ethnic background. Thus the civil rights movement in the United States in 
the 1960s did not include all African Americans, but rather that subset of African 
Americans (and others) who were in favour of improving the status ofthis group. 
Clearly, the identification with certain groups is on occasions strongly connected with 
intended collective action. However, while these groups cannot always be equated 
with social categories, they can nevertheless be about social categories, and in 
particular about attempts to change relations between social categories. 
To capture this idea I suggest that people who share opinions about different 
issues can be seen as forming opinion-based groups. The idea to focus on of opinion-
based groups constitutes a key contribution of this thesis and it will be further 
developed in Chapter 5. 
Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to (a) offer definitions for the key concepts used 
such as social identity, social identification, social identity salience, intergroup 
behaviours; (b) outline an integrated theoretical explanation of the processes involved 
in predicting collective behaviours; and (c) provide a review of the most relevant 
research investigating this issue. There are two main views in the literature concerning 
the relationship between subjective group membership and group behaviour: one 
predicts positive simple correlation between identification and displays of group 
45 
behaviour such as ingroup bias based on Brown and colleagues' reading of social 
identity theory. The other one argues, based on Turner and colleagues reading of 
social identity theory, that there is not a simple link between these factors, and, on the 
contrary, this relationship is moderated by a number of variables and mediated by 
salience. 
In any case, the empirical evidence of connections is not particularly strong. 
One solution I will propose in this thesis is that in order to reveal stronger links 
between the key variables (i.e., social identification, salience and group behaviour) it 
is necessary to research a particular type of group, opinion-based groups under 
conditions where there is intergroup conflict and high normativeness of behaviours. 
As previously mentioned in the introductory chapter, theory and past research suggest 
that the main factors which might enhance the relationship between social 
identification, salience and intergroup behaviours are: 
1. Particular social contexts (e.g. cases of relatively clear intergroup conflict); 
2. Normativeness ofbehaviours for groups (Turner, 1999; see McGarty, 2001); 
3. Commitment to a particular type of groups (i.e. opinion-based groups). 
Therefore, the next three chapters will review these theoretical points in order. 
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CHAPTER3 
INTERGROUP CONFLICT AS A CONTEXTUAL ENHANCER OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DEFINITION AS A GROUP MEMBER AND 
GROUP BEHAVIOUR 
Introduction 
The main purpose of this chapter is to point out the implications of intergroup 
conflict for the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group 
behaviour. It is argued that intergroup conflict is a contextual variable which should 
lead group members to behave more in line with the norms of the group they identify 
with. Thus, intergroup conflict is an hypothesized enhancing factor of the relationship 
between identification/salience and group behaviour. 
In this chapter I will start by presenting the classical account of intergroup 
conflict as envisaged by the realistic conflict theory. I will then present an alternative 
social identity theory account of intergroup conflict and Tajfel's distinction between 
different types of intergroup conflict which potentially have different underlying 
mechanisms and implications. The section after that will be concerned with outlining 
the antecedents of intergroup conflict as proposed by Tajfel and Turner (1979). More 
specifically, I will focus on socially shared systems of beliefs which should influence 
behaviour in relation to intergroup conflict and the distinction between social mobility 
versus social change belief systems. The main point is that people who share a social 
change belief system are more likely to see the situation in terms of social 
competition, and to act in those terms, compared to people who hold a social mobility 
belief system (and hence tend to act more in individual terms). 
I will then move on to discuss the implications of intergroup conflict as 
anticipated by social identity and self-categorization theories. As already indicated, 
the main idea here is that, under conditions of intergroup conflict, people tend to act 
more in terms of their group membership, that is the link between identification, 
salience and group behaviours should be stronger when intergroup conflict exists. 
Finally, in the last section of the chapter I will review some studies which 
investigate the role of intergroup conflict, some dealing explicitly with intergroup 
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conflict and its consequences, and some others conceptualizing the intergroup conflict 
as social identity threat. 
Realistic Conflict theory: A Classic Treatment 
of Intergroup Conflict 
One way to define social conflict as distinct from other forms of conflict is to 
consider it as conflict between large-scale socio-economic or socio-political groupings 
as distinct from conflicts inside an individual or between individuals (Tajfel, 1982). In 
that sense there is a distinction between social conflict and intergroup conflict which 
can also concern conflict between small groups. 
One of the best-known approaches to intergroup conflict is Sherifs realistic 
conflict theory (RCT). Its central hypothesis is based on the simple idea that "real 
conflict of group interests causes intergroup conflict" (Campbell, 1965, p.286), and 
this hypothesis has received strong empirical support over the years (for a review see 
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). 
Realistic conflict theory argues that, when resources are scarce, opposed group 
interests promote competition which develops into overt social conflict. Intergroup 
conflict is most intense where the real conflict of interests is greatest and where the 
conflicting parties have the most to gain by victory (Levine & Campbell, 1972). 
When groups are independent and in competition, the interplay between the actions of 
each group results in positive outcomes for the ingroup and negative outcomes for the 
other group. Consequently, through attempting to achieve beneficial outcomes for 
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themselves, the actions of the members of each group are realistically perceived to be 
calculated to frustrate the goals of the other group. 
However, Sherif noticed in his early experiments that there were displays of 
intergroup bias even before the introduction of functionally competitive relations 
between groups. Even before groups met face to face or engaged in competitive 
activities, intergroup tension and conflict were already present. It seemed that 
knowledge of the mere existence of the other group appeared to initiate ingroup bias 
(Tajfel, Flament, Billig, & Bundy, 1971). As Tajfel and Turner (1979) noted an 
institutionalized or explicit conflict of 'objective interests' between groups does not 
provide a fully adequate basis to account for many intergroup situations. For this 
reason, they introduced the distinction between subjective and objective conflict 
which is explored in the next section. 
Another Type of Conflict: Distinguishing Subjective 
from Objective Conflict 
The intergroup conflict in the Sherifs studies can be seen as having three main 
characteristics: 
1. It was institutionalized (in the sense that it was officially organized by the 
summer camp authorities); 
2. It was explicit (it dominated the life of the participants); 
3. It was objective (in the sense that, under the terms of the competition, one of 
the groups had to be the winner and the other the loser). 
However, there is empirical evidence that these three characteristics 
(institutionalization, explicitness, and objectivity) of an intergroup conflict are often 
found to be sufficient but not necessary conditions for intergroup behaviours. Thus, 
Tajfel made the distinction between objective or realistic conflict which would imply 
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a competition over resources in the sense used by Sherif and subjective conflict which 
does not necessary involve the existence of competition over resources. The minimal 
group paradigm experiments (Tajfel eta!, 1971) are the clearest examples of the fact 
that discrimination can exist in conditions of minimal group affiliations, anonymity of 
group membership, absence of conflict of interests, and absence of a previous history 
of hostility between the groups. These experiments provide evidence for the existence 
of a subjective intergroup conflict which is the result of mere awareness of 
belongingness to a particular group. However, the subjective conflict can occur also in 
the case where there is a competition not over resources but a "social competition" in 
the sense used by Turner (1975) and discussed by Tajfel (1982): 
There exists, however, another basis for competition, in which( ... ), the 
scarce resources have no value outside of the context of the 
competition itself. This is the case of groups competing to win a 
contest, to achieve higher rank, status, or prestige- the case of 'social 
competition. (p. 12) 
It is also true that objective conflicts are generally speaking, conflicts over 
power, such as wealth or territory and involve structures such as the economic, 
political and historical ones. It is useful to distinguish them from subjective conflicts 
which can be seen as usually being based on attempts to establish positive 
distinctiveness for the ingroup (Hewstone & Greenland, 2000). Although objective 
and subjective conflicts can be distinguished conceptually, they are often closely 
interrelated as in cases where subjective conflicts exist long after the initial objective 
conflict disappeared (such as cases of historical antipathies between people living in 
zones of previous ethnic frictions). There are also cases where the conflict for the 
"scarce resources" of status or prestige is "realistic" in the sense of Sherif, and it is 
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also institutionalized, that is for example, when it is explicitly defined as a contest or 
determined as such by the norms of the social situation (Tajfel, 1982). Having 
clarified what social identity theory means by subjective conflict, the next question of 
interest is when such a conflict is more likely to occur. 
Antecedents ofintergroup Conflict: Social Mobility versus Social Change 
Belief Systems and Their Implications for Intergroup Conflict 
An important role in explaining intergroup conflict is played by socially 
shared system of beliefs. The social identity theorists introduced the idea that the 
social psychology of intergroup relations should take into account "social realities as 
well as their reflection in social behaviour through the mediation of a socially shared 
systems of beliefs" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 36). 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) considered that there is another social and 
behavioural continuum which is associated with the interpersonal-intergroup 
continuum and its two extremes are "social mobility" and "social change". These 
terms refer to the "individuals' belief systems about the nature and the structure of the 
relations between social groups in their society'' (p.34). The social mobility belief 
system is based on the assumption that the society has a flexible and permeable 
structure, so that if individuals are not satisfied with the conditions imposed by the 
groups they belong to, it is possible for them though different means (e.g., talent, hard 
work, good luck, etc.) to move individually to another group which provides a more 
satisfactory social identity. 
At the other extreme, there is the social change belief system. This social 
change system of beliefs implies that "the nature and structure of the relations 
between social groups in society is perceived as characterized by marked 
stratification, making it impossible or very difficult for individuals, as individuals to 
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divest themselves of an unsatisfactory, unprivileged, or stigmatized group 
membership" (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p. 35). This is the case in which individuals 
cannot achieve social mobility by themselves and in order to be satisfied by the social 
conditions they have to act rather as a group and try to achieve a change in society. As 
Tajfel noted, the impossibility of "getting out" based on individual effort alone 
determined different forms of intergroup behaviour. Thus, the main characteristic of 
social behaviour related to the social change belief system is that: 
( ... )in the relevant intergroup situations, individuals will not interact 
as individuals, on the basis of their individual characteristics or 
interpersonal relationships, but as members of their groups standing in 
certain defined relationships to members of other groups. (Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979, p.35) 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) also pointed out that there is a close relationship 
between explicit conflict of interests and the social change system ofbeliefs. One of 
the main features of this system of beliefs is that individuals perceive it to be very 
difficult or impossible to move individually from their own group or category to 
different ones, but this is exactly the situation where there is an intense conflict of 
interests which makes it very difficult for members to resolve their situation by 
moving to the opposite group. This is also the case when movement to the opposite 
group is perceived as betrayal and can be followed by powerful sanctions from the 
original group members: 
The intensity of explicit intergroup conflict of interests is closely 
related in our cultures to the degree of opprobrium attached to the 
notion of 'renegade' or 'traitor'. This is why the belief systems 
corresponding to the 'social change' extreme of our continuum are 
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associated with intense intergroup conflicts. These conflicts can be 
conceived, therefore, as creating a subclass or subcategory of the 
subjective intergroup dichotomization characteristic of that extreme of 
the belief continuum. They share the basic feature of the 'social 
change' system of beliefs, in the sense that the multigroup structure is 
perceived as characterized by the extreme difficulty of an individual's 
moving from one group to another. (Tajfel & Turner, 1979, p.36) 
Holding one or the other system of beliefs has other consequences for 
intergroup behaviour which have to do with the variability or uniformity of 
behaviours and attitudes in a group concerning the relevant outgroup. There are two 
main statements regarding intergroup behaviours that can be drawn from the 
previously discussed ideas about the belief systems: 
I. the nearer are members of a group to the social change extreme 
of the belief-systems continuum and the intergroup extreme of the 
behavioural continuum, the more uniformity they will show in their 
behaviour toward members of the relevant outgroup; 
2. the nearer are members of a group to the social change and 
intergroup extremes, the more they will tend to treat members of the 
outgroup as undifferentiated items in a unified social category, rather than 
in terms of individuals characteristics (e.g., group stereotypes in situation 
of high intergroup conflict). 
The general implications of considering intergroup relations through the 
socially shared systems of beliefs are that, in cases where social stratification is based 
on an unequal distribution of scarce resources such as power, prestige and wealth 
between groups, the social situation can be characterized by ethnocentrism and 
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antagonism between the over- and underprivileged groups (Oberschall, 1973; Tajfel & 
Turner, 1979). More specifically, conflicts are more likely to arise and develop in 
situations where people share a social change belief system (i.e., people will tend to 
act collectively in order to achieve social change) compared to cases where people 
shared a social mobility belief system (i.e., people will tend to act individually in 
order to move to other more satisfactory social groups). Moreover, when the social 
context is characterized by impermeability and inflexible social stratification, 
intergroup tensions and overt conflicts are more likely to develop. However, the 
consequences of intergroup conflict in general are far more diverse than simple 
displays of ethnocentrism and these consequences will constitute the focus of the next 
section. 
The Social Identity Perspective on the Link between Intergroup Conflict and 
Group Behaviour 
Giving the implications of this topic, there is a considerable amount of 
research investigating the consequences of different types of intergroup conflict. 
Previous studies generally showed that intergroup conflict enhances intragroup 
morale, cohesiveness, and cooperation (Fiedler, 1967; Kalin & Marlowe, 1968; 
Vinacke, 1957). Moreover, real conflict of interests not only creates antagonistic 
intergroup relations but also heighten identification with, and positive attachment to, 
the ingroup (see Tajfel & Turner, 1986, p.8). However, identification with the ingroup 
received little attention from RCT theorists, being considered more an 
epiphenomenon of intergroup conflict. 
Alternatively, Tajfel and associates introduced social identity theory in order 
not to replace RCT as a valid explanation of intergroup conflict, but to supplement the 
theory in some essential aspects, such as the role of identification with the ingroup. 
Tajfe and Turner (1986) pointed out the important role played by identification in 
relation to intergroup conflict: 
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As treated by RCT, these identifications are associated with certain 
patterns of intergroup relations but the theory does not focus either 
upon the processes under! ying the development and maintenance of 
group identity nor upon the possibly autonomous effects upon the in-
group and intergroup behaviour of these 'subjective' aspects of group 
membership. (p. 8) 
In terms of implications of intergroup conflict for behaviours and from a social 
identity perspective, intergroup conflict should increase the salience of group 
memberships and thereby lead to attitudes and behaviours that are more in line with 
group norms and values. As Tajfel and Turner (1986) argue: 
It could be assumed, in accordance with our common experience, that 
the more intense is an intergroup conflict, the more likely it is that the 
individuals who are members of the opposite groups will behave 
toward each other as a function of their respective group membership 
rather than in terms of their individual characteristics or interindividual 
relationships. (p.l 0) 
In other words, during overt conflict, group membership becomes salient and 
thus the individuals tend to become depersonalized, so there is a shift from personal to 
social identity. As pointed out by Hewstone and Greenland (2000, p.13 8), the 
consequences of overt intergroup conflict are that "a concern with the in-group takes 
over from a concern with the self; ingroup favouritism replaces self-favouritism; the 
self is stereotyped as an ingroup member; and the ingroup is viewed as coherent and 
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homogenous" There is, of course, an explicit opposition in this quote between the idea 
of self and the ingroup that is not entailed in self-categorization theory. 
Brewer (1997) also proposed three principles which are likely to operate in 
any situation in which a group membership becomes salient, so that they are 
applicable in the cases of intergroup conflict, too. These three principles are: 
I. The intergroup accentuation principle, which refers to assimilation within 
category boundary and contrast between categories (members of the ingroup 
are seem as more similar to the self then members of the outgroup ); 
2. The in group favouritism principle, which refers to the selective generalization 
of positive affects such as trust liking, to ingroup members but not outgroup 
members; 
3. The social competition principle, which refers to the fact that intergroup social 
comparison is typically perceived in terms of competition, rather than 
cooperation with the outgroup. 
Tajfel and Turner (1979) made a further distinction concerning the behaviour 
toward the outgroup in situations of intergroup conflict. They suggest that such 
behaviour can be divided into instrumental and noninstrumental behaviours. 
Instrumental behaviours refers to actions which aim to cause the ingroup to win the 
competition, while noninstrumental behaviour is gratuitous discrimination against the 
out group and does not have any meaning outside the context of intergroup relations. 
One example of such noninstrumental behaviour is the attribution of negative 
stereotypes to the outgroup: a set of traits is attributed to all members of a group or 
category such that all individuals are assumed to be more similar to each other and 
different from members of other categories. Through this strategy, the out group is 
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seen as more predictable, discrimination becomes more justifiable, and the ingroup 
can better positively discriminate from the outgroup (Hewstone & Greenland, 2000). 
Self-categorization theory argues that intergroup conflict increases salience 
and therefore relationships that are not present (or too weak) otherwise, might be 
detected in conditions of conflict. Intergroup conflict increases salience through 
comparative fit (i.e., ingroup members seem more similar compared to outgroup 
members, so the differences between ingroup and outgroup should be considerable 
enhanced) providing that this is consistent with the social meaning of category. As 
Haslam, Turner, Oakes, Reynolds, and Doosje (2002, p.l63) noted in relation to 
comparative fit: 
( ... ) a New Yorker and a Californian are more likely to see 
themselves (and be seen) as Americans at the Olympic Games (an 
intergroup context) than at the Superbowl (an intragroup context). 
Conflict, however, might also increase perceiver readiness by making the outgroup 
more accessible and relevant because of the threat it poses. 
Beside the classical intergroup conflict studies of Sherif and colleagues, there 
is a considerable number of studies in the literature investigating the effects of 
intergroup conflict on different aspects of self-definition as a group member (e.g., 
identification, salience, self-stereotyping, etc.) and behaviours. It is not surprising that 
over the years, researchers have found intergroup conflict to be a topic of increasing 
interest. Thus, the following section will be concerned with reviewing some of the 
existing studies which I believe are most relevant for showing the effects of 
intergroup conflict on different aspects of self-definition as a group member and 
behaviours. 
Review of Studies Investigating the Effects oflntergroup Conflict 
The studies investigating intergroup conflict can be regarded as falling into 
three main categories: 
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I. Studies which explicitly deal with intergroup conflict and its consequences on 
group behaviour; 
2. Studies which approach intergroup conflict in terms of threat to social 
identity; 
3. Studies which approach intergroup conflict as a trigger for negative emotions; 
4. Studies which approach intergroup conflict focusing on crowd disorder (see 
Table 3.1). 
Table 3.1. Different approaches and studies on intergroup conflict. 
Approaches Examples of studies Background theories General hypotheses 
1. Classic treatment of Jackson (2002); Stephan, Social identity theory, Conflict moderates the 
intergroup conflict Boniecki, Ybarra, self-categorization relationship between 
Bettencourt, Ervin, theory, realistic conflict ingroup identification 
Jackson, LA., McNatt, & theory. and group behaviour 
Renfro (2002); including displays of 
ingroup bias; perceived 
intergroup conflict 
predicts negative racial 
attitudes 
2. Intergroup conflict as Spears, Doosje, & Social identity theory, Under identity threat the 
threat to social identity Ellemers ( 1997), self-categorization relationship between 
EJlemers, Wilke, & van theory, realistic conflict identification and group 
Knippenberg (1993), theory behaviour (e.g., in group 
Grant (1993); bias, derogation, coping 
Branscombe & W ann strategies, etc) is 
(1994); Grant & Brown stronger. 
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(1995); Dietz-Uhler and 
Murrell (1998); Crocker 
& Luhtanen (1990); 
Veenstra & Haslam 
(2000). 
3. Intergroup conflict as a Mackie & Smith (1998); Intergroup emotion Intergroup conflict and 
trigger for negative Mackie, Devos, & Smith theory; Self- perception of ingroup 
emotions (2000); Devos, Silver, categorization theory; power (relative to 
Mackie, & Smith (2002). outgroup) trigger 
negative emotions (i.e., 
anger) and behaviours. 
4. Intergroup conflict as Reicher (1996); Stott & Social identity theory, Co11ective behaviours 
in crowd disorders Reicher (1998); Stott, self-categorization are better explained in a 
Hutchinson, & Drury theory, realistic conflict dynamic, intergroup 
(2001 ). theory, crowd manner which consider 
behaviour approaches the interplay between 
perceptions and self-
categorization ofboth 
groups in conflict. 
Despite the volume of research on intergroup conflict, few studies have 
explicitly tested the effect of intergroup conflict on the relationship between 
identification/salience, and group behaviour. One example of a study dealing directly 
with intergroup conflict and its antecedents was conducted by Jackson (2002). He 
focused on identification and perceived intergroup conflict as predictors of different 
intergroup attitudes. Using self-selected ingroups and outgroups (i.e., participants had 
to think about various groups they belonged to and then write down one they 
especially valued; they also had to write down a relevant out group), he included a 
three-dimensional scale of identification in order to assess the impact of different 
aspects of identification on attitudes toward the in group and outgroup such as 
feelings, thoughts and behavioural tendencies toward the ingroup and outgroup. 
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The intergroup bias score was calculated by subtracting the average outgroup 
evaluation score from the average ingroup evaluation score. Furthermore, in that 
study, perceived intergroup conflict was assessed on a twenty-one-item scale (e.g., 
"When outgroup members obtain their goals, the ingroup is hindered", "General 
relations between the ingroup and outgroup are cooperative") in order to examine the 
impact of this important social context variable. 
The hypotheses were formulated on the basis of both social identity theory and 
self-categorization theory. It was expected that perceived intergroup conflict should 
moderate the relationship between ingroup identification and ingroup bias. That is, the 
relationship between identification and ingroup bias should have been significantly 
stronger when perceived conflict was high. Moreover, perceived conflict was 
predicted to be related to expressions of ingroup bias because it should have 
stimulated negative views of the outgroup but have little impact on views of the 
mgroup. 
In support of social identity ideas, the results of the study showed that the 
relationship between evaluative and cognitive dimensions of identification on group 
attitudes was significantly moderated by perceptions of conflict. Perceived conflict 
significantly interacted with the following dimensions of group identification: ingroup 
attraction, self-categorization, affective ties, and ingroup bias. Under low levels of 
perceived conflict, participants with high levels of ingroup attraction expressed 
greater ingroup bias than those with low levels of ingroup attraction. This pattern was 
further accentuated, however, when the perception of conflict was high, in that, self-
categorization, and affective ties, were associated with more bias when conflict was 
perceived as high. Thus, under conditions of high conflict, the link between self-
definition as a group member and ingroup bias was stronger. 
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Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra, Bettencourt, Ervin, Jackson, McNatt, and Renfro 
(2002) investigated the effects of perceptions of intergroup conflict along with other 
variables (i.e., negative contact, strength of ingroup identification, perceived status 
inequality, negative stereotyping) on negative racial attitudes for groups of Blacks and 
Whites. They had predicted that the relationship between perceived intergroup 
conflict (plus the other investigated variables) and negative racial attitudes should be 
mediated by various types of threat such as realistic (i.e., threats to the existence of 
the group) and symbolic threats (i.e., perceived group differences in morals, values, 
standards, beliefs, and attitudes) and intergroup anxiety (i.e., feeling of threat 
experienced by people during intergroup interactions because of concerns about 
negative outcomes for the self). 
Perceived intergroup conflict was measured on a four-item scale consisting of 
items like: "Relations between Blacks and Whites have always been characterized by 
conflict" and "Although sometimes it is not visible, there is a racial battle going on in 
this country" (p.1246). 
Negative racial attitudes were measured using a previously employed scale 
(Stephan, Ybarra, & Bachman, 1999; Stephan, Ybarra, Martinez, Schwarzwald, & 
Tur-Kaspa, 1998) that was designed to reflect negative affect associated with 
outgroups. They measured twelve different evaluative and emotional reactions toward 
the outgroup including hostility, admiration, dislike, acceptance, superiority, 
affection, disdain, approval, hatred, sympathy, rejection, and warmth. 
They found that for both groups (Black and Whites) the perceived intergroup 
conflict predicted negative racial attitudes, and this relationship was also mediated by 
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the different types ofthreat and intergroup anxiety investigated. Realistic threats, 
symbolic threats and intergroup anxiety all significantly predicted negative racial 
attitudes for both Blacks and Whites. Finally, perceived intergroup conflict predicted 
realistic threats, symbolic threats and intergroup anxiety for both Black and White 
groups. 
Another way in which intergroup conflict may be evident is through 
manipulation of social identity threat because such threats can also be seen as a form 
of subjective conflict. These researchers including Ellemers, Spears, Doosje and 
Branscombe have focused not so much on the effects of intergroup conflict but on 
social identity threat on different outcomes such as identification, salience, self-
stereotyping, and discrimination. Tajfel and Turner (1979; Tajfel, 1978) suggested 
three general ways in which people might react when their social identity is 
threatened: a) social mobility (the enhancement of social identity through moving to a 
group of higher status); b) social creativity (e.g., strategies such as comparing the 
ingroup with the outgroup on different dimensions); and, c) social competition (i.e., 
ingroup members can compete directly with the outgroup to attain positive 
distinctiveness). 
However, research on social identity threat is mainly based on an 
interpretation of social identity theory that when group boundaries are not permeable 
the low status group should be more prone to discrimination, and also to other forms 
of collective behaviours, and this should be especially true when group social identity 
is threatened in some way by a higher status outgroup. Moreover, it is argued that one 
reason why identification with the group does not always predict ingroup bias, relates 
to the intergroup context, and that social identity threat is one factor that should make 
the identification-bias relationship stronger. Thus, these researchers are primarily 
interested in outcomes such as increased identification, discrimination and group 
behaviour, when social identity is threatened and they are usual! y manipulating 
intergroup conflict through status and hierarchical relationships between groups. 
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A good example of such research is provided by the work of Ellemers, Wilke, 
and van Knippenberg (1993). In two experiments, Ellemers and colleagues tested the 
prediction that legitimacy of low status, permeability of group boundaries and 
stability of group status (identity threat) will impact upon ingroup identification, 
ingroup favouritism and individual and collective attempts to achieve social mobility. 
Their main hypotheses regarding the low status groups were that illegitimate 
treatment of a group as a whole, resulting in low group status, would determine 
stronger ingroup identification then legitimate assignment oflow status. Secondly, 
they predicted that in the case when a group has an illegitimate low status position, 
group members will focus more on opportunities for collective status improvement 
(which depend on the stability or instability of group status) than in the case of 
legitimate group status. In other words, if we consider the condition of illegitimate 
low status and impermeability of group boundaries as the high threat condition, then, 
in this case, ingroup identification as well as collective attempts to change or improve 
the group status (i.e., group behaviour) should increase. In a first experiment they 
found that illegitimate assignment oflow status to the participants increased in-group 
identification. In a second experiment they found that illegitimate allocation of 
individual participants to a low-status group decreased group identification. Finally, 
attempts to acquire higher status individually (individual mobility) or collectively 
(group mobility) were more strongly affected by prospects for status improvement 
than by the legitimacy manipulations. 
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Other studies, which also support the idea that threat to identity and 
identification may interact in order to produce group behaviour, have been conducted 
by Spears, Doosje, and Ellemers (1997). In four studies, they investigated the effects 
of self-perceived or public-perceived threat to group status on self-stereotyping for 
people with high or low levels of ingroup identification. They manipulated social 
identity threat by manipulating status, so that the low status condition consisted of a 
combination of comparison groups (i.e., psychology students versus art students, and 
psychology students versus physics students) and dimensions (i.e., intelligence and 
creative). In the high status condition, the psychology ingroup compared favourably 
with either arts students with respect to their intelligence or with physics students with 
respect to creativity. Self-stereotyping, defined as the perception of the self as a 
prototypical group member (Turner, 1987), was operationalized in terms of general 
similarity of self to the group prototype. They predicted that high and low identifiers 
would respond differently to a threat to their group status, such that self-stereotyping 
would be reduced for low identifiers but enhanced for high identifiers. 
They found that, in general, high identifiers perceived themselves as more 
prototypical for their group than low identifiers and there was a significant interaction 
between group status and identification. That is, this pattern was even stronger when 
the identity of the group was threatened. Under threat conditions, low identifiers 
tended to choose individualistic strategies of dissociating from their group, while high 
identifiers in the same situation tended to adopt group-level strategies and still see 
themselves as prototypical for their group. 
Another study by Grant (1993) showed that identification moderated the effect 
of threat on ingroup bias in the context of gender relations (i.e., groups of men and 
women discussing issues related to gender). He found that positive intergroup 
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differentiation along gender-stereotypic dimensions was obtained when group identity 
was threatened, especially for people with high levels of identification. 
In another study, Branscombe and W ann (1994) tested the effects of social 
identity threat using exposure to a video clip in which the ingroup representative 
either won or lost a world boxing title to a member of the outgroup. Although there 
was a strong correlation between ingroup identification and ingroup favouritism 
(more exactly outgroup derogation in this particular case) in both conditions (i.e, 
threat and non-threat), the correlation was even stronger under threat. 
Grant and Brown (1995), besides threat to social identity, also tested the 
effects of collective relative deprivation conceptualized as the result of a social 
comparison implying that the person making the comparison was not receiving 
entitled valued resources, on behaviours such as intention to engage in collective 
protest actions and expressions of ethnocentrism. They investigated the realistic 
conflict theory prediction that perceived threat to valued resources is an important 
factor in ethnocentrism and also would be an incentive to collective action (Campbell, 
1965; Sherif, 1966). Perceived threat was conceptualized as the perception that an 
objective conflict of interest existed between ingroup and outgroup (i.e., they actually 
created a threat from the outgroup to the values and beliefs shared by the members of 
the ingroup ). The authors also assessed behavioural intentions to engage in individual 
and collective protest action, ethnocentrism (i.e. in the form of dislike for the 
outgroup and ingroup-outgroup differentiation), and strength of group identification. 
The participants were divided into two groups which were seated in separate but 
adjoining rooms and they were informed that both groups would be working on the 
same task (to develop and tape record their position on a particular social issue). 
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They also based their argument on the social identity theory idea of the social-
change belief system suggesting that when status is illegitimate and unstable, 
subordinate or lower status group members would strive collectively for changes in 
society which were beneficial for the ingroup through directly confronting the 
dominant outgroup. However, regardless of illegitimacy and instability of group 
status, direct threats to social identity may increase the likelihood of group members 
engaging in collective action to counter this threat. 
Thus, the authors explored the impact of threat to social identity (in the form 
of an attack on central, shared ingroup attitudes, values, beliefs, norms, and group 
practice, by rejecting and derogating their nature and importance) on collective 
behaviours, particularly protest behaviours, as well as expressions of ethnocentrism 
along attitudinal and stereotype dimensions. They predicted that such threats to social 
identity, would generate negative reactions both by an increased likelihood to engage 
in collective protest and by a more intense expression of ethnocentrism toward the 
outgroup. Additionally, they predicted that the relationship between ingroup 
identification and ingroup bias should be stronger in the condition of high relative 
deprivation and threat. 
However, Grant and Brown found that only collective relative deprivation had 
an impact on collective social protest, and that the threat to social identity 
manipulation did not influence the choice of the collective protest. Regarding 
ethnocentrism, manipulation of collective relative deprivation resulted in a strong 
ethnocentric reaction, while threat to social identity increased the likelihood of 
derogation of the outgroup. The threat to social identity manipulation had a main 
effect only on the ingroup differentiation measures, so that groups in the high threat 
conditions differentiated the outgroup from the ingroup more strongly than did groups 
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in the low threat conditions. Most importantly, however, in line with the predictions, 
they found that the correlations between identification and intergroup differentiation 
or ingroup bias were stronger in the deprived-high threat condition. 
Dietz-Uhler and Murrell (1998) examined reactions and coping responses to 
threatened group identity in two studies. In a first study they expected that people who 
identified more strongly with a group would react more strongly and would be more 
likely to engage in coping responses when their positive identity was threatened than 
people not identifying with a group. In a second study they hypothesized that people 
who identified strongly with their group and who engaged in coping responses would 
feel better about themselves and their group. 
Manipulation of threat consisted of participants (students at a U.S. university) 
reading a fictitious news statement indicating that the U.S. Board of Education 
recently completed a rating of textbooks used in all universities and colleges. The 
news statement asserted that the quality of books reflected the quality of education. In 
the low threat condition the respective university received a good score (90 out of 100 
possible points) and in high threat condition a poor one (30 out of 100 possible 
points). Participants also completed different self-esteem, ingroup bias, and 
organizational commitment scales. 
Although they found that identification with their university significantly 
predicted university commitment, academic self-esteem, and general self-esteem, 
there were no main effects of threat or interactions of social identity and threat. The 
results of the coping responses measures (i.e., degree of affirmation and amount of 
group-serving attribution) showed that people in the high threat condition made more 
positive affirmations than those in the low threat condition. 
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In the second study, the hypothesis tested was that when people who strongly 
identify with a group make group-serving attributions (i.e., internal attributions for 
success and external attributions for failure), they will have higher self-esteem than 
people who do not identifY strongly with the group and who do not make group-
serving attribution. For this study, the results showed a three-way interaction of social 
identity, threat, and type of attribution for self-esteem. 
Overall, the results in both studies showed that people tend to act defensively 
when their group is threatened and there is a tendency for this reaction to be especially 
high among those who identifY strongly with the ingroup. Moreover, the authors 
suggest that this defensive reaction seems to serve the purpose of restoring or at least 
protecting a person's self-esteem. 
From a slightly different perspective, a piece of research by Crocker and 
Luhtanen (1990) dealt with the relationship between threat to social identity and 
ingroup enhancement/outgroup derogation. They made the distinction between 
personal self-esteem and collective self esteem and, based on research on personal 
self-esteem predicted that people with a high collective self-esteem should be more 
likely to react to social identity threat (e.g., threats to collective self-esteem) by 
derogating the outgroup and enhancing the ingroup. 
Based on theories regarding the self-concept, they also argued that, when there 
is threat to their social identity, people maintain a positive social identity by 
identifYing or creating favourable comparisons between the ingroup and outgroup. 
Consequently, individuals will discriminate against or derogate the members of the 
outgroup, in order to create and maintain the favourable comparisons between them 
and outgroup, which results in a positive social identity and high collective self 
esteem. 
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In a study using the minimal group paradigm, Crocker and Luhtanen ( 1990) 
manipulated threat by telling participants that they performed well or poorly in a task. 
Then, authors measured personal and collective self-esteem, and participants received 
information about the average performance of their group. As predicted, the results 
showed that participants high in collective self-esteem rated above-average and 
below-average scorers on the test in an ingroup-enhancing way, while those 
participants low in collective self-esteem did not. Their conclusion was that collective 
self-esteem is an individual variable that may moderate the attempt to maintain a 
positive social identity. 
It is also worth mentioning that there is another series of papers focusing on 
the effects of interaction between threat to identity and identification not specifically 
on group behaviour but on other related effects and outcomes. For example, Turner, 
Hogg, Turner, and Smith (1984) investigated the effect of threat and identification on 
group cohesiveness, showing that "socio-emotional attraction to the group" or group 
cohesiveness increased after failure and defeat, especially under conditions of high 
initial commitment to the group, while Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995) found 
that social identity threat and identification impacted upon group variability, that is 
under conditions of threat, high identifiers perceived less variability within both 
ingroup and outgroup than low identifiers. 
An example of research that integrates classic treatment of intergroup conflict 
with approaches of intergroup conflict as threat to social identity is a study done by 
Veenstra and Haslam (2000) in which they manipulated both perceived intergroup 
conflict and threat to social identity in union context. More specifically, they explored 
the role ofboth intergroup context (i.e., intergroup conflict) and identification on 
willingness to participate in an industrial protest in a survey-type study employing 
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three conditions: a control condition (no reference was made to the broad context), a 
conflict condition (explicit reference was made to the conflict between the 
government and unions), and finally, a conflict and threat condition (reference was 
made to the threat that government reform posed to union members). The authors 
expected that willingness to participate in collective action would vary as a function 
of identification in interaction with the intergroup context (e.g., intergroup conflict, 
threat from out group). They argue that: 
this is because the meaning of collective action conferred by different 
contexts - and the impact of context on the salience of a shared in-
group categorization- should vary depending on the participant's level 
of identification. (p.l60) 
In particular, they anticipated that reference to conflict alone should increase 
the salience of union membership for high identifiers and these tendencies should be 
further affected by references to the threat posed by the outgroup to union members 
(i.e., the government). 
Veenstra and Haslam (2000) found that high union identifiers were generally 
more wiling to participate in collective action than low identifiers. Regarding the 
intergroup context manipulation, all participants showed more willingness to 
participate in collective action in the conflict and threat condition than in the control 
condition. The results also revealed that high identifiers were more willing to 
participate in collective action in the conflict and conflict plus threat conditions than 
in the control condition. On the contrary, for low identifiers, the willingness to 
participate in collective action did not seem to be strongly affected by the intergroup 
context manipulation. The authors point out the importance of the intergroup context 
explaining that, collective action seems to be: 
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( ... ) not simply a product of identification, but it is also shaped by the 
distinct meaning which such action assumes for high and low 
identifiers within a given context. (p.l53) 
In conclusion, this research, generally suggests that intergroup conflict, in the 
form of threat to social identity indeed plays an important role in the processes 
relating to self-definition as a group member and different forms of group behaviour. 
Social identity threat is a context-determining variable and not taking it into 
consideration might be responsible for the inconsistent results concerning the link 
between identification and group behaviour. 
Another slightly different approach on intergroup conflict comes from 
intergroup emotion theory (Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, 2002; Mackie, Devos, & 
Smith, 2000; Mackie & Smith, 1998). 1bis approach takes into account emotions as 
determinants of intergroup attitudes and behaviours. Following from self-
categorization theory, it holds that when a social identity becomes salient people come 
to define themselves in terms of this group membership, and this specific group 
membership becomes part of the self, and acquires emotional significance. Thus, 
"( ... )people do not only define themselves as group members; they also care about 
situations or events affecting the ingroup" (Devos et al., 2002, p.112). This approach 
is of relevance here to the extent to which the theory maintains that different forms of 
intergroup conflict and relations between groups trigger specific emotions and that 
"specific emotions also correspond to different patterns of behavioral responses" 
(Devos eta!, 2002, p. 113). More specifically, as the intergroup emotion theorists 
noted: 
There is no doubt that a wide range of specific emotions may arise in 
intergroup situations. For example, a threatening and powerful 
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outgroup is likely to be feared. Conflicts between groups often produce 
anger. If an outgroup is blocking tbe goals and actions of the ingroup, 
frustration will occur. Disgust arises when an outgroup is appraised as 
violating moral standards ( ... ). In addition, these emotional reactions 
will often prompt specific intergroup behaviour. (p.lll) 
In order to test these ideas Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) created an 
appropriate context for emotional reactions by using subjective conflict (i.e., conflict 
of values) between groups supporting different views on some attitudinal issues (e.g. 
illegal drug use, rights of homosexual couples, etc.). The aim of this research was to 
investigate to what extent the perceived power of tbe ingroup relative to the outgroup 
would trigger negative emotions and action tendencies. 
In a first correlational study on illegal drug use, they addressed the issue that 
negative emotional reactions and behaviours (or more correctly behavioral intentions) 
should be differentiated in an intergroup context. The authors introduced a conflict of 
values, explaining to participants that disagreement between people is based on tbe 
fact that people often do not share the same values. An initial pretest showed tbat tbe 
issue of illegal drugs related to a conflict between social order (stability of society) 
and freedom values (freedom of action and thought), and tbat two groups 
corresponded to tbese two currents of opinion (i.e., tbe participants categorized 
themselves as supporting one or tbe other opinion on the illegal drug issue). Mackie 
and colleagues also measured group identification, appraisal of collective support 
(i.e., perception oftbe ingroup of being either stronger or weaker than the outgroup), 
emotional reactions (i.e., anger and fear), offensive and defensive action tendencies 
and the importance of social order and freedom as values for tbe ingroup and 
outgroup. 
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As the authors expected, participants perceived a clear value conflict between 
ingroup and outgroup. In addition, two negative emotions (i.e., anger and fear) could 
clearly be differentiated in this intergroup context. They also examined the extent to 
which group identification and appraisal of collective support were related to specific 
emotional reactions and action tendencies. They found that identification and 
appraisal of collective support predicted expression of anger toward the outgroup and 
the willingness to take action against it. The more ingroup members identified with 
the ingroup, and appraised it as being stronger than the outgroup, the more they 
expressed anger and were willing to move against the outgroup. They found in 
addition that anger mediated the effects of group identification and appraisal of 
collective support on offensive action tendencies. Thus, the results of this study show 
that the more individuals saw themselves as group members, the more they 
experienced specific emotions and the more they were willing to act accordingly. 
In another study, Mackie and colleagues created subjective conflict by using 
the issue ofrights of homosexual couples, and actually manipulated the appraisal of 
collective support for the ingroup relative to the outgroup. Furthermore, they 
examined the impact of this manipulation on emotional reactions and behavioural 
intentions. Similarly to the first study, the authors found that such conflicts over 
values provoke anger, regardless of the perceived power of ingroup in relation to the 
outgroup. Finally, these studies point to the fact that self-definition in terms of certain 
group membership is predictive for group behaviour but conflict and the negative 
emotions triggered by conflict can modify the pattern of the relationship. Thus, 
offensive actions toward the outgroup can be explained not only through group 
identification mechanisms but also by the emotional charge of the intergroup context. 
In this sense, the intergroup emotion account supports the idea that intergroup conflict 
is a contextual factor which should play a determining role in the processes 
underlying group behaviours. 
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Finally, there is another approach to intergroup conflict which focuses 
specifically on explaining collective action including violent behaviour from a social 
identity and crowd behaviour perspective. This approach is represented mainly by 
researchers such as Reicher, Stott, Drury and Hutchinson. They investigated various 
violent social events ranging from violent confrontations between students and police 
to football collective violence. Their analysis of collective violence in terms of 
intergroup dynamics is based on social identity and crowd behaviour accounts. 
Following Tajfel (1978, 1982) and Turner (1982), Stott and Reicher (1998b) argue 
that: 
( ... )any given person may adopt a range of social identities 
corresponding to the various social categories of which they consider 
themselves to be a member. This range will differ from person to 
person as a function both of their own choices and of what is allowed 
to them by others( ... ). When individuals act in terms of any specific 
social identification, they will conform to the norms and beliefs, which 
define the relevant category and react to others in terms of whether or 
not they form part of the same category. (p.358). 
Based on a number of studies, they discovered a specific pattern of crowd 
disorder. Initially the crowd is composed of individuals who consider themselves as 
belonging to different social categories, more specifically most of the people from a 
crowd define themselves in opposition to other violent subgroupings. They argue that, 
to the extent to which the opposing subgroup (e.g. police, army, etc.) perceive the 
crowd as a homogenous threat and treat them in an undiscriminated way, this alters 
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their individual self-perceptions, and they come to see each other as sharing a 
common group membership. Moreover, because they perceive themselves to share a 
illegitimate and repressed common fate, resistance to the opposing group is perceived 
as an appropriate response. Thus, "even if the violence of some in the crowd may 
provoke police action, this action is a necessary component of processes of escalation 
( ... )."(Stott & Reicher, 1998b, p.359). 
Reicher (1996) uses this social identity model of crowd behaviour to explain 
initiation and development of collective conflict in the case of a violent confrontation 
between students and police during a demonstration held in November 1988 (the so 
called 'Battle of Westminster'). His analysis concentrates on how the conflict 
originated and how it developed and he used a variety of sources including television 
reports, newspaper articles, student magazines, written accounts of participants' 
experiences, and tape-recorded interviews. Finally, a group of seven participants were 
shown a video-compilation of the events and then they were asked questions about 
their perception and reactions to the events portrayed in the video. 
Following the analysis of these materials, he advanced three hypotheses that 
may account for the processes by which crowd members become involved in conflict: 
1. Crowd members will only enter into conflict with an outgroup where: (a) 
conflictual behaviour is seen as legitimate, (b) outgroup action is seen to violate 
concepts of proper social practice, and (c) conflictual tactics are considered an 
effective way to meet desired ends. 
2. The legitimacy of conflict, the concepts of proper social practice, and both 
identification of ends as well as the calculation of whether these ends will be 
reached are all defined by reference to the collective beliefs of the relevant social 
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category. Hence, in order to understand which actions may initiate crowd conflict 
it is necessary to understand the perspectives of the groups which are involved. 
3. The incidents out of which crowd behaviour originates are not incidental to the 
underlying causes of conflict. Rather, they are the points at which conceptual 
differences in the concept of proper social practice as held by different groups 
become concretely enacted. (Reicher, 1996, p.l29) 
Clearly, the model proposed proved to be very useful for understanding the 
mechanisms of conflict in general and more specifically of crowd violence in real life 
settings from an intergroup dynamic perspective. As Reicher (1996) noted, "there is 
clear match between respondent's accounts oflegitimacy and the onset of conflict, 
between their accounts of their changing participation in the event and between these 
broadening self-definitions and the increasing homogeneity of the crowd( ... )" 
(p.132). 
In another paper, Stott and Reicher (1998a) investigating collective football 
crowd disorder this model was also applied. The event analyzed was the violent 
confrontation between England supporters and Italian police during the 1990 World 
Cup. The authors argue that collective football violence needs to be understood in 
terms of intergroup dynamics rather than in terms the personal characteristics of 
crowd members (e.g., hooligans versus police). 
The analysis of this account was based mainly on one of the authors' direct 
observations as a participant in the events. Similar to the previous account, the role of 
interactive processes in drawing football fans into collective conflict was evident. It 
was shown that treating members of the crowd as a homogenous mass and a potential 
threat resulted in violent responses from the crowd members. That is: 
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( ... ) where police treat all fans as if they are potentially dangerous and 
treat all forms of collective self-assertion (singing, chanting, marching, 
etc.) as actual danger, then many supporters may experience what they 
perceive as legitimate rights to be denied ( ... ) and /or may experience 
what they perceive as illegitimate forms of external constraint ( ... ). In 
either case, resistance to police action can be construed by participants 
as a reassertion of rights rather than commitment to conflictual norms. 
(Stott & Reicher, 1998a) 
More recently, Stott, Hutchinson and Drury (2001) investigated the incidents 
that took place during the 1998 Football World Cup Finals in Marseilles, France 
where English supporters were involved. In the analysis of these events the role of 
dynamic intergroup context was again central. The authors argue that such violent 
incidents cannot be explained simply in terms of conflictual norms to which the 
'hooligans' are committed. More specifically, where the outgroup actions were 
perceived as illegitimate from the ingroup perspective, the ingroup members redefined 
their identity in such a way that violent action against the outgroup comes to be seen 
as legitimate and even necessary, in order to protect ingroup members. On the 
contrary, where the outgroup hostility was not present and the ingroup was not 
perceived as 'hooligans' by the outgroup, ingroup members also define themselves 
through contrast with the 'hooligans'. 
The data were collected in June 1998, during an etlmographic study of football 
fans. The main data sources employed by the researchers were field notes consisting 
of observations, informal conversations, unstructured and semi-structured interviews, 
songs and chants, and descriptions of specific events, places, and people. Other data 
included videotapes filmed during some of the events, newspaper articles, television, 
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video and radio programs, and questionnaires obtained from the Football Supporters 
Association. Given the nature of the data, they were primarily analyzed through 
qualitative methods. The analysis focused on both English and Scottish supporters and 
it revealed the different factors (for both categories) which can explain the dynamic 
involved in the subsequent 'crowd disorder' incidents. For English supporters these 
factors were: 
I. Initial perceptions of the normative dimensions of English football fan 
identity (i.e., English supporters described their intentions and normative 
dimensions of their ingroup in terms of non-violent and legitimate 
activities); 
2. A hostile intergroup context (i.e., supporters from the sample had contact 
with Marseilles youth described a general hostility from them toward 
English supporters); 
3. Variation in the form and content of English supporters identity (i.e., 
conflict came to be understood by people involved as a legitimate response 
to protect ingroup members from hostile outgroup action); 
4. 'Englishness' defined through a continuing history of antagonistic 
relations to other national groupings (i.e., supporters talked about previous 
similar situations in which they found themselves). 
For the Scottish supporters these factors were: 
1. Perceptions of the normative dimensions of Scottish football fan 
identity (i.e., similarly to the English supporters, Scottish fans 
described the ingroup in terms of non-violent, legitimate actions); 
2. A non-hostile intergroup context (i.e., in contrast to the English 
supporters, Scottish fans perceived the outgroup behaviours as 
legitimate); 
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3. Variation in the form and content of Scottish supports identity (i.e., 
Scottish supporters positively differentiate their own group identity 
from the perceived group identity of English supporters; they 
defined the ingroup norms and values in tenns of"social relations in 
the distal intergroup context", p.372); 
4. Scottishness defined within a continuing history of positive 
intergroup relations (i.e., Scottish supporters perceived a continuity 
of positive relations between them and other national group in 
previous international tournaments). 
This analysis applied to both English and Scottish supporters is in line with the 
Elaborated Social Identity Model (ESIM) which emphasizes the more general point 
that: 
( ... ) crowd events are characteristically intergroup encounters. As 
such, identity processes within a crowd do not simply determine 
collective action in an one-way process; rather, identity processes 
involve the dynamic of intergroup relationships. These intergroup 
dynamics function to change the nature of the social relations facing 
crowd participants, which in tum redefmes their initial social identity 
and its associated norms, thus changing the shape of collective action. 
Therefore, rather than context being seen as something merely external 
to identity, the context in which any one group acts is formed by the 
identity-based actions of other groups. (p.363) 
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This study demonstrates once again the role played by the dynamic process of 
inter- and intra-group interaction in changing the nature of people's collective 
identities in situations where conflict escalades. In essence, this account of intergroup 
conflict offers insightful explanations as to how conflict originates and escalates 
through interactions between two opposing groups as well as on how perceptions of 
both groups about themselves and the outgroup influence the dynamic of conflictual 
behaviours. However, this account, being mainly developed in natural settings rather 
than in laboratory, does not explicitly measure such things as degree of identification 
with the ingroup, degree of self-definition at a given moment in time, etc. Thus, this 
approach can be considered as a valuable complement to the previous perspectives 
which are more experimental and laboratory-orientated. 
Conclusion 
However, for the purpose of this thesis, the most important point regarding 
intergroup conflict and its consequences is that intergroup conflict is a contextual 
enhancer of the relationship between different aspects of self-definition as a group 
member and behaviours and mainly the first two sets of studies supports this point. 
More specifically, the idea emerges that intergroup conflict is one of the factors that 
determines whether group members will act more in line with the norms of the group 
they identifY with. Of course, beside intergroup conflict, there are other variables 
which also may be called enhancers of this relationship and one of them concerns 
group norms and the degree to which anticipated group behaviours correspond to 
these norms. Thus, the next chapter will focus on normativeness of behaviours as one 
of the factors contributing to the enhancement of the relationship between self-
definition as a group member and group behaviour. 
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CHAPTER4 
NORMATIVENESS OF GROUP BEHAVIOUR AS AN ENHANCER OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DEFINITION AS A GROUP MEMBER AND 
GROUP BEHAVIOUR 
Introduction 
Besides contextual factors which enhance the relationship between 
identification, salience and group behaviour such as intergroup conflict, another factor 
which plays an important role in this relationship is the degree to which behaviours 
prescribed by a specific group membership correspond with the group norms (i.e., the 
normativeness of group behaviour). Hence, the main idea I will focus on in this 
chapter is the point that people tend to be more likely to follow behaviours which are 
highly normative for a group they strongly identify with. The idea that norms are good 
predictors of behaviours or behavioural intentions has received quite a lot of attention 
in social psychology. However the empirical support for this idea is not always strong. 
It is useful therefore to explore the reasons for this relative lack of support. One 
explanation is that group norms are predictive of behaviours but only for people who 
identifY with the respective group. Thus, group norms should moderate the 
relationship between identification and group behaviour, rather than directly predict 
group behaviour. 
Another important idea I will discuss is that social category salience should be 
a good predictor of group behaviour only when the group behaviours are normatively 
congruent. In order to develop this argument, different sections of this chapter will 
deal first with basic conceptualizations of group norms as predictors of group 
behaviour, I will then review some research investigating the role of group norms in 
predicting behaviours on the basis of subjective group membership. Finally, I will 
draw some conclusions reflecting the ways that group norms act as enhancers of the 
relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviours and I 
will introduce a third factor (opinion-based group membership) which will be the 
focus of the next chapter. 
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Group Norms and Their Relationship to Group Behaviour: The Predictive Power of 
Group Norms for Behaviour 
Social interaction, in general, produces norms that regulate behaviours in 
social situations, so that group norms can be considered to be emergent properties of 
groups (Sherif, 1936; Turner, 1991). Once groups are formed, they provide members 
with information about how to behave in various situations, that is, through group 
norms people get to know what behaviours they should adopt in different 
circumstances. Thus, norms have a high informative value for group members, and it 
is evident why they should also be predictive of behaviours. Sherif (1936) defined 
norms as "customs, traditions, standards, rules, values, fashions, and all other criteria 
of conduct which are standardized as a consequence of the contact of individuals" 
(1936, p.3). Hovland, Janis and Kelley (1963) argue that norms are "standards, shared 
among the members of a group and representing the behaviour and attitudes they 
expect of one another" (p.136). Finally, Turner (1991) defined a social norm as: 
( ... ) a generally accepted way of thinking, feeling, or behaving that is 
endorsed and expected because it is perceived as the right and proper 
thing to do. It is a rule, value or standard shared by members of a social 
group that prescribes appropriate, expected or desirable attitudes and 
conduct in matters relevant to the group. (p.3) 
Nevertheless, there is obviously more to norms than the idea of preferring 
some behaviour to others. As Turner (1991) noted" the idea of norm conveys a 
82 
feeling of 'oughtness' about certain behaviours" (p.3) that is, there is also "an element 
of moral obligation, duty, right justice" (p.3) about norms. Another theoretical 
concept which is fundamental to understanding what social norms are, is subjective 
validity (Festinger, 1950; Turner, 1991). Subjective validity describes the subjective 
aspect of holding a social norm and it refers to the feeling of confidence in its 
appropriateness, correctness and social desirability given by engaging in some 
particular action: 
If a social norm is a shared belief that a certain course of action is 
appropriate in a given situation, then, when individuals act in line with 
the norm, they experience their behaviour as subjectively valid. 
(Turner, 1991, p.4) 
McGarty (1999a, p.199) elaborates this point arguing that feelings of 
correctness follow from the development of consensual understandings or 
explanations and: 
( ... ) cognitively speaking, nonns are representations of the mind's 
operation as an interpretative/explanatory system. In particular, norms 
are explanations of behaviours or beliefs, whether they be planned, 
past or current. 
Self-categorization theory introduces another theoretical principle in relation 
to the role played by norms in achieving group distinctiveness. This because norms 
provide ways for groups to differentiate themselves from outgroups. More 
specifically, the fit between categorization and group norms should be higher when 
ingroup norms are different from outgroup norms, allowing maximal differentiation 
between them. Under these conditions, norms provide a clear way of differentiation 
from the outgroup (Turner eta!. 1987; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996). 
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However, conceptualizing and operationalizing norms in different contexts can 
pose a few problems. For example, Cialdini and colleagues ( Cialdini, Reno, & 
Kallgren, 1990) pointed out the definitional difficulty of the concept of a norm. They 
argue that it is especially important when considering the normative influence on 
behaviours, to distinguish between descriptive and injunctive meaning of social 
norms. In his view, the descriptive norm describes what is typical or normal, while the 
injunctive meaning of norms refers to rules or beliefs which constitute a morally 
approved or disapproved way of behaving. Although it seems hard to differentiate 
between these two types of norms in real social situations (as what is seen as typical 
or normal comes to be accepted and viewed as moral over time and what is moral can 
become typical, too), it is clearly important to make this distinction as the two types of 
norms should have a different impact upon behaviour. 
Perhaps a more productive question is to ask how norms can influence 
behaviour. One of the best-known attempts to answer this question has been made by 
the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975) and its more recent extension, 
the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991). Fishbein and Ajzen's (1975) 
conceptualization of norms is that they are the extent of perceived pressure from 
others to perform certain behaviours instead of others. 
It is important to understand that the theory of reasoned action is focused on 
predicting behaviour on the basis of behavioural intentions. Thus, when we ask why, 
from the multitude of behaviours that can be adopted in a certain situation are only 
some of them preferred, then according to the theory of reasoned action the answer is 
that behaviour can be best predicted by a person's intention or willingness to perform 
the respective behaviour. Intention, in tum, is determined by two conceptually 
different components: an attitudinal component which refers to the favourableness of 
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people's evaluation of the behaviour, and a normative component (subjective norm) 
which reflects people's perception of the extent to which important others think that 
they should perform the behaviour. Thus, in this approach, norms represent one of the 
two key predictors of behavioural intentions. 
However, research in support of these theoretical assumptions reveals that 
norms are not as good a predictors of behaviours as might be expected. In fact, the 
link between norms and behavioural intentions is much weaker than the link between 
attitudes and intentions, that is norms only weakly influence people's intentions to 
behave in certain ways (see Ajzen, 1991). This apparent lack of influence of norms on 
behaviours was explained by Terry and colleagues (see Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 
2000; Terry, Hogg, & White, 2000; Terry & Hogg, 1996) in terms of the way 
Fishbein and Ajzen (1975) conceptualized norms as additive factors, that is, a norm 
exists if a number of significant others endorse a particular course of action. Another 
factor might be that although they treated norms and attitudes as two factors which 
independently influence behaviour, there can in fact be an interplay between attitudes 
and norms, whereby ultimately norms are created by people's attitudes. 
However, as Terry and colleagues argue, the social identity perspective 
approaches norms in a different way. According to their reading of self-categorization 
theory, groups influence people's attitudes and behaviours through the process of self-
categorization. Psychologically belonging to a particular group involves 
categorization of oneself as a group member, which, through the process of 
depersonalization, transforms one's self-concept and attitudes, feelings and 
behaviours in such a way that they are consistent with the group prototype. 
Importantly, the group prototype can be regarded as the cognitive representation of 
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the group norm. If a particular social identity is salient, it becomes a basis for self-
definition and the self is then perceived to be increasingly prototypical of the ingroup. 
From this perspective, norms are viewed as properties of social groups derived from 
shared attitudes and behaviours that become prescriptive and descriptive of group 
membership. 
In particular, self-categorization theorists such as Turner (1991) argue that 
when a social identity becomes salient, depersonalization of self-perception will result 
in behaviour which is highly normative: 
It is assumed that depersonalization, the creation of mutually perceived 
similarity between group members,( ... ) leads to more consensual 
behaviour in terms of the norms and values that define one's group 
( ... ). (p.16) 
That is, in an intergroup situation, or when a social identity becomes a basis for self-
categorization, people's behaviour will be highly normative. In such situations it is 
more likely that people will conform to group norms and will behave in group 
stereotypical terms, so that highly normative behaviours are more likely to be 
preferred to less normative ones. Thus, social identities should influence group 
behaviour through the mediating role of group norms. In other words, group members 
will be more likely to engage in a particular behaviour if it is in accordance with the 
norms of a behaviourally relevant group membership, particularly if identity is a 
salient basis for self-definition (Terry, Hogg, & White, 1999; Terry & Hogg, 1996; 
White, Terry, & Hogg, 1994). In cases where group membership is not salient, it is 
more likely that people will behave in terms of their individual characteristics rather 
than following group norms, so that individual norms should play a more important 
role in predicting behaviours. 
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An important point made by McGarty (1999a) is that norms provide 
explanations and justifications for group relevant action. As he noted: 
To the extent that the action is appropriate it will be seen in a positive 
light (i.e., it will be understood to reflect some current ingroup 
consensus) and will provide a basis for that action. Where some group 
consensus is not seen to explain or justify action then this is not a true 
norm. Instead it reflects the operation of a power process, where the 
individual is opposed to the will of an outgroup. (p.l99) 
Thus, group norms establish through a real consensus should be highly 
informative about the action that might be taken by the members of a particular group. 
Consensus seems to play an essential role in both intemalisation of group norms and 
becoming committed to follow behaviours prescribed by the respective group 
membership. 
Studies Investigating the Relationship between Norms, Subjective Group 
Membership and Group Behaviours 
There is a large number of studies investigating the role of group norms in 
relation to group behaviours. I would distinguish between three different but highly 
interrelated categories of studies: 
1. Studies investigating the role of norms in the attitude-behaviour 
relationship from a social identity perspective; 
2. Studies investigating the idea that the relationship between 
identification and group behaviour (e.g., displays ofingroup bias) is 
moderated by group norms; 
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3. Studies investigating the idea that normative behaviours are more 
positively evaluated and more likely to be followed by group 
members compared to non-nonnative or less normative behaviours. 
The next section will involve presenting some studies that can be included in 
each of these categories. Generally, studies falling in all three categories support the 
point that norms play an essential role in relation to behaviour and it is not possible to 
make accurate predictions in relation to behaviour of group members ifthe normative 
context is ignored. However, the third category of studies seems to be the most 
relevant from the perspective of this thesis. This is because they are specifically 
focusing on the situation where the relationship between self-definition as a group 
members (e.g., identification) and group behaviour is stronger, that is, in a highly 
normative context. 
The first category of studies I will focus on comprises research investigating 
the role of norms in the attitude-behaviour relationship, but from the perspective of 
social identity and self-categorization theories. This line of research mainly revolves 
around work done by Terry and colleagues. Wellen, Hogg, and Terry (1998) proposed 
that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour should become significantly 
stronger "under conditions in which people categorize themselves and identifY with an 
in-group that defines membership in terms of specific behaviourally and attitudinally 
prescriptive norms" (Wellen eta!., 1998, p.49). These authors thus base their 
arguments on social identity theory and self-categorization theory, in that they explain 
the attitude-behaviour relation as a function of depersonalization. In addition, they 
consider norms and attitudes as not independent from one to another. In their 
perspective, attitudes and behaviours become normative to the extent that they 
characterize group membership, and they influence people to the extent that the 
respective group is salient for them in the context of interest. 
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These authors treat attitudes in a different way to Fishbein and Ajzen (1975), 
more specifically they see them either as personal in some cases (i.e., judgements of 
the favourableness of a behaviour), but also as socially shared and tied to specific 
group membership, and in this latter case they are perceived to be normative. Wellen 
eta!. (1998) also consider norms as highly context-dependent but at the same time 
they regard the content of norms as "emanating from group prototypical attitudes and 
behaviours rather than from information available in the immediate context" (Wellen 
at a!., 1998, p. 49). Specifically, they investigated the effects of ingroup norms on the 
relationship between people's attitudes and their behaviour. They expected that these 
effects would vary depending mainly on the salience of group membership and they 
focused on participants' attitudes toward students being responsible for picking up 
litter on a university campus. 
They found that the effects of the attitudinal congruency of norms varied 
indeed as a function of group salience and also ingroup norms were more influential 
for high salience individuals than for low salience individuals. More specifically, their 
findings suggested that ingroup norms influenced behavioural decision making for 
individuals high in group salience but only when there was an opportunity to carefully 
process the normative information. 
Terry, Hogg, and White (1999) further examined the role played by self-
definition as a group member in the attitude-behaviour relationship. More specifically, 
in one study, they investigated first the effects of self and social identity on intentions 
and behaviours, and secondly, the effects of identification as a function of past 
experience of performing the behaviours. In the context of this chapter, the first part 
of the study is of more relevance. The study conducted was concerned with the 
prediction of intention to engage in household recycling and reported recycling 
behaviour. 
Beside social identity perspective, they based their prediction on identity 
theory (Stryker, 1968, 1980, 1987), arguing that there is a direct link between self-
identity and behavioural intentions. In identity theory, self is "conceived as a 
collection of identities that reflects the roles that a person occupies in the social 
structure" (Terry eta!., 1999, p.226). Thus, in order to predict behaviour, it is 
necessary to consider the self and the wider social structure as being closely linked. 
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In an attempt to reconcile the social identity perspective and identity theory, 
the authors tested the proposal that group norms, at least for people who identify 
strongly with the group, would influence behavioural intentions. The study had a 
longitudinal design, with a first questionnaire assessing participants intention to 
engage in recycling behaviour, and a second questionnaire (distributed two weeks 
later), assessing the reported behaviour for the last two weeks. The authors also 
included measures of attitudes towards the target behaviour, perceived social pressure 
(subjective norm), perceived behavioural control, importance of behaviour for self-
identity, perceived group norm, strength of identification with the reference group, 
and past recycling behaviour. 
The results showed that the perceived norm of a behaviourally relevant 
reference group was related to behavioural intentions for people who strongly 
identified with the group, but not for those who did not. The study results point to the 
fact that, in order to get valid behavioural predictions, it is necessary to take into 
consideration the relevance of the behavioural role for self-definition, in addition to 
the salience and norms of behaviourally relevant social identities. 
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Finally, Terry, Hogg, and McKimmie (2000) tested the hypothesis derived 
from social identity and self-categorization theories that attitudes are most likely to 
predict behaviour when they are supported by a congruent ingroup norm. Thus, in two 
experiments, they examined the effects of ingroup norms, salience of group 
membership, and mode of behavioural decision-making. 
First, they manipulated norm congruency and mode of behavioural decision-
making (spontaneous and deliberative) in a between-subjects study of career choice in 
psychology. The salience of group membership was assessed as strength of 
identification with the group membership. Following social identity and self-
categorization theories, they predicted that participants exposed to an attitudinally 
congruent ingroup norms (norm-consistent information) would be more likely to 
behave in accordance with their attitudes than participants in a no-norm condition 
(norm neither attitudinally congruent, nor incongruent), who, in turn, would be more 
likely to behave in accord with their initial attitude than participants exposed to an 
attitudinally inconsistent norm (norm-inconsistent condition). Moreover, they 
expected that this effect would be stronger for high identifiers. In line with their 
prediction, they found that participants exposed to an attitudinally consistent norm 
toward their preferred career choice were more likely to display attitude-behaviour 
consistency than those exposed to an attitudinally inconsistent group norm. 
In a second experiment, they replicated and extended the first one by including 
a manipulation of ingroup salience. Consistent with predictions and findings from the 
first experiment, participants exposed to an incongruent norm displayed greater 
attitude-behaviour inconsistency than those exposed to a congruent in group norm. 
However, contrary to predictions, they found that this effect did not vary as a function 
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of group salience. Finally, the results suggested that perceived identification with the 
group moderated the influence of norms on attitude-behaviour consistency. 
Another line of research focuses on the role of norms in relation to 
discrimination and prejudice and is based on the idea that the relationship between 
identification and ingroup bias is moderated by group nonns. It is argued that the 
inconsistent relations that have been observed in past research between the level of 
group identification and the displays of ingroup bias (Hinkle & Brown, 1990; see also 
chapter 2) can be explained by the fact that norms have not been taken into account. 
J etten, Spears, and Manstead ( 1997) advance the idea that: 
( ... )group norms that prescribe or proscribe differentiation can express 
important aspects of group's identity and these group norms will 
particularly influence high identifiers' willingness to display ingroup 
bias. (p. 604) 
They argue that in different intergroup situations, specific group norms are 
salient and they can influence the willingness to display ingroup bias. J etten and 
colleagues (1996), anticipated that the ingroup norm would be a stronger predictor 
and a more direct predictor of reward allocation in a minimal-group setting, in 
comparison to the outgroup norm. This was because "conformity to the in-group norm 
expresses one's salient social identity, assuming some degree of identification with 
the in-group" (p.1223). More specifically, their prediction was that an ingroup norm 
of fairness would lead to more fairness, while an ingroup norm of discrimination 
would lead to more discrimination toward the outgroup. 
The authors were also interested in the ways that the tendency to show ingroup 
bias and conformity to ingroup norms interact and relate to each other. Thus, another 
goal of this study was to investigate the relative strengths of the processes of 
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conformity and ingroup bias when they were in conflict, so in order to achieve this 
they manipulated orthogonally both ingroup and out group norms of fairness and 
discrimination. They predicted that, manipulating ingroup and outgroup norms, would 
vary not only the sort of behaviour they sanction or prescribe for the respective 
groups, but also the relation of similarity or dissimilarity of ingroup and outgroup 
norms. 
Thus, in their first study J etten et a!. (1997) examined the influence of ingroup 
and out group norms on levels of ingroup bias in a modified minimal-group setting. 
They measured ingroup bias and positive differentiation by using the Tajfel eta!. 
(1971) reward matrices. Specifically, they hypothesized that the ingroup norm would 
have a disproportionate influence on allocation strategies, although an ingroup norm 
of discrimination would be more influential than one of fairness, because the latter 
conflicts with the positive distinctiveness principle. Hence, they predicted that, once 
again, positive differentiation would be higher when the ingroup norm was 
discriminatory than when it was fair, and they argued that this was due to the 
enhancement motive of social identity theory. 
The norms were manipulated by giving participants false feedback about the 
reward strategies used by both ingroup and outgroup members. As dependent 
variables, besides ingroup bias and differentiation, they also measured identification 
with the ingroup and outgroup, and prototypicality. 
In line with their predictions, they found that the ingroup norm was indeed a 
more important factor for the allocation of rewards than the outgroup norm. 
Interestingly, ingroup bias or favouritism could be dramatically reduced when the 
norm was against this strategy. The outgroup norm did not have any significant 
effects and the authors explained this by the fact that the equity principle might have 
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been overshadowed by conformity and ingroup bias effects in this stndy. They also 
found that, in line with self-categorization theory principles, high comparative fit, 
reflected in dissimilar norms, produced a sense of group distinctiveness that resulted 
in positive discrimination. 
In a second stndy, they tested exactly the same hypotheses, but in a context of 
natural social groups. The results from this stndy suggested that the outgroup norm 
had more of an effect on ingroup bias compared to the first stndy. Thus, anticipation 
of fairness from the outgroup resulted in slightly more fairness, while anticipation of 
discrimination from the outgroup resulted in slightly more ingroup bias, but this effect 
was qualified by the higher order interaction between ingroup and outgroup norms on 
ingroup bias and differentiation measures. The authors suggest that these interactions 
reflect the predicted tendency for participants to differentiate more when the group 
norms were similar than when they were different, especially when they reflected 
discrimination. In general, the results from both studies point out the importance of 
conformity to ingroup norms as well as the relationship between ingroup and 
outgroup norms as influences on group members' willingness to express in group bias. 
In another paper by J etten, Spears and Manstead (1997), they advanced the 
idea that level of ingroup bias can be moderated by a salient group norm that 
prescribes or proscribes bias. Based on the social identity perspective, they argue that 
since high identifiers should be more concerned about achieving and maintaining a 
positive social identity, salient group norms should particularly influence high 
identifiers' willingness to behave in accordance to group norms. 
Thus, in one experiment, they manipulated fairness and differentiation as two 
different group norms. Group identification was also manipulated by making positive 
or negative aspects of group membership salient by linguistically framing the items. 
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The authors predicted that participants who were high identifiers (as a result of the 
salience of positive aspects of group membership), should act more in line with group 
norms. Consequently, high identifiers should display less in group bias if the group 
norm is fairness and more ingroup bias if the group norm is differentiation, compared 
to low identifiers. 
The results showed that, in line with the predictions, participants who strongly 
identified with the group conformed more to the group norm representing positive 
differentiation. However, they did not find any evidence for the conformity to fairness 
norm, that is high identifiers did not display more fairness compared to low 
identifiers. The authors explained this finding by the fact that introducing a fairness 
nonn might conflict with a more general tendency to show ingroup bias as a mean of 
enhancing social identity. Jetten et a!. (1997) argue that: 
for high identifiers the processes of being more motivated to act in 
accordance with group norms and at the same time being more eager to 
show ingroup bias might have cancelled each other out, leading to 
similar levels of ingroup bias for high and low identifiers. (p.608) 
However, this study demonstrates the importance of group norms in regulating 
group behaviour such as displays of ingroup bias. The finding that for high identifiers 
the level of in group bias can vary with the salient group norm suggests that also 
displaying low levels of ingroup bias might be consistent with maintaining a positive 
identity for high identifiers when this is in accordance with a salient group norm. 
Finally, another slightly different line of research advances the idea that 
normative behaviours are more positively evaluated and more likely to be adopted by 
group members than non-normative ones. Similar to the other approaches previously 
mentioned, this perspective also builds on ideas from social identity and self-
95 
categorization theories. This perspective emphasizes the role played by norms in 
group processes and, more specifically, in predicting group behaviour. This approach 
supports the idea that by manipulating group norms judgements of group members 
and their behaviours can be influenced as well. 
A good example for this approach is research done by Marques, Abrams, Paez, 
and Martinez-Taboada (1998). Based on social identity and self-categorization 
theories, they predicted that group members seek both intergroup distinctiveness and 
legitimization of ingroup norms. 
According to conformity and social identity literature, normative 
differentiation among individuals (regarding an ingroup norm) or category 
differentiation (regarding their category membership) can both affect evaluations of 
group members. Marques and colleagues consider the situation in which category 
membership and behaviour are either consistent or inconsistent with one another. 
They argue that both category differentiation and normative differentiation operate 
together, so that category differentiation establishes the category membership of 
group members (e.g., male or female), while normative differentiation establishes the 
extent to which ingroup members adhere to category norms (e.g., masculine or 
feminine traits or behaviours). 
In their research they investigated how perceivers react to inconsistencies 
between category membership and normative behaviour. They predicted that, in 
general, perceivers would attempt simultaneously to sustain category differentiation 
and to seek legitimization for ingroup norms. As a result, perceivers would make 
derogatory judgements for ingroup deviants and positive judgements of people 
endorsing group norms. Marques eta!. (1998) examined category and normative 
differentiation in four experiments using minimal group procedures. They 
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manipulated category membership and normative position for five group members. 
They also measured group identification, and asked participants to evaluate the group 
(global impression), and each group member. The results from all four experiments 
conducted, consistently supported the hypothesis, and most importantly from the 
perspective of this thesis, they show that norms play an important role in the process 
of self-categorization. More specifically, normative behaviour which is more in 
accordance with a particular group membership, is seen as more valuable and 
desirable as it contributes to increase the perceived cohesion of the ingroup. 
There is also more recent research by McAuliffe, Jetten, Homsey, and Hogg 
(2003) which investigated the influence of different group norms on the evaluations of 
group members who display behaviour in accordance to these norms. They focused on 
the ways in which evaluations of collectivist and individualist behaviour are 
influenced by group norms that endorse collectivism or individualism. Their argument 
was that, usually, collectivist behaviour is perceived as 'good' and acceptable as 
group behaviour, while individualist behaviour is seen as deviant from the group 
norm. However, they predicted that preferences for collectivist behaviour can be 
attenuated, or even reversed, by manipulating group norms, more specifically, when 
group members are motivated to conform to group norms that prescribe 
individualism. Thus, they built on other research showing that normative group 
behaviour is more positively evaluated than is non-normative behaviour (e.g., 
Marques et al., 1998). 
Their hypothesis was that when group norms are individualistic, group 
favouring of collectivist behaviour becomes non-normative, while individualist 
behaviour (traditionally regarded as deviance from group norms) becomes normative. 
Thus, they predicted first that there would be a general tendency for collectivist 
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behaviour to be more positively evaluated than individualist behaviour. The second 
prediction was that this tendency would be affected by the content of the group norm. 
In other words, when the group norm was collectivist, members who displayed 
collectivist behaviour would be evaluated more positively than members who 
displayed individualist behaviour. On the contrary, when the group norm is 
individualistic, individualist behaviour would become norm-consistent behaviour and 
therefore should be evaluated more positively than might be normally expected. 
Thus, in one study, the authors experimentally manipulated norms of 
individualism and collectivism in an organizational role-play and also behaviour of 
group members so that they reflected individualism and collectivism. Results showed 
that, consistent with predictions, collectivist behaviour was more positively evaluated 
than individualist behaviour but this tendency was attenuated when the norm was 
individualist Thus, by manipulating group norm (i.e., individualistic versus 
collectivist), individualist behaviour became normative and preferred by group 
members. This piece of research points to the importance of group norms for 
behaviours. Self-definition as a group member is certainly one predictor of group 
behaviour, but the preferred behaviour to be adopted by group members depends also 
on the normative content prescribed by the respective group membership. 
To sum up, the body of research presented in this section reflects the role 
played by group norms in predicting behaviours. More specifically, Wellen, Hogg, 
and Terry (1998) found that the effects of the attitudinal congruency of norms varied 
as a function of group salience and also ingroup norms were more influential for high-
salience individuals than for low salience individuals. Terry and colleagues (1999, 
2000) found that the relationship between attitudes and behaviour was moderated by 
perceived group identification. Similarly, Jetten and colleagues (1996, 1997) found 
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that participants who strongly identified with the group conformed more to the 
ingroup bias norm. Finally, in the last set of studies, Marques and colleagues (1998) 
found that group normative behaviour, is seen as more desirable by group members 
(as it contributes to increase the perceived cohesion of the ingroup), and McAuliffe 
and colleagues (2003) found that the preferred behaviour by group members depends 
on the normative content of the group membership. 
It seems that although attitudes and group identification are essential factors in 
relation to group member behaviours, they are not the only variables involved in the 
process. It is important to recognize that in order to make more accurate predictions 
about behaviours it is crucial to take into consideration the normative context, that is 
the particular norms prescribed by a certain group membership. The research 
reviewed demonstrates the importance of norms as moderators of these processes. 
However, as we have seen this is only one factor that plays a role in the process, and 
there are also other factors, which have to be taken into the consideration (e.g., 
intergroup context, type of group, etc.). Another general observation that can be made 
regarding the existing research is that none ofthis work has empirically addressed or 
satisfactory resolved the distinction between identification and salience. The study by 
Terry et al. (2000) which failed to demonstrate effects of salience in the attitude-
behaviour relationship, is one case in point here. 
Conclusion 
The objective of this chapter was to emphasize the importance of group norms 
in the relationship between self-definition as a group member (i.e., identification and 
salience) and group behaviour. Intergroup conflict (see chapter 4) is one contextual 
factor which contributes to the enhancement of the link between identification, 
salience and group behaviour, but after reviewing this material it seems certain that 
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there is another important factor involved in this relationship which is the normative 
context. 
The normative context or more specifically, group norms, influence this 
relationship between self-definition as a group members and behaviour by increasing 
the likelihood that members will prefer behaviours which are in accordance with 
group norms (i.e., highly normative) to others which are not or are less normative. 
That is, those behaviours which correspond to a higher degree with the norms 
prescribed by a specific group membership are more likely to be adopted by members, 
and this should be especially true for people who strongly identify with the group. 
Thus, in situations where anticipated behaviours are highly normative, the relationship 
between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be stronger, 
too. 
Finally, besides intergroup conflict and normativeness of group behaviours, 
there is another factor which should have an impact upon the relationship between 
self-definition as a group member and group behaviour. This is the specific type of 
group membership, and I would emphasize that there is a particular type of group, 
which is highly suitable for investigating the relationship between self-definition as a 
group member and behaviour. The reason is that this relationship seems to be 
particularly strong for such opinion-based groups, and they will constitute the focus of 
the next chapter. 
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CHAPTERS 
OPINION-BASED GROUPS AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-
DEFINITION AS A GROUP MEMBER AND GROUP BEHAVIOUR 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will discuss the idea of the opinion-based groups, a type of 
group which I consider to be very useful for studying the mechanisms explaining how 
group identification, salience of social identity, and group behaviour relate to each 
other. Just as intergroup conflict and normativeness of group behaviours (see Chapters 
3 and 4) can act as enhancers of the relationship between self-definition as a group 
member and group behaviour, the type of group, in this case opinion-based groups, 
can also play an important role in this relationship. My argument is that this specific 
type of group is particularly well-suited for capturing the processes involved in 
predicting group behaviour in different social situations, and I will present a series of 
reasons for why that should be the case in this chapter. 
Most importantly, in this type of group the relationship between self-definition 
as a group member and group behaviour is particularly clear, partly because such 
groups are often engaged in social conflict, and partly because they have features 
which make it easy for relevant behaviour to be defined as normative. That is, in 
opinion-based groups the existence of the other two factors which enhance the 
relationship of interest are relatively common. 
Thus, the focus of this chapter will be first on defining and explaining the 
concept of the opinion-based group, and secondly, on the differences between 
opinion-based groups and other types of social groups and social categories. Finally I 
will review some previous research which has employed this type of group (though 
without explicitly using the concept) and, I will present some implications of the 
opinion-based group concept for studying social identity processes. 
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What are Opinion-based Groups? 
Commitment to artificial groups or broad social categories seems only 
sporadically related to commitment to take collective action or decision to become 
involved in intergroup behaviour in general. As shown in Chapter 2, the relationship 
between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour is not always as 
strong as would be expected. The pattern that can be inferred by looking at the 
previous research investigating this relationship suggests that there is a particular type 
of group which seems especially appropriate for studying the identification - salience 
- intergroup behaviour link. As detailed in Chapter 2, studies such as those conducted 
by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995), and Simon, Sturmer and colleagues (1998, 2000, 
2003) suggest that the relationship is stronger when identification with particular 
activist groups rather than broad categories is measured. The point that commitment 
to only some types of group, are particularly relevant to action, is well illustrated by 
the comment ofKlandermans (2000), who noted that even where mass action is taken 
by members of ethnic groups (i.e., broader social categories), this action is actually 
taken by people who hold shared opinions and are committed to the action rather than 
by everybody who shares the particular ethnic background. 
Opinion-based groups are psychological groups (as opposed to membership 
groups or sociological categories) in the sense used by Turner (1982), but which have 
a social identity defined by a shared opinion. For example, pro-life versus pro-choice 
opinion-based groups can be defined in terms of opinions on the issue of abortion. 
Thus, members of such groups perceive themselves as sharing a certain opinion about 
a specific issue (in this case abortion), and this opinion group membership becomes 
part of their self-definition, when the context is relevant. 
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Opinion-based groups possess a set of characteristics that make it easy to 
distinguish them from other types of groups and social categories. In the next sections 
of this chapter I will outline these characteristics and present in detail how exactly 
opinion-based groups differ from social categories and some other specific types of 
group. 
Characteristics of Opinion-based Groups 
Opinion-based groups are formed around a belief or a set of beliefS rather than 
mere preference. They usually involve an evaluative dimension, taking a position on a 
certain issue is equivalent to evaluate, judge and decide on the view to adopt on some 
state of affairs. 
For example, people who merely prefer to wear the colour black would rarely 
come to constitute an opinion-based group (as these people merely share a preference 
for a colour). However, where black-clad people come to perceive their colour 
preference as a shared attribute, perhaps because of some organized set of beliefs or 
constructed ideology which would offer explanations as to why black is better than 
other colours, they could come to form opinion-based groups (e.g., Gothics would be 
one example). 
Thus, sharing an opinion is not sufficient, but that shared opinion (or in some 
cases the place of a single opinion is taken by a more organized set of beliefs) needs 
to become part of their social identity. In this way, group members might come to 
perceive and define themselves in terms of their opinion group membership, 
depending on the context, in the same way as with any other psychologically 
meaningful social category or group. Just as when any other social category is salient, 
when the context is relevant to a particular opinion-based group membership, the 
opinion-based group membership becomes switched on, so that people come to act 
and think in accordance with that membership. 
103 
Opinion-groups are most visible in relation to controversial issues (partly 
because conflict makes them visible) and we can easily make a parallel between 
oppositionally defined opinion groups and the conformity-deviance framework. In 
other words, there are opinion-based groups which aim to change the social world in 
some way (the "deviants") and, on the contrary, groups which aim to preserve the 
status quo (the "conformists"). This dynamic is very well illustrated by the research of 
Sani and Reicher (1998; 1999) and Sani and Todman (2002) on schism. Schism refers 
to "the division of the group into subgroups, and the ultimate secession of at least one 
group from the parent group" ( Sani & Reicher, 1998, p. 624). The process of schism 
provides an excellent example of opinion-based group formation. 
For instance, Sani and Reicher (1998) had first focused on the analysis of the 
split in the Italian Communist Party, suggesting that schism was due to the different 
and irreconcilable opinions on the essence of the parent group identity. In this case the 
broader group (i.e., the Italian Communist Party) was split into at least two opinion-
based groups around core ideological issues concerning the party. 
The authors argue that schismatic process is based on the idea that "while 
group members may expect to achieve consensus, the issue of where that consensus 
should reside may be a matter of argument" (Sani & Reicher, 1998, p.623). They also 
suggest that, although often, intragroup negotiation and discussion may lead to an 
eventual consensus, there may be times where such unity is not reached or even where 
it comes to be seen as unreachable. This would be most likely to occur when one 
faction within the group sees the positions of another faction as not only different to 
their own but as subverting the very nature of the group (p.626). 
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In such cases, members do not choose compromise as a strategy of resolving 
the conflict because this would mean that "the group is acting against their social 
identity where social identity is what makes group behaviour possible" (p.626). Thus, 
they no longer psychologically belong to the same group and disagreement regarding 
the essence of group identity is a precondition of schism. They further examined these 
ideas by looking at the division of the Italian Communist Party into the Democratic 
Party of the Left and the Party for Communist Refoundation. The authors 
investigated the way in which members of the two factions, which are in my terms 
members oftwo different opinion-based groups, would describe both the ingroup and 
the outgroup. Their suggestion was that members of both factions would characterize 
their own group as representing the essence of the Italian Communist Party as 
opposed to the other faction that was seen as subverting this essence. In short, this 
paper clearly exemplifies how oppositionally defined opinion-based group can form 
within a broader political organization. 
In two other studies Sani and Reicher (1999) investigated the split in the 
Church of England over the controversial issue of ordination of women as priests. 
Basically, the broad initial category had split into two new opinion-based groups 
made up by proponents and opponents of the change within the Church of England. 
Sani and Reicher (1999) suggest that: 
( ... )where the position of some in the group is seen by the others as 
contradicting the essence of group identity, then consensua1ization is 
blocked and difference becomes non-negotiable. In such conditions, it 
is not only that consensualization fails to lead to consensus, but it 
actually exacerbates dissensus ( ... ).In a nutshell, where differences are 
construed by either side as subverting the group essence, 
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consensualization processes produce schism rather than agreement. 
(p.281) 
Following these studies, the model of schismatic process was finally tested in 
another study conducted by Sani and Todman (2002). For this research, they 
investigated officials of the Church of England who were against the ordination of 
women to priesthood. The authors described the model based on data collected on 
Italian Communist Party and Church of England schisms as follows: 
Members of a subgroup will express schismatic intentions if they 
believe that a proposed new norm fundamentally changes a central 
aspect of group identity. The effect of this perception on schismatic 
intentions is mediated by the belief that group identity has been 
subverted. In turn, the effect of subgroup members' perception of 
identity subversion on schismatic intentions is mediated by the 
perception that they have no voice and that the group as a whole has 
low entitativity. (Sani & Todman 2002, p. 1649) 
The account of schism is relevant here as it illustrates the particular case of 
opinion-based group formation around controversial issues in a broader group or 
category. It is also important to note the role of consensus, or more specifically lack of 
consensus in the case of schism. The lack of consensus, together with the subsequent 
perceived lack of group entitativity are considered by the authors to be the main 
mechanisms responsible for schism here, but by the same token, reaching consensus 
in the new faction created following schism is the basis of opinion-based group 
formation. 
These examples of research on schism also point out the contrastive nature of 
opinion-based groups. Being formed around controversial issues within a broader 
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social category or group, there is always some degree of opposition between one 
opinion-based group and another. In most cases opinion-based groups are actually 
mutually exclusive, that is they are defined in an aii-or-none manner by their 
member's commitment to some position so that where somebody is a member of one 
opinion group they are automatically precluded from being a member of another at the 
same time and on the same issues. It is difficult, for example, for one individual to 
both support and be opposed to a certain presidential candidate at the same time (as 
opposed to merely being undecided or ambivalent), even though a group or institution 
such as a political party (which is not a mutually exclusive opinion group) can contain 
individuals who are supporters and opponents of that particular candidate. 
Following from this point, in opinion-based groups there is almost necessarily 
competition between groups as to which of their conflicting views is actually correct. 
Even though it is (barely) possible to argue that an opposing group has an opinion that 
is no less valid than the ingroup' s it is not logically coherent to argue, from an ingroup 
perspective, that the other group's view is better than the ingroup. Such an argument 
would be likely to be followed by a change in group membership. If you believed that 
some other group's view is better than your group's view on the single crucial group-
defining dimension then subjectively you are a member of that other group (see 
McGarty, 1999a for a discussion of related points). Qualitatively then, all opinion 
groups members must believe that their opinions are at least as correct as the 
alternatives. Quantitatively they may differ in the degree of the strength of their 
conviction that their own group's view is more correct. Thus, subjective conflict is 
comprised in the very nature of opinion-based groups. Then, once subjective conflict 
is present, there is always the possibility to transform into an objective conflict in the 
sense of competition over resources (Tajfel eta!., 1971; Tajfel, 1970). 
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These characteristics and some others suggest that opinion-based groups are 
conceptually distinct from social categories and other types of group. In the next 
section, I will therefore focus on differences and potential similarities between 
opinion-based groups and social categories, artificial and natural groups, institutions 
or organizations, and action groups. 
How Do Opinion-based Groups Differ from Social Categories and Other 
Types of Groups? 
Firstly, opinion-based groups are not reducible to social categories. In fact, 
they can often be formed within a broader social category. To give one example of an 
opinion-based group within a category, within the category women, there can be 
women who are feminists, and within the same broad category, there can also be an 
anti-feminist group (in opposition to the feminists) and also a group of people who do 
not belong to either groups, and who probably do not have a strong view about the 
issue or they are undecided (see Figure 5.1). Of course, exactly the same process can 
take place in the case of social category men or society in general. Particular social 
category memberships may be stereotypically associated with certain social categories 
but there is no restriction from the point of the perceiver on the opinion-based group 
memberships held. 
Women 
Feminists 
people who 
do not 
care 
Men or the society in general 
Feminists 
people who 
do not 
Figure 5.1. Opinion-based group formation within a broader social category 
It is important to note that the opinions that are the basis of opinion-based 
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group formation are often actually about social categories, or more specifically, about 
relations between social categories (or groups in general). This is the case with 
feminist and anti-feminist opinion-based groups, which are groups formed around 
ideologies about relations between gender social categories and, in the case of 
feminist activist groups, their behaviour is aimed to change the existing relations 
between men and women, according to an ideology about how these relations should 
be. Thus, the shared opinion which is the basis of many opinion-based groups is an 
opinion about intergroup relations. Thus, in the case of supporters of Ku Klux Klan 
(KKK) in the US (see McGarty, & Bliuc, in press): not all Whites are KKK supporters 
and being a White high identifier is not sufficient to make someone KKK supporter. 
In order to be a KKK supporter one must accept the White supremacist beliefs of 
KKK, so that members of this opinion-based group share an opinion about how the 
relationships between Whites and other races are (or should be). 
It is also worth noting that social categories are not always broader than 
opinion-based groups. Opinion-based groups can be inclusive of social categories as, 
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for example, pro-apology opinion-based group in Australia probably completely 
includes the category aboriginal (i.e., all aboriginal people and others are supporters 
of an official apology from the Australian government). 
To give a better idea about exclusively defined opinion-based groups which 
are about social categories and relations between them it is useful to consider another 
example. When we see a pro-gay pride parade followed by an anti-gay rally, there is 
obviously an intergroup conflict but it can be a serious mistake to assume that conflict 
is between heterosexuals and homosexuals (which are social categories). Rather, the 
conflict is probably between supporters and opponents of intolerance of 
homosexuality. These two groups are exclusively defined opinion-based groups 
(nobody simultaneously supports and opposes intolerance of homosexuality), which 
are made up of people who hold a particular view on some issues and reject the 
alternative view. In this particular example, the issue which is the basis for group 
formation is intolerance toward homosexuality but other such groups are supporters 
versus opponents of animal rights, supporters versus opponents to a certain political 
party, and so on. 
Things such as ethnicity, gender, preference for a colour (i.e., any given 
category) as well as a particular opinion can all potentially become bases for group 
formation. However, unlike some other attributes, sharing an opinion should provide a 
ready basis for cooperation and common action. This is, because opinion-based 
groups are formed around opinions, subjective membership in such groups is 
routinely informative about the basis of consensus and consequent behaviours 
compared to other category membership. Opinion-based groups help people to define 
an intragroup consensus more easily. 
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Unlike social categories, they also tend to have greater normative fit as they 
are often formed around a single opinion and the normative content and the social 
meaning of such groups are easier to detect. They also tend to be characterized by low 
intragroup ambiguity which is mainly due to the fact that members of such opinion-
based groups are all either in favour or against some issue. For example, in a debate 
involving two oppositionally defined opinion-based groups (pro and anti-war on 
terror) it should be relatively easy to distinguish between the two groups. First the 
context of the arguments employed by the two groups would be starkly different (high 
normative fit) and secondly, there should be a high degree of agreement and 
uniformity within each group regarding these arguments (low intragroup ambiguity). 
Both high normative fit and low intragroup ambiguity lead to a stronger basis for 
consensus. 
Opinion-based groups cannot be equated with the artificial groups that are 
habitually used in experimental settings. Obviously, opinion-based group can be 
formed in experimental settings by giving participants a certain issue and asking them 
to take a position either in favour or against. 
However, in real opinion-based groups, members define themselves in terms 
of a position they genuinely hold about some issue, so that such groups tend to have a 
psychological significance for their members. Unlike most artificial groups, opinion-
based group members will tend to have expectations about what sort of behaviours are 
consistent with the social meaning of their group. Even in experimental settings when 
a relatively novel issue is used it is still possible that some participants have 
previously used and identified with the respective opinion. This is even more probable 
if the issue used is prevalent in the historical context (as for example the position 
regarding the war with Iraq). 
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Another distinction can be made between opinion-based groups and 
institutions. This distinction is based on the fact that, as I mentioned before, opinion-
based groups are psychological groups, and of course, they need not involve an 
organized structure of rules and prescriptions as in the case of institutions. However 
there are certainly institutions which initially developed from opinion-based groups 
(e.g., Amnesty International, RSCPA, etc.), and within institutions and organizations 
there can exist factions which are actually opinion-based groups (as in political parties 
or religious institutions, see Sani & Reicher, 1998). 
Finally, opinion-based groups are different from action groups. Most action 
groups are based on shared opinions, so that opinion-based groups can be regarded as 
an incipient stage of action groups. That is, the formation of action groups can be 
considered as emerging from opinion-based groups. Within a broader opinion-group, 
there can be a faction which is committed to take action (see fig 5.2). 
Social 
category Opinion-
based 
group 
Action group 
Figure 5.2. Example of an action group formed within an opinion-based group that is, 
in turn, formed within a broader social category 
Thus, an action group is usually made up of members of a broader opinion-
based group who not only hold a shared opinion but they are also ready to take action 
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in terms of this opinion. For example, within a feminist opinion-based group all 
members share more or less the same view on gender issues, but only some members 
are involved in and committed to action, and these particular members form a feminist 
action group. 
To make it absolutely clear, I do not suggest that opinion-based groups fonn in 
relation to all opinions, or that all social behaviour that is related to opinions derives 
from membership of such groups. In addition, just as in the case of social categories 
and other groups, opinion-based group membership might not be psychologically 
significant for members, and this is detennined by the social context. Rather, I suggest 
that where genuine collective action does take place in relation to opinions the idea of 
the opinion-based group can be useful for understanding the social psychological 
processes involved, and that this is especially true for political opinion. Thus, 
political opinion-based groups are a special case especially suitable for studying these 
processes. 
Some Previous Research Involving Opinion-based Groups 
Although opinion-based groups have often been used in past research on group 
polarization, minority influence, and group-based persuasive communication, the term 
itself has not been used explicitly and the unique features of these groups have not 
been examined. Indeed, other terminology that has been used in relation to groups 
does not capture the content of opinion-based group concept. For example, social 
psychologists distinguish between reference and membership groups (Turner, 1991). 
A reference group can be defined as a group that is psychologically significant for 
members' attitudes and behaviours. Of course, an opinion-based group can also be a 
reference group in the sense that it might be psychologically significant for members 
and certainly influence their attitudes and behaviours. However, the two concepts 
cannot be equated, reference groups being far more general and inclusive than 
opinion-based groups. 
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On the other hand, a membership group is "one a person is in by some 
objective criterion, but which that person may not refer to psychologically for self-
evaluation and social values" (Turner, 1991, p.5). Clearly, the concept of membership 
group does not include opinion-based groups. In relation to membership and reference 
groups, it is clear that the concept of opinion-based group can be regarded as closer to 
the latter rather than the former. 
Considering other terminology in the literature the closest usage to the idea 
referred to here is probably the term "single- issue pressure group" used by Kelly and 
Breinlinger (1995). Such single-issue pressure groups included Women for Safe 
Transport, Women for Peace, and so on. However, this term is more exclusive than 
opinion-based groups referring especially to those people from an opinion-based 
group who actually take action in relation to their shared ideas. In much the same way 
as action groups which can be formed within a broader opinion-based group, single-
issue pressure groups can be considered as crystallisations of opinion-based groups. 
Nevertheless there is plenty of research that uses such groups. To give one 
typical example of research using opinion-based groups, in a minority influence study, 
David and Turner (1999) exposed moderate feminist participants to another ingroup 
minority. This was either the broad opinion-based group of feminists (or pro-
feminism) or an extreme subcategory (pro-separatism). A very high proportion of 
published minority influence studies can be seen as investigating relationships 
between different opinion-based groups. 
As mentioned before (see Chapter 2), the 'single-issue pressure groups' that 
were studied by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) and the activist groups such as Gray 
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Panthers, gay movement, AIDS volunteer service organization and fat acceptance 
movement, investigated by Simonet a!. (1998; 2000) and Stiirmer eta!. (2003), can 
be regarded as directly emerging from opinion-based groups. These were groups 
formed in order to bring about social change, and they can be considered as being 
derived from broader opinion-based groups. In these studies the relationship between 
identification as an activist and identification with the broader social category and 
participation in political actions was compared. In all these studies, it was shown that 
identification with an activist group was much more relevant to action than 
identification with the broader category. It can be inferred, then, that it is 
identification with an opinion-based group (e.g., pro-feminism, pro-gay movement, 
pro-AIDS volunteerism or fat acceptance movement) which actually strongly predicts 
collective behaviour and it is part of an activist identity. In particular, Simonet al's 
(1998, 2000, 2001) and Sturmer et al.'s (2003) studies are discussed in relation to the 
model of politicized collective identity (see Chapter 2). Simon and Klandermans 
(2001) argue that identification with the more specific organizations (i.e., Gray 
Panthers, gay movement, fat acceptance social movement, and AIDS volunteer 
service organization) is more related to a politicized collective identity than the 
broader categories and this is why these identities are more relevant to action. They 
note in relation to these studies that: 
identification with the broader recruitment category made no unique 
contribution to the prediction of behavioural intentions or actual 
participation, whereas identification with the more politicized social 
movement organization had a reliable and unique (positive) effect. 
(Simon & Klandermans, 2001, p. 328) 
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It is certainly not claimed here that single-issue pressure groups and activist 
groups are identical to opinion-based groups. Rather, the claim that I am making is 
that single-issue pressure groups and activist groups are based around a commitment 
to take action in line with a shared opinion. Activist groups are therefore opinion-
based groups par excellence. There are, however, opinion-based groups that are more 
diffuse and less well-organized (and indeed in studies to be detailed in later chapters I 
explore artificial and minimal opinion-based groups). 
Another piece of research which can be interpreted as being highly related to 
opinion-based-groups was conducted by Herrera and Reicher (1998). Theoretically, 
they argue that the definition of social categories should be open to discussion and 
include a rhetorical dimension. In particular, they suggest that speakers "construct the 
boundaries and the content of social categories so as to render the position they are 
proposing as normative for the largest possible proportion of their audience" (Herrera 
& Reicher, 1998, p.982). In other words, they propose that the content of arguments 
regarding the use of a social category is flexible and will tend to reflect the position 
that would appear as normative for the majority of ingroup. Put in terms of opinion-
based groups, it can be inferred that the flexibility of category content depending on 
the normative position ofthe majority of ingroup can be regarded as an alignment of 
the content of a category with a particular opinion-based group. 
In previous research by Reicher and colleagues (Reicher & Hopkins, 1996a,b; 
Reicher, Hopkins, & Condor, 1997), the authors followed this argumentation by 
focusing on politicians and social movement activists. Herrera and Reicher (1998) had 
shown: 
how speakers use categories in order to define their project as 
normative for their audience as a whole and how different speakers 
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employ very different categories in order to characterize the same 
event as a function of their attempts to mobilize people in support of 
different positions. (p.983) 
Herrera and Reicher (1998) used what I term opinion-based groups made-up 
of people holding pro and anti positions towards the 1991 GulfW ar. The authors 
argued that depending on which position they held, pro- or anti-war, people described 
the social categories involved in the conflict in very different terms. For example, in 
pro-war political discourse, such as a speech by George Bush about war, the figure of 
Saddam Hussein was used to stand for the Iraqi force, transforming the ingroup into a 
global category (i.e., victims of Saddam), and the outgroup into a one-man group. On 
the other hand, MaJjorie Thompson who was one of the speakers from a major anti-
war rally in London in February 1991 referred to "financiers and politicians who 
sought profit without regard for the cost" (p.983) as opposed to "the losers ... the 
mothers and fathers, the husband and wives, the orphan children". 
The authors examined how a sample of non-activists construed the categories 
involved in the Gulf War. They expected that pro-war participants and the anti-war 
participants would describe the sides involved in the conflict in opposing ways. They 
used undergraduate students as participants and the study had two phases. In the first 
phase, participants answered a 1 0-item questionnaire concerning their views on Gulf 
War. Although they did not explicitly measure categorization in opinion-based 
groups, they designed four items in order to measure support for war, or in other 
words a sense of commitment to one or another opinion-based group (e.g., "I support 
the way in which the Coalition conducted the war"). 
In the second phase, participants were asked about the impact of Gulf War 
images. More specifically, they were first asked to recall and describe images from 
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the war which had the most powerful impact on them, and then participants were 
shown images taken from the media and asked to rate their impact on them on a I 0-
point scale. Additionally, participants were asked to explain why the image did or did 
not have an impact on them. 
Herrera and Reicher's hypotheses were supported by the data. They found that 
pro- and anti-war participants did recall, select and rate images very differently. In 
other words, people belonging to different opinion-groups use different categories to 
describe the same event. As they expected, they also found that participants' choices 
matched the category constructions of the respective movement leader. Hence, the 
way in which each opinion group used the categories reflected the most prototypical 
ingroup position (this was especially true in the case of pro-war respondents). 
This paper is especially illustrative and of importance to opinion-based groups 
as it reflects, on the one hand, the actual formation of the opinion-based groups in 
relation to a relevant social issue (i.e., the 1991 Gulf War). On the other hand, it 
exemplifies how these opinion-based groups variously reflect the social categories 
involved and the relations between these social categories. This paper, thus, supports 
the point discussed earlier that opinion-based groups are often about categories and 
relations between categories. Moreover, the paper shows how, by shaping members 
perceptions about the social world, opinion-based groups influence the subsequent 
behaviours of their members. 
These studies show that opinion-based groups were used by other researchers 
in the field, even if they were not formally recognized as such. They also emphasize 
the previous point that opinion-based groups are especially relevant for studying 
participation in different forms of collective action (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; 
Simonet a1.1998, 2000,2001; Stfumer et al., 2003) but they are also used to elaborate 
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the point of how the content of social categories is constructed and changed (Herrera 
& Reicher, 1998). After focusing on several examples about how opinion-based 
groups has been previously employed in the literature, in the next I will deal with two 
main classes of process on which opinion-based could have a high impact: social 
identity and minority influence processes. 
Implications ofthe Opinion-based Group Concept for Studying Social Identity 
and Minority Influence Processes 
Opinion-based groups seem to be well suited for capturing the relationship 
between collective self-definition and group behaviour for a number of reasons. First, 
opinion-based groups are often formed primarily to convert broad ideologies or 
affinities into collective action. As I mentioned earlier, unified social action is aimed 
either to create social change or to preserve, the status quo. Adopting early social 
identity ideas (Tajfel & Turner, 1986) and building on Klanderman's (2000) 
suggestion, such action is not simply taken by people who have a social change belief 
system. Those people must also share an opinion about achieving or rejecting social 
change. Depending on the opinion they hold, they can be considered to be members of 
one opinion-based group or another (e.g., pro or anti-change of the status quo). The 
consequence of that is that members of such groups may be particularly prone to take 
action. This is because, although social mobility is practically possible and relatively 
easy compared to other types of groups, there is still little reason for social mobility, 
due primarily to the fact that membership in such group is based on members' 
commitment to hold a certain opinion in relation to some issue (subjectively the 
membership involves a personal choice). According to social identity theory, the one 
option left to members is the social change alternative. If we follow this logic, these 
groups should be especially orientated towards social change, and they should 
commonly have more collective action type behaviours associated with them. 
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Secondly, following from the first point, compared to many other groups, 
opinion-based groups are less ambiguous in relation to associated group behaviours. 
This is because, opinion-based group membership hinges on agreement between the 
members and this agreement implies some courses of action and rules out other 
alternative actions. Moreover, in the case of social categories the content of that 
respective category will determine what members will do or not (i.e., the definition of 
category content determines the direction of behaviour or action), but in the case of 
opinion-based groups appropriate content will tend to correspond with the opinion 
which the group is based on. Thus, in the case of opinion-based groups the direction 
of action should be much clearer for members than in the case of many social 
categories. As Kelly and Breinlinger (1995) showed, being a woman does not imply a 
particular stance on gender equality, but membership of a feminist opinion-based 
group will tend to imply much clearer stances and courses of action. In opinion-based 
groups behaviours that are usually preferred and adopted by members should be easier 
to predict. Thus, in opinion-based groups, highly normative behaviours are much 
easier to detect and define compared to other types of groups or social categories. 
In addition, opinion-based groups can be psychologically significant for their 
members and can provide a basis for strong opinions (also being usually 
oppositionally defined), which tends to make them associated with intergroup conflict 
in a higher degree than other types of groups or social categories. As shown in 
Chapter 3, that intergroup conflict is a contextual enhancer of the relationship between 
self-definition as a group member and behaviour. As social identity and self-
categorization theories maintain, in conditions of intense intergroup conflict the 
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salience of group membership is increased, and this makes group members behave 
more in line with their group norms (Haslam eta!., 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1986; 
Turner et a!., 1987). The implication here is, then, that in such opinion-based groups 
where conflict is implicit, the relationship between self-definition as a group member 
and group behaviour should be stronger and more evident compared to other types of 
groups and social categories. 
Thirdly, another important implication of the concept of opinion-based group 
in relation to the relationship between self-definition as group member and group 
behaviour is that identification with a particular opinion-based group seems to be a 
much better predictor for group-relevant behaviours compared to identification with 
a broader social category. This argument is strongly supported by research conducted 
by Kelly and Breinlinger (1995), and Simon and colleagues (Simonet a!, 1998, 2000; 
Stiirmer eta!., 2003). To take another example, if we look for instance at emotions of 
collective guilt and associated behaviours of Australians in relation to the treatment of 
Indigenous Australians, commitment to an official apology by the Australian 
government is not so well predicted by national identification with the broader 
category Australians. Identification with an opinion group made-up of people who are 
supporters of an official apology, that is they share an opinion that official apology is 
an appropriate response, would be a much better predictor of associated behaviours 
such as signing a sorry book, going to a rally, and voting for a pro-apology party (see 
McGarty & Bliuc, in press). 
Finally, the idea of opinion-based groups also has implications in the minority 
influence processes (Moscovici, 1980; Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969; 
Muguy & Perez, 1991). For instance, in the process of minority conversion, there is 
always a minority that consistently represents a clear and coherent position differing 
121 
from that of the majority which can change the viewpoint of the majority (Clark, 
2001). It can be argued that when a broader group or social category is divided into 
two opinion-based groups, often there is 'minority opinion-based group' which 
attempts to achieve some change in a majority view as illustrated by the previous 
example of gender categories and feminist opinion-based groups. 
Another good illustration of this point is Reginald Rose's play Twelve Angry 
Men. This is the story of a group of 12 jurors who are brought together to deliberate 
and decide after hearing the facts in a seemingly simple murder trial case. At the 
beginning, the group of jurors is composed of two subgroups, one representing the 
majority position and the other one the minority, which actually consists of only one 
member. The way in which the two factions see the "objective facts" presented during 
the trials is completely different, the majority members are convinced that the 
defendant is guilty of murder and they see every fact as a proof of his guilt, while the 
minority member is convinced of the opposite, his innocence. Thus, in this case, there 
are basically two opinion-based groups formed in relation to the position of members 
regarding the guilt/innocence of the defendant in the murder trial. This minority 
influence paradigm was actually experimentally tested by a series of several studies 
conducted by Clark (1999a, 1999b, 1998, 1994, 1990) who showed that persuasive 
minority arguments could indeed affect a majority. 
The Twelve Angry Men paradigm is, of course, an extreme example based on 
a fictional account, but it captures the minority influence dynamics very well, 
especially in relation to opinion-based groups. For instance, the point that the 
minorities seem to be more consistent is illustrated by the fact that the minority 
member is presented as much more coherent and certain about his point compared to 
the majority members. The persuasion process is nicely illustrated next when, 
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following the certain minority member's arguments, the members of the majority 
change their position one by one and finally they all reach consensus about the 
innocence of the defendant. The relevance of this fictional account consists of two 
important points. Firstly, the account is a good example of the way opinion-based 
groups are created in everyday life. The second point relates to theories of minority 
influence processes and Moscovici' s (1976) model of social influence, and 
specifically to the idea that minority groups are more influential because they are 
consistent. It is important to note here that their great consistency stems from and 
conveys certainty about the minority group's position (Moscovici, 1976). According 
to Moscovici and colleagues (Moscovici & Faucheux, 1972) the most important 
behavioural style in the process of minority influence is consistency, and as Turner 
(1991) also observes "consistency is a sign of certainty and commitment to a coherent 
choice" (p.87). 
This idea is relevant in relation to the next section in which I focus on the 
importance of the certainty concept in opinion-based groups, where I make the 
argument that the salience of opinion-based groups can be measured in terms of 
certainty. 
Capturing the Social Identity Salience in Opinion-based Groups 
Social identity salience is generally recognized by researchers as a difficult 
variable to measure compared with other social identity constructs such as 
identification or ingroup favouritism. As other authors have also noted, social identity 
salience is rarely measured directly even though attempts are often made to 
manipulate it (Haslam eta!., 1999). Early studies on religious group membership 
manipulated salience through "vivid reminders" or increasing the awareness of group 
membership (Charters & Newcomb, 1952). In such studies, participants were made 
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aware of a particular group affiliation or through such procedures as open and public 
group identification, or simply being told that they were participating in research as 
group representatives (Charters & Newcomb, 1952; Festinger, 1947; Kelley, 1955; 
Lambert, Libman, & Poser, 1960; see Oakes, 1987, p.119). Other manipulations of 
salience include using intergroup comparisons (Bochner & Ohsako, 1977; Bochner & 
Perks, 1971; Bruner & Perlmutter, 1957; Doise, Deschamps & Meyer, 1978; Wilder 
& Shapiro, 1984), intergroup conflict (Myers, 1962; Ryen & Kalm, 1975), 
separateness and clarity of categorization (Brown & Turner, 1979; Buss & Portnoy, 
1967), and public commitment to a group membership (McGarty, Haslam, 
Hutchinson, & Turner, 1994). 
There have been several attempts to manipulate salience by manipulating the 
accessibility of a social identity. Accessibility-based manipulations of salience 
generally involve attempts to increase or decrease participants' awareness of their 
membership in a particular group (and hence their readiness to perceive themselves in 
terms of that categorization). Basic strategies to increase accessibility include 
assigning only some participants to groups (Grieve & Hogg, 1999), making some 
participants wear a group-relevant uniform (Gaertner, Marm, Murrell, & Dovidio, 
1989; Worchel, Rothgerber, Day, Hart, & Butemeyer, 1998), or decorating 
participants' response environment with group-relevant signs such as posters or 
harmers (see Haslam, 2001). 
Expressed social identification was also often used as a mean of measuring 
salience, especially as a check where salience was manipulated (Haslam, 2001; 
McGarty et al., 1994). For example, Verkuyten and Hagendoom (1998) manipulated 
the salience of social identity and in order to check their manipulation they used 
identification items from scales ofLuhanen and Crocker (1982) and Rosenberg 
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(1965). Other researchers such as Hogg and colleagues frequently used perceived 
group identification as a mean to check salience of social identity (Hogg, Cooper-
Shaw, & Holzworth, 1993, Hogg, Hains, & Mason, 1998; Wellen eta!., 1998). This is 
a reasonable way of capturing salience because, according to McGarty (1999a), one of 
the consequences of depersonalized self-perception are expressions of identification: 
One common example of such group normative behaviour is the public 
statement of private recognition of one's identity as a group member. 
That is, under conditions of salient social categorization people are 
more likely to express identification with the group. In other words, if 
we measure identification under conditions of high social category 
salience we will find that identification is high. (p.l93) 
Haslam and colleagues (1999) manipulated social identity salience by asking 
participants questions intended either to activate a national social identity or a 
personal identity. This research is of interest to the empirical work of the thesis 
because it included a manipulation check of salience. Their manipulation check was a 
single item measure related to the importance of the category (nationality) to the 
perceiver ("Being a member of Group X is important to me", see Haslam, 2001, 
p.367). They assumed that nationality would be perceived to be more important when 
a nationality-based social category was salient. 
Given that importance relates to centrality and strength of a group membership 
it is reasonable to use it as an indicator of salience. For opinion-based groups it might 
be easier to capture salience in other ways. That is because when a particular opinion-
based group membership is salient, sharing the respective opinion becomes part of 
collective self-definition, so that generally speaking, the degree of certainty associated 
with that opinion should reflect salience in a reasonably accurate way. I suggest that 
the certainty with which the categorization is applied to the self should be the best 
indicator of salience for such opinion-based groups. 
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This is also because, according to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; 
Turner eta!., 1987), a category is salient when it is cognitively prepotent or switched 
on. That is, in order to be salient the perception of the category has to be strong and 
powerful. I would argue that the clearest definition of a strong perception is one that 
the perceiver is certain about. Conceptually, certainty is a subjective sense of 
conviction or validity about one's attitude or opinion (Festinger, 1950, 1954). As 
Gross, Holtz, and Miller (1995) note, appropriate synonyms of subjective certainty are 
perceivers' sense of attitude or opinion confidence, conviction, commitment, 
correctness, surety, or finnness. According to self-categorization theory, features such 
as clarity, coherence and separateness of the identity are expected to increase when a 
social identity is salient. As all of these relate to certainty perceivers should be more 
certain that some group membership describes them when it is psychologically salient 
(for a different view see Hogg & Abrams, 1993). Thus, in opinion-based groups 
where group formation is actually based on a set of beliefs or shared ideas, certainty 
of self-definition in relation to that particular opinion should be the most direct way to 
capture salience. The strength of these beliefs or certainty about their correctness as 
well as certainty of self-definition seem to the most probable and direct indicators of 
salience especially for such groups. 
Moreover, when one particular social category is salient, according to the 
social identity approach, individuals should be motivated to seek positive 
distinctiveness between ingroup and outgroup, that is people who become aware of 
their group membership search for ways to distinguish their group from the others. 
Thus, between- category differences and within-category similarities are accentuated, 
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and this also leads to the polarization of group-definitional nonns (McGarty, Turner, 
Hogg, David, & Wetherell, 1992; Turner, Wetherell & Hogg, 1989). It is suggested 
that group polarization depends on subjective group membership, which enhances the 
perceptual extremization of group characteristics occurring during the process of 
categorization (see also Mackie & Cooper, 1984). Haslam and Turner (1992, 1995) 
also explore the idea that extreme positions are a self-categorical basis for polarized 
judgements. They emphasize the point that: 
extremists tend to make more polarized judgements of social stimuli 
than do the moderates, and thereby tend to accentuate (or exaggerate) 
the differences between different classes of such stimuli. (Haslam & 
Turner, 1995, p. 341) 
In other words, the extremists perceive the social world more in "self-
categorical terms, more black and white" (p.368) than do the moderates, thus for the 
extremists social stimuli are much clearer and distinctive which entails that they will 
be more certain about their perceptions. Haslam and Turner (1995) also argue that "a 
given stimulus will be perceived to share the same social category membership as the 
stereotyper (i.e., be representative,protorypical, of the stereotyper's ingroup)" 
(p.343). It can be inferred then, that prototypicality in the case of extremist perceivers 
can be equated to certainty and clarity of perception which actually reflects a salient 
self-category. Following from this point, it can be argued that extremity of opinion 
should be a reflection of opinion-based group membership salience. However, I 
would suggest that in this situation, the most extreme opinion need not be merely the 
most radical, but the one people are most certain about. 
However, it is important to clarify that the construct of certainty is not related 
to salience in any way for social categories or other types of groups. This construct as 
an indicator of salience works only for opinion-based groups which are highly 
contextually variable but in the case of social categories for instance, things are 
different (e.g., somebody can always be certain that she is a woman, but variably 
certain that she is a pro-feminist). 
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Finally, it is worth noting that other researchers have used certainty as a way 
to assess attitude strength. For example Bassili (1993), used measures of certainty for 
the purpose of predicting discrepancies between voting intentions and actual voting 
behaviour. Measures of certainty have been previously shown to moderate the 
relationship between attitudes and behaviours (e.g., Davidson, Yantis, Norwood, & 
Montano, 1985; Fabio, & Zanna, 1978; Sample & Warland, 1973). Certainty was 
assessed in this case by a single question about the finality of the voting intention (i.e., 
"Would you say that your choice of the party is final, or that you may still 
change your mind?", Bassili, 1993, p. 57). However, in this example, this certainty 
measure reflects more a construct of confidence about future behaviours rather than 
certainty about self-definition as holding a particular opinion. 
Conclusion 
The idea of the opinion-based group which is expanded in this chapter seems 
to get us to a resolution concerning the circumstances in which the relationship 
between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour is the strongest 
possible. While Chapters 3 and 4 pointed out factors such as intergroup conflict and 
normativeness of group behaviour which enhance this relationship, the present chapter 
presents a type of group with features which enable it to comprise both factors. 
Specifically, there are three key points about opinion-based groups. Firstly, the 
way in which opinion-based groups are formed means that conflict will often be 
present. Secondly, the very nature of opinion-based groups makes group normative 
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behaviour much easier to detect and define for members of such groups. Finally, 
studying this type of group would enable researchers to actually capture the 
relationship between identification, salience and group behaviour in a more accurate 
way. Using opinion-based groups helps address the unresolved problem of how to 
assess social identity salience in a valid way. Certainty about position in the case of 
opinion-based groups is potentially a good indicator of their social identity salience. 
These ideas provide the basis for a series of hypotheses which are presented in the 
next chapter. 
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CHAPTER6 
SUMMARY OF THE THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS CONCERNING THE 
LINK BETWEEN SELF-DEFINITION AS A GROUP MEMBER AND GROUP 
BEHAVIOUR AND OVERVIEW OF THE EMPIRICAL WORK TO BE 
PRESENTED 
Introduction 
The main objectives of this chapter are firstly, to offer a short overview of the 
most important theoretical ideas presented up to this point as they relate to the 
questions addressed in this thesis. Secondly I will present the main hypotheses 
formulated on the basis on the theoretical review, and finally, I will introduce the 
empirical work conducted in order to test these hypotheses. 
As I mentioned in the first chapter the main question addressed in this thesis is 
when do people decide to take collective action in relation to shared ideas. From 
social identity perspective collective action is determined by the group members' self-
definition and the present social context. In other words, the relationship between self-
definition as a group member (i.e., identification and salience) and group behaviour, 
depends to a considerable degree on the conditions created by the intergroup context. 
Based on the previous literature review in Chapters 3 and 4, the conditions or the 
specific factors which contribute to the enhancement of the relationship between 
group self-definition and relevant behaviours are intergroup conflict and 
normativeness of group behaviours. In the next section I will focus on summarizing 
some previous points about the relationship between self-definition as a group 
member and relevant group behaviour and the factors which might enhance this 
relationship. 
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When Should the Relationship between Group Self-definition and Relevant 
Group Behaviour be Strong? 
Returning to the main question of the thesis, the answer proposed here is that 
self-definition as a group member is likely to lead to a decision to take politically 
relevant action: 
1. where group members define themselves in terms of a shared group 
membership which is psychologically significant and also relevant for 
action. That is, firstly, they should identify with a certain group which is 
action-orientated or it has the potential to become one, and secondly, this 
group membership should be salient in a given social context; 
2. where intergroup context is defined in conflictual or at least oppositional 
terms (i.e., if there is an identifiable out group which can be perceived as 
opposed to or in competition with the ingroup ), and 
3. where norms in relation to behaviours are easy to detect for group members 
(i.e., there are behaviours which are clearly normatively consistent with 
collective action associated to this group). 
Thus, politically relevant collective action is more likely to occur under these 
conditions, but these conditions are often simultaneously met with politically relevant 
opinion-based groups. That is, opinion-based groups are usually highly relevant to 
action. As detailed in Chapter 5, opinion-based groups represent vehicles which serve 
to convert broad ideologies or shared opinions into collective action. Powerful social 
movements and associated actions are often based on a single predominant idea or 
opinion (e.g., anti-war on terror movements or 'single-issue pressure' groups, Kelly & 
Breinlinger, 1995). 
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Moreover, they can be psychologically significant for their members and there 
is always a potential for intergroup competition when opinion-based groups are 
involved, as they tend to be oppositionally defined and mutually exclusive. Another 
important point is that in opinion-based groups normative behaviours can be easier to 
detect compared to other types of groups or social categories. As explained in Chapter 
5, opinion-based groups, being formed around one clear position, are usually 
associated with unambiguous courses of action. Thus, normative behaviours are more 
likely to be adopted in such groups, as there is a general consensus about what these 
behaviours are. For example, in the case of "anti-war on terror" activists (I use this 
example because it clearly involves an action group formed around an opinion), 
certain options for behaviour are limited by the norms and nature of the group. For 
example, members can participate in a peaceful march or rally, join an organized 
group having the same objective, express their views by writing, or campaign against 
their goverrunent, but a violent demonstration might be rejected as inconsistent with 
the peace-oriented ideals of the movement, and to take a more fanciful example, a 
donation to a terrorist group would be rejected out of hand (because the movement is 
not pro-terrorist but "anti-war on terror"). 
Furthermore, the predictive power of self-definition as an opinion-group 
member in relation to group behaviours might improve if we can find measures which 
do a better job of capturing salience than the customary salience measures do. It is 
proposed here that for opinion-based groups such measures would include certainty 
items (such as certainty of self- definition, certainty about the position held). 
Considering these points, it seems crucial to investigate the relationship 
between group self-definition and different forms of collective action using opinion-
based groups. It is also worth emphasizing the empirical advantages of using opinion-
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based groups in research. For almost any socially relevant issue in a given historical 
context it should be possible to find two opinion-based groups which are likely to be 
psychologically significant for many members. Thus, it is plausible that people will 
identifY with such groups even in laboratory settings and this should make it easy to 
detect the impact upon variables such as behavioural intentions. 
The Predictive Role of Group Self-definition of Collective Behaviours. 
General Predictions Regarding this Relationship 
Having in view all these points, a number of generic hypotheses can be 
formulated. Firstly, self-definition as a group member is influenced by the intergroup 
context, or in other words, self-definition as a group member is highly context-
dependent. That is, according to the social identity approach, the specific intergroup 
context such as perceived intergroup conflict should make group members see 
themselves more in terms of their group membership, rather than as separate 
individuals. Thus, following intergroup conflict, the extent to which people perceive 
themselves as sharing a common group membership should increase. 
Intergroup conflict Self-definition as a 
group member 
Figure 6.1. The relationship between intergroup conflict and self-definition as a 
group member 
Secondly, according to the self-categorization theory, there is another 
important link to focus on. That is, self-definition as a group member should also 
predict group behaviour. More specifically, to the extent to which people come to 
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perceive themselves in terms of a particular group membership rather than in terms of 
individual entities, the likelihood for them to behave in line with the group norms 
should increase. Group self-definition should predict normative group behaviour but 
considering the effect of intergroup context on this relationship, this relationship 
should be especially strong in conditions of clear intergroup conflict. 
Self-definition as a Group relevant 
group member behaviour 
Figure 6.2. The relationship between selj~definition as a group member and group 
relevant behaviour 
In addition, self-definition as a group member should be an even better 
predictor of group behaviour related to collective action in the case of groups which 
are highly relevant to action, which include many opinion-based groups. Thus, the 
link between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be 
relatively strong in opinion-based groups especially when they are formed around 
politically or socially relevant issues (e.g., groups of feminist activists, supporters of 
political parties, etc.). In this case, opinion-based groups are particularly useful, as 
they can be directly relevant to collective action. 
Finally, self-definition as an opinion-based group member should be a better 
predictor of group behaviour when the behaviours involved are perceived to be highly 
normative for the group. Thus, where behaviours are highly relevant for group 
members and strongly in line with group norms, the link between self-definition as a 
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group member and group behaviour should be stronger as well. In addition, this link 
should be weaker, or should not exist at all, in the case of non-normative or less 
normative behaviours. 
Self-definition as an Normative 
opmwn group ~ behaviours related 
member to collective action 
Non-normative or 
less normative 
behaviour 
Figure 6.3. The relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group 
member and normative and non-normative behavaviours 
Overview of the Empirical Work 
to be Presented 
In the next four chapters I will present a number of experiments and surveys I 
conducted involving different opinion-based groups in order to investigate these ideas. 
A number of more specific hypotheses derived from the general predictions presented 
here also have been tested. The opinion-based groups used ranged from minimal 
artificial opinion-based groups to real political opinion groups formed around political 
or social issues. There are two streams of research that I will anticipate here. 
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In Chapter 7 I will present two experimental studies (Studies 1 and 2) 
involving minimal opinion-based groups. These studies are based on the literature 
review on the effects of intergroup conflict on self-definition as a group member and 
group behaviour (see Chapter 3). More specifically, according to social identity 
theory, in conditions of clear and intense intergroup conflict, group members come to 
behave more in line with norms prescribed by their group membership. As self-
categorization theory argues, group members behave more consistently with their 
group norms because, in conditions of intergroup conflict they come to perceive 
themselves more in group terms as their group membership identities become more 
salient. Therefore, in Studies I and 2 intergroup conflict was experimentally 
manipulated. The main hypothesis tested here was that intergroup conflict should 
impact upon self-definition as a group member, which should be reflected in an 
increase in expressed identification, certainty about ingroup position and normative 
responses such as ingroup favouritism. In these initial studies I was primarily 
interested in variations in the mean level of responses and not in the strength of the 
relationships between variables. 
Then in Chapter 8 I will start the presentation of a series of studies using real 
opinion-based groups that are (potentially) the basis for actual political activity. In 
these studies I will be focusing on testing the hypothesized relationships between the 
constructs. That is rather than looking at variation in the mean levels of (say) 
identification and salience I will be looking at the relationship between measures of 
these constructs and intention to take a variety of different forms of action in multiple 
contexts. 
136 
CHAPTER 7 
THE EFFECTS OF INTERGROUP CONFLICT ON THE RELATIONSHIP 
BETWEEN SELF-DEFINITION AS A GROUP MEMBER AND GROUP 
BEHAVIOUR: STUDIES 1 AND 2 
Introduction 
In this chapter I will present two experiments testing some ideas that stems 
from the theoretical perspectives outlined in Chapter 3 on intergroup conflict. To 
reiterate one of the main points of Chapter 3, intergroup conflict should act as a 
contextual enhancer of the relationship between self-definition as a group member and 
group behaviour. In other words, from a social identity perspective intergroup conflict 
should increase the salience of group memberships and thereby lead to attitudes and 
behaviours that are more in line with group norms and values. Thus, in conditions of 
intergroup conflict increased self-perception in terms of a particular group 
membership should lead to behaviours which are more in line with the respective 
group norms. According to social identity theory, the relationship should be: 
Self-
Intergroup perception in terms 
• 
Group 
conflict of a specific group behaviour 
membership 
Figure 7.1. The relationship between intergroup conflict, self-perception in terms of a 
group membership and group behaviour 
Exploring the relationship anticipated by social identity theory enables us to 
refine the understanding of the basic effects of conflict. That is, as self-categorization 
theorists argue, conflict should lead to salient self-categorization at the group level 
(depersonalization) and according to McGarty (1999) this should be followed by: 
a) stronger expressions of identification with the group; 
b) stronger confidence in the ingroup position (strength of position or 
certainty); 
c) group-normative responses including stronger ingroup favouritism 
(because ingroup favouritism is likely to be viewed as a highly normative 
behaviour in conditions of conflict). 
In order to examine these ideas from a social identity perspective, the 
empirical challenge is to create conflict between groups without introducing 
competition over resources or conflict of interests (and thereby introduce an 
alternative realistic group conflict explanation). In this regard, I believe that of all 
groups, exclusively defined opinion groups are particularly useful. 
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As detailed in Chapter 5, opinion-based groups seem to be particularly 
appropriate for investigating the effect of intergroup conflict on the relationship 
between self-definition as a group member and group-based responses. To reiterate 
the main arguments presented in Chapter 5 one important reason why opinion-based 
groups are particularly useful for studying intergroup conflict is that in such groups 
there is almost inevitable competition between groups as to which of their 
(conflicting) views is actually correct. Such groups tend to be exclusively and 
contrastively defined and where this is the case their positions cannot be both correct 
at the same time to the same degree. In such groups intergroup competition can 
therefore be appropriate and highly normative. 
In addition, opinion-based groups can be psychologically significant for their 
members and can provide a basis for strong opinions, which means they can be 
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associated with clear intergroup conflict. In the real world opinion-based groups do 
not exist in a vacuum, there is a communication between and within them. Group 
members naturally provide feedback to each other in the form of validation and 
invalidation of opinion. For example, the behaviour of people participating in a rally 
to support a certain position is all about providing strong ingroup validation and 
out group invalidation of a view. Ingroup validation and out group invalidation thus 
provide the essential core of political protest carried out by members of opinion-based 
groups (i.e., we carry out protests to communicate that 'we' are right and 'they' are 
wrong). Members of opinion-based groups cannot invalidate the ingroup position and 
validate the outgroup position without effectively leaving the group. For example, 
someone cannot define themselves as a supporter of a gay rights movement but 
believe at the same time that the substantive position of the opposite group (anti-gay 
rights) is more correct than that of their own group. Of course, they could potentially 
accept an individual stereo typic outgroup position (e.g., that a particular form of 
protest was ineffective) but logically they cannot believe that an anti-gay right stance 
is in general more correct than the pro-gay rights stance. At best, it could be slightly 
less correct from that view point. 
Consequently, group validation of position can be used as a way of 
manipulating conflict between opinion-based groups. Where both groups strongly 
validate their own position conflict should be clear and both groups would be 
expected to act in line with their norms. Where both groups weakly validate their own 
position conflict is vague and group normative action would be lessened. Logically, 
there are four logical possibilities, however: 
1. Both groups can strongly validate their own position, so in this case the 
disagreement between groups is strong and this corresponds to a high 
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degree of comparative and normative fit. People would expect that two 
contrasting! y defined opinion groups will strongly disagree with each other 
by validating their own position and invalidating the outgroup position. This 
creates conditions of clear conflict. 
2. The ingroup could strongly validate its own position while the outgroup 
weakly validates its own position. This ingroup superiority claim should 
still entail relatively high fit from the ingroup perspective. 
3. The outgroup could strongly validate its own position where the ingroup 
only weakly validates its own position (lower fit). This creates conditions of 
a an outgroup superiority claim and relatively lower fit than cases I and 2 
from the ingroup perspective, though it may also amplifY outgroup threat. 
4. Both groups could weakly validate their own positions, creating vague 
conflict and relatively low fit. 
These four cases are illustrated in Figure 8.1. In each case the figure shows the 
position of the ingroup and out group in terms ofthe degree to which they see 
themselves as superior to the other group. 
1. 
low 
Claimed superiority over the other group 
Out group 
2. 
low 
Claimed superiority over the other group 
Ingroup 
Outgroup 
high 
Ingroup 
high 
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Ingroup Outgroup 
3. 
low high 
Claimed superiority over the other group 
In group 
Out group 
4. 
low high 
Claimed superiority over the other group 
Figure 7.2. Four cases of validation ofingroup and outgroup positions 
As indicated, the fit between expectations and reality in these cases should 
affect the salience of the social categorization. According to the principle of meta-
contrast (Turner, 1985; Oakes, 1987, see Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, Turner, & 
Onorato, 1995), the ratio of interclass differences and intraclass differences should be 
proportional to salience. Ingroup members expect strong ingroup validation and 
strong out group invalidation (especially in the case of exclusively defined opinion-
based groups), so the highest salience should be where there is stark disagreement. 
These considerations lead to the formulation of the following hypothesis: 
strong intergroup conflict produced by a combination of strong ingroup validation and 
strong out group validation of the ingroup position should increase salience and hence 
group normative responses. 
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In order to investigate this hypothesis minimal opinion-based groups were 
artificially created. The groups are minimal in the sense that they had no prior history 
and no real meaning for the members as they are formed around a trivial issue 
(choosing one or the other classification for a series of eight political statements). It 
was considered that using minimal opinion-based groups would be suitable for 
exploring the basic processes that occur in these groups in conditions of intergroup 
conflict. Using these minimal opinion-based groups would also enable us to create a 
subjective conflict (i.e., subjective conflict) and to explore opinion group formation in 
relation to stark disagreement. Given the decision to explore these questions using 
minimal opinion-based groups, theoretical and practical considerations dictated some 
empirical choices that need to be explained here. One question was how to measure 
salience. The default strategy in the literature appears to be to use expressed social 
identification (e.g., Haslam, 2001; McGarty, 1999a; Verkuyten & Hagendoom, 1998). 
Given the issues raised in Chapter 5, however, I also incorporated a measure of 
subjective confidence in the position, the reasoning being that certainty in the position 
should be related to self-definition as an opinion-based group member. 
The other key issue was how to measure the group normative responses that 
would follow from salient opinion-based group membership. Given the focus of this 
thesis the most obvious measures would be intentions to take politically relevant 
action. Given that these groups were minimal in the sense of having no past (and no 
plausible future) this would have been unrealistic. I therefore measured group 
normative responses in terms of ingroup favouritism. The argument is that where 
group members are prepared to favour the normative view of their ingroup they may 
be more likely to act in line with this view. 
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In summary, the prediction was that clear intergroup conflict would increase a) 
expressed identification, b) certainty in the ingroup position, and c) ingroup 
favouritism. 
Overview and Design 
Study 1 
Method 
The experiment involved a 2 (strong or weak ingroup validation) X 2 (strong 
or weak outgroup validation) X 2 (phase) design with repeated measures on the last 
factor. The experiment involved assigning participants to artificial opinion-based 
groups on the basis of asking them to perform an attitude statement classification task 
and then to evaluate their own group and the outgroup, before and after receiving 
feedback from both the ingroup and outgroup about the relative self-perceived 
statuses of the two groups. 
Participants 
The participants were 74 female and male first and second year psychology 
students at Petre Andrei University of Iasi, Romania. They were randomly allocated 
to one of the conditions. Their participation in this experiment was as part of a 
practical activity class. 
Procedure 
Participants attended their normal practical classes. The experiment involved 
three main phases. 
Pretest 
Participants were classified into two groups on the basis of their completion of 
an attitude classification task. First the participants received identical sheets with 
eight statements concerning attitudes about one large minority group (in Romania, 
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Romanians of Hungarian descent, most of whom live in or are from Transylvania) 
and/or attitudes to minorities in general. Half the statements were about Hungarians 
and half the statements were about minorities in general. Half the statements 
expressed favonrable attitudes toward a minority or minorities and half expressed 
unfavorable attitudes. Participants had to choose between two classifications of these 
statements each of which included all the statements in two classes offonr statements. 
These classifications involved separating the statements in (AI) those about 
Hungarians and (A2) those not about Hungarians or (Bl) favonrable to minorities 
and (B2) unfavourable to minorities. As it happened 27 participants chose the first 
classification and 47 participants chose the second one. As the differences between 
classifications were trivial in terms of the purpose of the experiment, the data below 
have been collapsed across the two classifications. 
The preference of participants for one or the other of these classifications was 
used as the basis of a social categorization. Participants were told that they would 
receive feedback from members of two groups: both their ingroup which had 
classified the statements in the way they had themselves and the outgroup (which had 
chosen the other classification). It is important to reiterate that the participants were 
not classified on the basis of their agreement with the statements (i.e., it did not matter 
whether the participant was pro- or anti-minority). These groups are minimal in terms 
of their having no prior history or personal meaning associated. They are opinion-
based because the basis of classification is an opinion (i.e., either classification A is 
better than B or classification B is better than A), and they are exclusively defined 
because a participant could not prefer both classifications at the same time. 
Next, the participants completed a number of ratings in each case using a 
scale from I to I 00. First, as a measnre of ingroup favouritism they evaluated both 
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their own group's and the outgroup's classifications on a scale from I (extremely bad) 
to I 00 (extremely good). They also rated their confidence that their choice was 
correct ("Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling about 
how certain you are that your group's categorization is the best categorization."). 
They then rated ingroup performance ("How well do you think your group performed 
the classification task?"). Next, they completed a six-item identification scale based 
on items drawn from work by Ellemers, Kortekaas and van Ouwerkerk (1999) and 
other social identity researchers. The items measured long term identification 
("Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling of 
belongingness to this group"; "I identify with other members of this group"), current 
identification ("Being a member of a group is an important part of how I see myself at 
this moment"), and social self-esteem ("Please write down the number that best 
corresponds to your feeling about yourself as a member of this group", "My 
membership in this group is important to me"). Finally they rated perceived similarity 
to other ingroup members ("Please write down the number that corresponds best to 
your perception of how similar you are to other members of your group"). Their 
responses were collected and ostensibly were oollated. 
Feedback phase 
After about half an hour the participants received feedback sheets which 
contained their own ratings of the ingroup and outgroup classifications and the 
purported average ratings given by the ingroup and outgroup of both the ingroup and 
outgroup classifications. Each of the four ratings was either high (in the range 83 to 
85) or moderate (in the range 52 to 55). Given that the groups had been formed on the 
basis of their preferred rating we ensured that each group's self-rating was at least one 
point higher than its rating of the other group. Thus, the participants were given 
feedback on the average rating of the ingroup and outgroup (see Appendix I). 
There were four different conditions: 
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I. Clear intergroup conflict: both groups perceived themselves to be superior to each 
other as in the example given above (strong ingroup validation/strong outgroup 
validation): 
"The average rating of your own group classification by your group was 85 points. 
The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification by the other group was 83 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 53 
points." 
2. Ingroup superiority claim: the ingroup perceived itself to be superior to the 
out group/ and the out group perceived itself as approximately equal to the ingroup 
(strong ingroup validation/ weak outgroup validation): 
"The average rating of your own group classification was 85 points. 
The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification was 53 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 51 
points." 
3. Outgroup superiority claim: the ingroup perceived itself to be approximately equal 
to the outgroup and the outgroup perceived itself to be superior to the ingroup (weak 
ingroup validation/strong outgroup validation): 
"The average rating of your own group classification was 55 points. 
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The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification was 83 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 54 
points." 
4. Vague intergroup conflict: both groups (ingroup and outgroup) perceived 
themselves to be approximately equal in status (weak ingroup validation/ weak 
outgroup validation): 
"The average rating of your own group classification was 55 points. 
The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 52 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification was 53 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 50 
points." 
These four cells entail a 2 X 2 between-subjects design with the factors being 
ingroup validation (strong or weak) and outgroup validation (strong or weak). 
Table 7.1. The experimental design (feedback stage) 
Ingroup validation 
Weak Strong 
Out group Weak Vague intergroup Ingroup superiority 
validation conflict claim 
Strong Outgroup superiority Clear intergroup 
claim conflict 
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Validation here refers to self-validation by the ingroup or outgroup of the 
superiority of their own group's classification, so that both strong and weak outgroup 
validation, for example, are also invalidation of the ingroup position, differing only in 
degree. As explained in the Introduction, this is an essential precondition for the 
existence oflogically coherent disagreement between opinion-based groups. 
Posttest 
Following this feedback, participants completed the entire set of dependent 
measures again. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
The first step was to establish whether participants actually identified with the 
contrasting opinion groups we had created. Identification was based on a scale of six 
items. The Cronbach's alpha for these six items was .83 at the pretest and .87 at the 
posttest. The grand mean for the six items at pretest phase was 61.43 declining 
(nonsignificantly) at posttest to 59.17 (see Table 7.2). This indicates that the 
participants expressed an average level of identification that was significantly above 
the scale midpoint at both pretest, t(73) = 5.73, p < .001, and posttest, 1(73) = 3.85, p 
< .001. It is worth noting also that responses on the identification item measuring the 
subjective importance of group membership was significantly higher than the scale 
midpoint for participants at both pretest (M = 62.86), t(73) = 4.43, p < .001 and 
posttest, (M = 63.31) t(73) = 4.51, p < .001. 
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Table 7.2. Means and standard deviations of identification, ingroupfavouritism and 
certainty at the pre-test and post-test. 
Identification M 
SD 
Ingroup favouritism M 
SD 
Certainty M 
SD 
Pre-test 
61.42 
17.42 
31.22 
24.91 
65.13 
18.84 
Post-test 
59.17 
18.22 
23.42 
23.54 
66.74 
17.85 
Given that it was expected that intergroup conflict would have a moderating 
effect on identification, certainty about ingroup position and ingroup favouritism at 
the posttest, it is important to establish that ingroup favouritism actually existed at the 
pretest. The level of ingroup favouritism was 31.22 points, that is, the in group was, on 
average, rated 31.22 points higher than the outgroup, F (1, 70) = 111.81, p < . 001, 17 
2
= .615. In other words, almost 62% of the variance in group ratings was accounted 
for by differences between groups at the pretest phase. This is an extremely large 
effect size as the F ratio converts to an R of. 78. The level of ingroup favouritism was 
approximately the same as the level of favouritism provided in the feedback in the 
strong validation cells (30 points). However, the mean ratings ofingroup (69.48) and 
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outgroup (38.26) classifications were rather lower than the mean group scores (84 and 
59) that were subsequently provided in the feedback. 
Main Analyses 
In order to test the prediction that, in conditions of clear intergroup conflict 
(given by the interaction of strong ingroup position validation and strong outgroup 
position validation), identification, certainty about ingroup position and ingroup 
favouritism should increase, I conducted an analysis of change (gain) scores using 
ANOVA. 
The first step was to compute the change scores for each variable involved that 
is, to compute the differences between pre-test and post-test values for identification, 
certainty about ingroup position and ingroup favouritism. Then, I conducted ANOV A 
with the interaction of ingroup position validation and out group position validation as 
independent variable and the change scores of identification, certainty in ingroup 
position and ingroup favouritism as the dependent variables. 
The results showed that for identification, the interaction of ingroup position 
validation and outgroup position validation had a significant effect, F (1, 74) = 4.3 7, p 
< .05. The change score means of identification for each of the conditions are shown 
in Table 7.3. Follow up tests by the Bonferroni method revealed no significant 
differences. 
150 
Table 7.3. Means and standard deviations of identification change scores. 
Ingroup position validation 
Weak Strong 
Weak 
Outgroup position M -6.44 1.92 
validation SD 9.86 10.77 
Strong 
M -1.19 -3.00 
SD 9.34 11.46 
Contrary to the predictions, the interaction between ingroup and outgroup 
validation did not have any effect on certainty about the ingroup position (F (1, 7 4) = 
0.24, ns. ). However, there was a main effect revealing that certainty about ingroup 
position was increased by ingroup validation (F (1, 74) = 6.33, p < .05). The means 
for this variable are shown in Table 7 .4. 
Table 7.4. Means and standard deviations of certainty about ingroup position change 
scores. 
Ingroup position validation 
Weak Strong 
Outgroup position Weak 
validation M -6.61 3.24 
SD 15.26 12.74 
Strong 
M 0.00 8.71 
SD 10.57 21.25 
In line with predictions, there was a significant interaction between ingroup 
and outgroup position validation on the ingroup favouritism change score (F(l, 74) = 
5.22,p <.05). The means for ingroup favouritism change scores in each of the 
conditions are shown in Table 7.5. Follow up tests revealed that the difference 
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between the vague conflict and ingroup superiority condition was significant (p = 
.051). 
Table 7.5. Means and standard deviations ofingroupfavouritism change scores. 
Ingroup position validation 
Weak Strong 
Outgroup position Weak 
validation M -13.72 4.47 
SD 27.27 13.64 
Strong 
M -8.83 -11.81 
SD 19.62 16.49 
Finally, for the single item evaluating the relative ingroup performance there was no 
performance evaluation item, there was no significant effect (F(I, 74) = .65, ns.). 
Discussion 
This study has yielded a number of key findings. It is worth noting that 
ingroup favouritism in this study was extremely strong. Mullen, Brown and Smith's 
(1992) meta-analysis suggests that ingroup bias effects tend to be of moderate size. 
The effect we obtained at the pretest shows a stronger ingroup favouritism effect than 
any study included in Mullen eta!. (1992)'s meta-analysis (the largest rbeing .73 
compared to the .78 found here). This is all the more notable because this experiment 
involved artificial groups that were not competing over scarce resources and were of 
equal size and status. In other words, the conditions that Mullen eta!. associated with 
strong effects were not implicated in this design. 
The hypotheses that intergroup conflict should affect group members' self-
perception and consequently have an effect on identification, certainty about ingroup 
position and ingroup favouritism were partially supported. Certainty about ingroup 
152 
position was increased by ingroup validation rather than conflict (the interaction of 
ingroup position validation and outgroup position validation). This finding is highly 
consistent with the argument that agreement with similar others (i.e., ingroup 
members) provided by ingroup validation should increase the feeling of subjective 
validity (Festinger, 1954; Turner, 1991) because: 
The perceived, expected or believed agreement of similar others in the 
same situation implies that our behaviour is a function of the objective 
world rather than our personal biases, prejudices and idiosyncrasies. 
(Turner, 1991, p.l61) 
Importantly, identification and ingroup favouritism were affected by the 
intergroup conflict manipulation. In particular, ingroup favouritism was low where 
intergroup conflict was vague. 
Of the three variables investigated, identification was the only one that did not 
vary with the experimental manipulation. The relative stability of identification might 
be due to the way in which identification was measured. The first point here is that 
identification was measured both at the pretest and posttest. The prettest may have 
created pressures for self-consistency resulting in resistance to influence it at the 
posttest. Although, it is, of course, possible that the self-consistency pressures on 
identification are no stronger than pressures applying on other items. 
Secondly, identification measures, unlike certainty about ingroup position and 
ingroup favouritism measures are intended to capture long-term and relatively stable 
attributes of group members. It is also possible that identification was measured in a 
way that was not sufficiently sensitive to the changes brought about by the 
manipulations. Some authors (e.g., McGarty, 1999b; Turner, 1999) have argued that it 
is wise to use contrastive measures of identification (i.e., identification with the 
ingroup versus identification with the out group) in order to detect the dynamic 
changes in self-perception suggested by self-categorization theory. Given this 
argument, the same hypothesis was tested again in a second study, with a different 
method for measuring identification. 
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Additionally, I sought to improve the reliability of the certainty measure by 
adding more items. These reflected perceived accuracy of the ingroup position, 
situational certainty (certainty related to the specific task given to participants), and 
perceived task difficulty (see Mullin & Hogg, 1998). 
Overview and Design 
Study 2 
Method 
As in Study I, this experiment involved a 2 (strong or weak ingroup 
validation) X 2 (strong or weak outgroup validation) X 2 (phase) design with repeated 
measures on the last factor. The experiment involved asking participants to perform a 
classification task and then to evaluate their own group and the outgroup, before and 
after receiving feedback from both the ingroup and the outgroup about the relative 
perceived statuses of the two groups. The changes from Study I are detailed below. 
Participants 
Participants were 64 male and female psychology students at Petre Andrei 
University oflasi, Romania, in their first or second year of study who participated in 
this experiment as part of their normal practical classes. Participants were randomly 
allocated to experimental conditions. 
Procedure 
There were few key changes to the procedure that was used in Study 1. First, 
in order to provide a more comprehensive measure of certainty additional items were 
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added. These included a measure of judgemental confidence (How sure are you that 
the option you chose was correct?), and perceived accuracy (How accurate do you 
think your option/answer is?). Measures of situational certainty (How well have you 
understood the instructions?), and task difficulty (How difficult do you consider the 
task?) were also included. All items were measured on scales from 1 (not at all) to 
100 (complete). Task difficulty, which measured uncertainty rather than certainty, 
was reverse scored to make it consistent with the other measures for the analyses. 
Secondly, identification was measured only at the post-test and was measured 
contrastively. That is, participants were asked which of the two groups they most 
identified with, rather than just how much they identified with their ingroup. 
Identification was measured using a scale comprising eight items, all of which 
measured standard aspects of identification such as similarity, commitment and 
interest in future social interactions with the groups (Please indicate which group you 
see yourself as most similar to? Which group do you most identify with? Which 
group do you more strongly feel that you belong to? Which group is more important 
to you at the moment? Which group are you more committed to? Which group do 
you think should feel more pleased about its performance? Other two items were 
added in order to reflect perceived social attractiveness of the group (Which group do 
you think that you would enjoy meeting and talking to?) and preference for one or 
another group in the case that they would had another choice (If you had the choice 
again which group would you prefer to be a member of?). 
Another change from Study 1 to Study 2 was in the feedback stage. The 
feedback stage in Study 1 required participants to compute themselves the difference 
between the groups' positions. The feedback stage in Study 2 was changed in order to 
make it easier to understand. Instead of giving participants a sheet with all ratings 
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(ingroup and outgroup average ratings), they received a sheet with the differences 
between scores, that is, it was explained exactly how groups rated each classification. 
That is, strong self-validation involved the group favouring its own position by 
between 27 and 32 points. Weak self-validation involved the group favoring its own 
position by 2 to 5 points. For example, in the equal status condition (where each 
group rated their own classification as being approximately equal to that of the other 
group) the participants were told: your group rated its own classification 5 points 
better than the outgroup classification; the other group rated its own classification 3 
points better than your group's classification. Finally, as the single performance 
evaluation item did not seem to be particularly sensitive to the intergroup conflict 
manipulation, it was not included in this version of the questionnaire. 
Results 
Preliminary analyses 
First, a composite measure of certainty was constructed at pretest and posttest 
using the four items. Cronbach's a at pretest (a=. 71) and posttest (a=. 77) were 
acceptable. 
Identification was based on a scale of eight items measured at post-test. The 
Cronbach's alpha for these eight items was a= .84. The grand mean for the eight 
items was 76.19. This indicates that the participants expressed an average level of 
identification that was significantly above the scale midpoint, t(61) = 13.95, p < .001. 
The response on the subjective importance of group membership item was also 
significantly above the midpoint, (M = 77.82) t(61) = 10.91, p < .001 (see table 7.6). 
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Table 7. 6. Means and standard deviations for identification, ingroup favouritism and 
certainty at the pre-test and post-test. 
Identification* 
Pre-test 
M 
SD 
Ingroup favouritism M 
SD 
Certainty M 
SD 
27.94 
25.75 
70.44 
19.32 
Note: Identification was measured only at the post-test. 
Post-test 
76.19 
14.22 
31.06 
29.43 
73.07 
20.58 
As Table 7.6 shows the level ofingroup favouritism was 27.94 points at the 
prettest and 31.06 points at the posttest. The ingroup favouritism effect at the pretest 
was significant with F (1, 58) =71.87 p <.005, if= .553. That is, 55% of the variance 
in group ratings was accounted for by differences between groups, this is an 
extremely large effect and corresponds to an R of .74. 
Main Analyses 
The hypothesis that strong intergroup conflict should be expressed in an 
increase in identification, certainty about ingroup position, and ingroup favouritism 
was tested again by conducting an analysis of change (gain) scores using ANOV A. 
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First, only the change scores for certainty and ingroup favouritism were computed, as 
identification was measures only in the second phase, at the post-test. 
Unlike Study 1, it was found that the interaction of ingroup and outgroup 
position validation did not affect identification (F(I,62) = 2.707, ns. The means for 
identification are shown in Table 7.7, but follow up Bonferroni tests revealed that 
there wan not a significant difference between the means. 
Table 7. 7. Means and standard deviations or identification. 
Ingroup position validation 
Out group Weak Strong 
position validation 
Weak 
M 74.74 71.14 
SD 16.72 15.86 
Strong 
M 75.00 83.00 
SD 11.69 10.53 
The prediction that the interaction between ingroup and outgroup validation 
should increase certainty about ingroup position was also checked. It was found that 
certainty change score is significantly affected by ingroup validation and outgroup 
validation interaction, F (1, 62)= 7.96, p < .01. The mean of certainty change score 
was significantly higher in the clear conflict condition than in the ingroup superiority 
claim condition (p <.05) and in the outgroup superiority claim conditions (p <.05, see 
Table 7.8). 
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Table 7.8. Means and standard deviations of certainty about ingroup position change 
scores. 
lngroup position validation 
Weak Strong 
Outgroup position Weak 
validation M 0.61 -0.67 
SD 10.18 9.84 
Strong 
M .-4.83 13.94 
SD 22.02 10.40 
The analysis was repeated using the same single item certainty score as in 
Study I. The results showed, as in Study I, a significant ingroup validation effect, F 
(1, 98) = 6.59,p < .05, but this effect was substantially qualified by a highly 
significant interaction between ingroup and outgroup validation, F (1, 98) = 10.79,p 
< .01. As Table 7.9 shows this effect was of a similar form to that for the full scale (a 
bigger increase in certainty in the clear conflict condition). 
Table 7.9. Means and standard deviations of single certainty item change scores. 
Ingroup position validation 
Weak Strong 
Outgroup position Weak 
validation M -0.40 -5.0 
SD 17.06 15.11 
Strong 
M -10.93 26.59 
SD 38.09 24.07 
Finally, the prediction that intergroup conflict should increase ingroup 
favouritism was investigated. It was found that the interaction between ingroup and 
outgroup validation was significant (F (1, 62)= 4.68, p < .05). Importantly, the mean 
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level of ingroup favouritism increased more in the clear intergroup conflict condition 
than in the outgroup superiority claim condition,p <.05 (see Table 7.10), and this 
effect qualifies a main effect for ingroup validation F (1, 98) = 5.06, p <.05. The 
effect for outgroup validation was not significant. 
Table 7.10. Means and standard deviations ofingroupfavouritism change scores. 
Ingroup position validation 
Weak Strong 
Outgroup position Weak 
validation M 0.67 1.13 
SD 12.08 14.51 
Strong 
M -7.47 16.41 
SD 26.04 27.10 
Discussion 
These results represent clear support for the hypothesis that intergroup conflict 
should affect certainty about ingroup position and group normative responses such as 
ingroup favouritism. In this study, certainty about ingroup position and ingroup 
favouritism were clearly increased under conditions where the groups competed over 
the validity of their own positions that is, in conditions of clear intergroup conflict. In 
particular, certainty and ingroup favouritism were especially high when there was 
intergroup conflict which should be associated with high salience. This is consistent 
with specific self-categorization theory predictions but is also in accordance with 
earlier social identity theory ideas about the importance of intergroup conflict, for 
expressions of ingroup favouritism. It can be argued then that, in this study, 
competition over who is actually correct which is actually a form of subjective 
conflict, operated in a similar way to competition over resources or objective conflict. 
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General Discussion 
It is important to note that findings in the two studies are not entirely 
consistent. First, in relation to identification, the effect of intergroup conflict in the 
first study was clearly significant but the change score mean was not significantly 
increased in the clear intergroup conflict condition more than in the other conditions. 
In the second study, identification was measured contrastively and only at the post-
test in order to avoid possible pressures of consistency from pre-test to post-test. 
Contrary to the suggestions ofMcGarty (1999a) expressed identification items do not 
seem to be good measures of salience because they did not capture the variation that 
were produced on the measures on other items. 
Secondly, changes in certainty about ingroup position in Study 1 were not 
affected by the interaction of in group and outgroup position validation. There was a 
main effect due to ingroup position validation alone. However, in Study 2, where a 
more comprehensive certainty measure was used (as supplementary items were 
included), in line with initial predictions, certainty was increased more by clear 
intergroup conflict than in the other conditions. These findings suggest that the 
certainty measures used were more sensitive to the contextual changes induced by the 
manipulation than the expressed identification measure. This is an important finding 
suggesting that, in line with arguments in Chapter 5, other ways of capturing salience 
(e.g., by certainty items) might enable us to more accurately reflect the processes 
involving identification, salience and relevant group behaviour. 
Finally, the clearest result was shown in relation to ingroup favouritism. In 
both studies, in line with the predictions of self-categorization theory and consistent 
with previous research on the effects of perceived intergroup conflict on displays of 
ingroup bias and negative racial attitudes (Jackson, 2000; Stephan, Boniecki, Ybarra, 
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Bettencourt, Ervin, Jackson, McNatt, & Renfro, 2002) ingroup favouritism was 
affected by the contextual changes induced by the intergroup conflict manipulation. In 
particular, ingroup favouritism increased especially in the condition of clear 
intergroup conflict (see Study 2), that is, where both groups strongly endorsed their 
positions. This finding is also in line with the argument, if not always the results of 
previous researchers (Jetten et al, 1996, 1997; Terry, Hogg, & McKimmie, 2000; de 
Weerd and Klandermans, 1999) that in conditions of salient group self-perception, 
group members tend to behave more in line with the norms of their group 
membership, assuming, of course that ingroup favouritism can be considered as an 
analogue of behaviours for the members of the minimal opinion-based groups 
explored here. 
Conclusion 
To sum up, the two experiments using a minimal opinion-based groups 
partial! y supported the point suggested by research on intergroup conflict (see Chapter 
3) that stark disagreement might be sufficient to increase identification, certainty 
about ingroup position as well as normative group behaviours such as ingroup 
favouritism. Such findings can have substantial implications in studying conflict in 
real opinion-based groups or real groups in general. Although the possibility to 
generalize the findings for different contexts is limited, the results provide evidence of 
the role played by intergroup context in determining increased group self-definition 
and group behaviours. In line with social identity theory and self-categorization 
theory predictions, the results show that the perceived social structure of intergroup 
relationships had an impact upon self-definition as a group member (identification and 
certainty about ingroup position in this case) and group behaviour (ingroup 
favouritism). Moreover, the fact that these relationships were found using minimal 
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opinion-based groups suggests that similar processes relate to subjective and objective 
forms of intergroup conflict. 
However, the next challenge is to investigate if these processes apply in the 
case of real opinion-based groups and implicit conditions of conflict. A further step 
would be to test the idea that self-definition as an opinion group member that is, 
identification in terms of opinion-based group and salience of such a group 
membership, are good predictors of commitment to take political action. Thus, the in 
the next chapter I will present two studies testing the similar relationships but dealing 
with aetna! political opinion-groups. 
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CHAPTERS 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SELF-DEFINITION AS AN OPINION-BASED 
GROUP MEMBER AND POLITICAL GROUP BEHAVIOUR: STUDIES 3 AND 4 
Introduction 
The two experiments presented in the previous chapter suggest that, variations 
in intergroup conflict are related to variations in self-definition as a group member 
and group normative responses. However, these two experiments involved artificial 
minimal groups and ingroup favouritism rather than real opinion-based groups and 
commitment to politically relevant action. 
The question is then, can these findings be replicated in natural settings 
involving real political opinion-based groups and relevant political behavioural 
intentions? It is important to emphasize that the focus in this thesis is on political 
behavioural intentions rather than actual behaviours. However, according to several 
models such as the theory of reasoned action (Fishbein, 1980; Fishbein & Ajzen, 
1975), the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1985, 1991), attitude-behaviour theory 
(Triandis, 1980), and protection motivation theory (Rogers, 1983), the most 
immediate and important predictor of a person's behaviour is his or her intention to 
perform it. Behavioural intentions are "instructions that people give to themselves to 
behave in certain ways" (Triandis, 1980, p.303), and they reflect "people's decisions 
to perform particular actions" (Sheeran, 2002, p.2). Additionally, there is a large 
number of studies in which intentions were used to predict a wide variety of 
behaviours ranging from consumer and leisure decisions (e.g., Warshaw & Davies, 
1984), diet (e.g., Conner & Sparks, 1996), physical activity (e.g., Norman & Smith, 
1995; Sheeran & Orbell, 2000), weight loss (e.g., Bagozzi & Warshaw, 1990), 
smoking (e.g., Norman, Conner, & Bell, 1999), academic activities and achievement 
(e.g., Manstead & van Eekelen, 1998) to voting (e.g., Bassili, 1995) and pro social 
behaviours (e.g., Warshaw, Calantone, & Joyce, 1986). 
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Finally, one potential problem with the first two studies is that salience of 
opinion-based group membership was not explicitly measured. It can be assumed that 
expressed identification and certainty about group position indicated higher levels of 
salience, but these measure are, at best, indirect. Moreover, the identification measure 
used did not seem to be very sensitive to, or to accurately capture, the variation in the 
level of salience that should have been induced by the intergroup conflict 
manipulation. Measuring, the salience of a particular group membership has not 
proved to be easy, however, and the next section deals with problems and challenges 
regarding capturing salience as an independent social identity construct. 
Measuring the Salience of Opinion-Based Group Memberships 
One problem with previous research in this area is that there have been few 
attempts to make a clear empirical distinction between social identification and social 
identity salience. Nevertheless, there are clear theoretical differences between social 
identification and social identity salience. Perhaps the most concrete difference is that 
identification has a more long-term nature than salience. That is, identification is 
relatively stable variable whereas salience is more context-dependent. As per 
McGarty's (1999b) analogy of climate and weather, the relationship between 
identification and salience is analogous to the relationship between climate and 
weather. In the same way that climate reflects relatively stable and repeatable 
characteristics of some geographic region and weather reflects what is happening at 
any instant, identification can be thought of as a long-term variable which should be 
strongly related to, but not identical to, salience. 
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The relatively stable nature of identification should make it less difficult to 
capture empirically. Indeed, in the social psychological literature it is relatively easy 
to find a number of different social identification scales (e.g., Brown, Condor, 
Mathews, Wade & Williams, 1986; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, 
Kortekaas, & van Ouwerkerk, 1999; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; 
Karasawa, 1991; Mae! & Ashforth, 1992; see Haslam, 2001, for a summary), but it is 
harder to find well-established measures of salience. However, it is worth noting that 
although identification measures are widely used and often shown to be reliable, there 
has been almost no work on their validity. 
As other authors have noted, social identity salience is rarely measured 
directly even though attempts are often made to manipulate it (see Chapter 5). For 
example Haslam and colleagues (1999) building on an earlier study by Verkuyten and 
Hagendoom (1998) manipulated salience by activating participants' either national 
social identity or personal identity. In this research they actually assessed salience by 
including a manipulation check of salience. Their manipulation check was a single 
item measure related to the importance of the category (nationality) to the perceiver, 
assuming that nationality would be more important when a nationality-based social 
category was salient. 
Clearly, Haslam et al's (1999) measure of salience in terms of importance is 
not unreasonable. However, for the case of opinion-based groups I would suggest that 
the certainty with which the categorization is applied to the self and not the 
importance of the self-categorization should be a better indicator of salience. This is 
because according to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner eta!., 1987), a 
category is salient when it is cognitively switched on. That is, in order to be salient the 
perception of the category has to be strong and powerful, and a strong perception is 
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actually one that the perceiver is certain about. Thus, as detailed in Chapter 5, 
especially for the case of opinion-based groups which are formed around issues on 
which people hold and sometime express strong opinions, certainty of self-definition 
as a person who holds and shares this position with other people should be a more 
direct way to capture salience. 
Having clarified the distinction between salience and identification and 
specified a possible way to capture salience of behaviourally relevant group 
memberships, the next step is to investigate these ideas empirically. It was predicted 
that in line with self-categorization theory that both opinion-based group 
identification and salience of an opinion-based group membership would predict 
political behavioural intentions, but that the salience measure would be a predictor of 
political behavioural intentions over and above identification, because salience should 
be, according to self-categorization theory, a more direct predictor of group normative 
responses. 
Identification 
~ Political behavioural 
intentions 
_. 
Salience 
Figure 8.1. Predictors of political behavioural intentions 
Overview 
Study 3 
Method 
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The predictive role of self-definition as an opinion group member for group 
behaviour was tested in a survey of political opinion-based groups in Romania. The 
data were collected two weeks before a general election in late 2000. 
Participants 
The participants were 101 Romanian second year undergraduate psychology 
students (85% female, and 80% in the age category 18-25). 
Procedure 
After reading a short introduction about the general election, the participants 
categorized themselves as being either supporters of the government in power or 
supporters of the opposition. To do this they circled one or the other of two statements 
either, I am a supporter of the government, or I am a supporter of the opposition). The 
two opinion-based groups formed were thus exclusively defined. 
After categorization, participants completed measures of social identification, 
social identity salience and collective behavioural intention. The items were worded 
to refer to both opinion-based groups generally. For each item, participants indicated 
their position by circling a number from a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 (strongly agree) 
scale. 
The measures of identification with the opinion group wete a modified version 
ofEllemers et al.'s (1999) three-component scale. As the original vetsion can be 
considered to be more appropriate for measuring identification in organizations or 
working teams, some items wete excluded and other were modified. These changes 
meant that social identification was measured by the following five items: 
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1. I am like the other people who voted for the same political party as me. 
2. I identify with other people who voted for the same political party as 
me. 
3. I am content about my choice of political party. 
4. I have respect for the other people who voted for the same political 
party as me. 
5. I think in the future I will vote for the same political party. 
In line with the arguments that in opinion-based groups salience can be 
assessed through certainty of self-definition and following previous work on 
subjective certainty (e.g. Gross et a!., 1995), that suggests this construct is related to 
confidence and conviction, four items were devised (one involving self-definition per 
se and three relating to certainty) in order to assess social identity salience. These 
were as follows: 
1. I define myself as a supporter of the group I will vote for. 
2. I am confident that the political option I have chosen is the best. 
3. I am confident that I am a real supporter of the political group I will 
vote for. 
4. I am confident that being a supporter of the political group I will vote 
for really reflects my ideas about the future of Romania. 
Political behavioural intentions were measured with the following four items: 
1. It is likely that I will join the political group I vote for. 
2. It is likely I will join a non-political group supporting similar ideas to the 
group I will vote for. 
3. It is likely I will participate in a rally to support the political group I will vote 
for. 
4. It is likely I will put my signature on a list to support the candidate of the 
political group I will vote for. 
169 
The last of these behaviours is a relatively common political behaviour in Romania. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
The hypotheses involve the relationships between three constructs: 
identification, salience, and collective behavioural intention. All had acceptable alpha 
levels: identification, a= .74 (five items), the salience measure a= .68 (four items) 
and political behavioural intentions, a= .70 (four items). All three measures are 
highly correlated (see table 8.1.). 
Table 8.1. Means, standard deviations and correlations for identification, salience 
and political behavioural intention measures. 
1. Political 
behavioural 
intentions 
2. Salience 
measure 
3. Identification 
measure 
M 
3.42 
5.75 
4.09 
SD 
1.43 
1.88 
1.00 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
1 2 3 
.760** .595** 
.592** 
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Main Analyses 
In order to test our hypothesis a hierarchical regression analysis was 
performed using the identification and salience measures as predictors and political 
behavioural intentions as the criterion (see Table 8.2). Both identification (/3= .22,p < 
.001) and salience (/3= .63,p < .001) predicted political behavioural intentions but, as 
expected, the salience measure predicted political behavioural intentions over and 
above identification. When the salience measure was entered into the equation, it 
significantly added to the predictive value of the model Rl(change) = .256, p <.001. 
Table 8.2. Regression analysis for identification, salience and political behavioural 
intentions measures. 
Criterion Predictor /3 Change in R2 p 
Political behavioural Identification .595 .354 .000 
intentions 
Identification .224 
Salience .628 .256 .000 
Total R2 = .610 
The model does also not reveal a high level of redundancy between the 
identification and salience measures. These variables were highly related (/3= .59,p < 
.001) but they were clearly separate constructs as shown in the additional prediction 
contributed by the salience measure. 
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Discussion 
These results clearly show that the identification and salience measures are 
related but distinct constructs. In line with predictions both identification and salience 
measures were strong predictors of political behavioural intentions, but the salience 
measure for these political opinion-based groups was a stronger predictor than 
identification. These results provide a strong direct and integrated test of the central 
relationships that form the basis of the self-categorization theory account of collective 
behaviour. The strength of support in terms of the predictive power (R 2 = .61) is 
particularly worthy of note, as effect sizes of this magnitude are rarely found in social 
psychological surveys. These relationships involves much larger effect sizes than 
those found by de Weerd and Klandermans, Kelly and Breinlinger, and Simon and 
colleagues reviewed in Chapter 2. 
Consequently, the results suggest that high levels of identification might not 
be sufficient to predict political activity rather identification is best seen as one strong 
but indirect predictor of it. The results also suggest that the certainty measures are a 
good way to capture social identity salience (or at least for opinion-based groups). 
Two explanations can be considered to account for the particularly strong link 
between salience and political behavioural intentions. The first is that the political 
context of the imminent election may have served to make these categories 
behaviourally relevant and increase the plausibility of the political actions. This 
explanation can be tested by examining whether the same relationships hold when an 
election is not imminent. The second explanation relates to the methodological 
innovation of using opinion-based groups. If identification with social class or some 
other politically relevant category would have been measured it would be expected 
that this relationship would be weaker. 
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Of greater concern is the question of whether the certainty measures used 
actually are indicators of salience. That is, although these results provide strong 
support for the idea that salience and identification are two separate constructs, there 
are no independent means of verifying that the certainty measures used did indeed 
capture salience. 
To answer this it is useful to consider the consequences of salience and, 
according to self-categorization theory, one of the consequences of salience is 
depersonalized self-perception. Depersonalization is seen as " ( ... ) the basic process 
underlying group phenomena (social stereotyping, group cohesiveness, ethnocentrism, 
co-operation and altruism, emotional contagion and empathy, collective action, shared 
norms and social influence processes, etc.)" (Turner, 1987, p.50). Thus, one way to 
validate the measure of salience used would be to show that it is associated with 
perceptions of the ingroup as being depersonalized (I will term this perceived in group 
depersonalization) and as being psychologically significant for participants. It is 
important to note that perceived ingroup depersonalization is not synonymous with 
the process of depersonalization itself, by which people come to perceive themselves 
as interchangeable with other ingroup members. The (subtle) difference here is 
between perceiving the ingroup to be genuinely collective and acting in terms of that 
collective identity. This idea of perceived ingroup depersonalization and the context 
of imminent election were addressed in Study 4. 
Study4 
In an attempt to validate the measure of salience used in the Study 3 the degree 
to which the ingroup was perceived as depersonalized by its members was measured. 
In order to do this the perception of the in group as depersonalized was assessed by 
examining the degree to which there was perceived to be a sense of shared identity, 
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values, and common goals. The degree to which participants explained similar 
behaviours by group members in terms of such shared identities, values, and goals 
was also measured (I termed this group attributions) 
It was expected that perceived ingroup depersonalization would increase with 
salience and that explanations for similar behaviour by group members that invoked 
this perceived ingroup depersonalization (i.e., group attributions) would be preferred. 
This is because, as self-categorization theory argues, increased salience is reflected 
thought the process of depersonalization, so that salience "tends to increase the 
perceived identity (similarity, equivalence, interchangeability) between self and 
ingroup members" (Turner eta!., 1987, p. 50). Where self-perception is 
depersonalized in this way people "come to perceive themselves more as the 
interchangeable exemplars of a social category rather than as unique personalities" 
and this is believed to be the basis for underlying group phenomena including 
collective action. Oakes (1987, p.135) further argues that "the same conditions will 
produce attributions to 'persons' (people) as social category members rather than to 
personality (or external factors)". 
Perceived collective qualities and behavioural explanations in terms of these 
qualities therefore seem to be theoretically plausible ways of validating our measure 
of salience. The relationship anticipated by self-categorization theory between 
salience and the new variables is as follows: 
Salience of Perceived ingroup Attribution of similar 
opinion-group ~ depersonalization behaviourstoingroup 
membership depersonalization (group 
attributions) 
Figure 8.2. Relating salience, perceived depersonalization and group attributions 
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In a fourth study the same relationships as in Study 3 were investigated but 
using an Australian sample and including additional measures. Unlike Study 3 where 
the data were collected two weeks before the general election, the data here were 
collected several months prior to a federal election in 2001. It was expected that the 
same relations as those obtained in Study 3 would hold, but in addition, that salience 
would predict the degree to which participants perceived the ingroup as 
depersonalized which would in tum predict the degree to which participants explained 
similar behaviours collectively. 
Method 
Participants 
Participants were 101 first year psychology Australian students (79% female, 
and 90% in the age category 18-25 years). 
Procedure 
As in Study 3, participants were first asked to categorize themselves either as 
supporters of the governing coalition of the Liberal and National Parties, parties 
which were in power at the time of the data were collected, and are commonly 
referred to as "the Coalition", or as supporters of non-government parties. Parallel 
forms of the questionnaire were provided in different columns on the response sheet, 
the left side for Coalition supporters and the right side for non-government party 
supporters. In describing the items below I refer to the Coalition version of the 
questionnaire. 
Identical measures of identification and salience to those in Study 3 were 
included. Different measures of political behavioural intentions were used to reflect 
the fact that different political behaviours are relevant in Australia. In particular, 
political parties rarely have public rallies and there are no signed lists of names to 
support candidates. For political behavioural intention the items were: 
1. It is likely that I will become a member of one of the parties 
from the Coalition. 
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2. It is likely that I will attend a meeting to support the Coalition. 
3. It is likely that I will explain to my friends why I support the 
Coalition. 
The items included to measure perceived ingroup depersonalization and group 
attributions in terms ofthis depersonalization were: 
1. Coalition supporters share a sense of identity. 
2. Coalition supporters share common ideals or values. 
3. Coalition supporters share common goals. 
For the group attributions the items were: 
1. Where Coalition supporters behave in the same way on relevant 
issues this is usually because of their shared identity. 
2. Where Coalition supporters behave in the same way on 
relevant issues this is usually because of their shared ideals or values. 
3. Where Coalition supporters behave in the same way on relevant 
issues this is usually because of their common goals. 
As with Study 1 all items were answered on a 1 (strongly disagree) to 7 
(strongly agree) scale. 
Results 
The hypotheses again involve the relationships between three central 
constructs: identification, salience, and political behavioural intentions. On this 
occasion, however, one supplementary objective was to simultaneously validate the 
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salience construct by demonstrating that salient social identity independently 
predicted perceived ingroup depersonalization. It was expected that perceived ingroup 
depersonalization would in tum predict the degree to which similar behaviour was 
explained in collective terms (group attributions). 
Preliminary Analyses 
The observed predictor variables in this case were similarly to Study 3, 
identification, based on five items with a Cronbach's a of .76 and salience based on 
four certainty items with a Cronbach's a of .89. There were three observed criterion 
variables, political behavioural intention, based on three items with a Cronbach's a of 
. 76, perceived ingroup depersonalization (three items, a= .86), and group attributions 
(three items, a= .85). A simple correlational analysis comprising the independent 
variables (identification and salience measures) and the dependent variables (political 
behavioural intentions, perceived group depersonalization, and attributions of 
common behaviour) is also shown in Table 8.3. 
Table 8.3. Means, standard deviations and correlations for identification, salience, 
political behavioural intention, perceived group depersonalization and attributions of 
common behaviour measures. 
I. Political 
behavioural 
intentions 
2. Salience 
measure 
3. Identification 
measure 
4. Perceived 
group 
depersonalization 
M 
2.78 
3.64 
4.09 
4.20 
SD 
1.42 
1.49 
.97 
1.23 
I 2 3 4 5 
.760** .676** .505** .418** 
.761** .519** .474** 
.503** .432** 
.780** 
5. Attributions of 
common 
behaviour 
4.13 1.29 
Note: **.Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Main Analyses 
As in Study 3, a hierarchical regression analysis was performed with 
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identification and salience measures as predictors and political behavioural intentions 
as criterion (see Table 8.4). This revealed that the salience measure (jJ = .584,p < 
.001) was a stronger predictor of political behavioural intentions than the 
identification measure alone (jJ =. 232, p < . 02). In particular, when the salience 
measure was entered into the model it significantly added to the predictive power of 
the overall model Rl(change) = .144, p < .001. 
Table 8.4. Regression analysis for identification, salience, political behavioural 
intention and perceived group depersonalization measures. 
Criterion Predictor Change in R2 p 
Political behavioural Identification .676 .457 .000 
intentions 
Identification .232 
Salience .584 .144 .000 
Total R 2 = .601 
Perceived ingroup Identification .504 .254 .000 
depersonalization 
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Identification .259 
Salience .322 .044 .016 
Total R 2 = .298 
Hierarchical regression with the identification and salience measures as 
predictors and ingroup perceived depersonalization as criterion was performed again 
in order to test the hypothesis that the salience measure was a better predictor of 
perceived ingroup depersonalization than the identification measure. The results 
revealed that the salience measure was a stronger predictor of perceived ingroup 
depersonalization (/3= .32,p < .001) compared to the identification measure (/3 = .26, 
p < .001), and added significantly to prediction (see Table 8.4). In tum, perceived 
ingroup depersonalization strongly predicts group attributions (r = .78,p < .001). This 
provides good evidence that the measure of salience is valid. 
Discussion 
The findings from Study 4 provided support for the hypothesis that, in 
opinion-based groups, the identification and salience measures are both strong 
predictors of behavioural intentions. However, at least for this case of political 
opinion-based groups, the salience measure is a better predictor of political 
behavioural intentions than identification alone. 
In addition, the new items measuring perceived ingroup depersonalization 
were all highly related to the salience measure. This suggests that to the extent that 
people define themselves in terms of these opinion group membership (i.e., where 
salience is high) they will see their group as being depersonalized, that is as sharing 
collective qualities and norms and explain common behaviour in terms of these 
collective qualities. This also suggests that the groups were perceived to be real and 
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meaningful for the people for whom they were salient. This provides strong evidence 
of the validity of the measure of salience. 
General Discussion 
Despite the fact that data were collected in widely varying cultural contexts, 
the results of the two studies are completely consistent. In both studies, in line with 
predictions, self-definition as an opinion-based group member was a strong predictor 
of political behavioural intentions. That is, both the identification and salience 
measures predicted political behavioural intentions, although the salience measure 
seems to be a more direct and a stronger predictor than the identification measure. 
This qualification is important in the light of the self-categorization theory argument 
that salience of a certain social identity and not identification is the most proximal 
predictor of group behaviour. It is also certainly worth noting that the overall level of 
prediction of behavioural intention was high in both studies (R2= .61 and .60). 
These results also extend an important body of research on collective action 
participation reviewed in more detail in Chapter 2 and also discussed in Chapter 5 
(Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simonet a!., 1998; 2000, Stiirmer eta!., 2003). This 
research has shown that identification with an activist group is a better predictor than 
identification with a broader social category. Although in the present two studies 
identification with the broader category was not measured, even stronger relationships 
between self-definition as an activist and relevant political behavioural intentions 
were found using opinion-based groups. 
There are two initial points that must be made here. The first is that the 
measures used provided an extremely high level of predictive power for collective 
behavioural intentions. The predictors, social identification and social identity 
salience were theoretically specified as psychological constructs and in the case of 
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salience did not even refer to behaviours (however, one of the identification items 
referred to behaviour). If it is assumed, in line with research on theories of reasoned 
action and planned behaviour that such specific intentions would be good predictors 
of actual behaviours these results are particularly important (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1977; 
Ajzen & Madden, 1986). 
Secondly, this research shows a strong link between identification and political 
behavioural intentions but this is only one part of the story. Consistent with self-
categorization theory it was found that social identification is a good predictor of 
collective behavioural intentions, but an indirect one, they being directly predicted by 
the salience measure. As detailed in Chapter 2, identification predicts group normative 
behaviours but only through salience which is determined by perceiver readiness and 
fit and which causes self-perception to become depersonalized, that is people would 
come to perceive themselves in group terms rather than individual terms (Turner et 
a!, 1987). 
These two studies thus may represent a successful attempt to measure salience 
in a way that distinguishes it from identification (see McGarty, 2001) and illustrates 
the importance of this variable in predicting political behaviour. A valid collective 
self-definition measure should be a good predictor of political behavioural intentions 
but the question has been how to create good measures and to improve the predictive 
power of standard identification measures. The solution offered here is to try to take 
measures which are more closely related to salience, such as the certainty of self-
definition items. 
It is important to acknowledge that that salience measure employed might be a 
good predictor of behavioural intentions because it captures not salience directly but 
one of its antecedents (perceiver readiness or fit). This idea will be further explored 
later, perceiver readiness being considered the best candidate to be reflected by the 
certainty measures. 
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The findings of these studies also demonstrated the utility of the idea of 
opinion-based groups and indeed this may have been why such strong relations were 
obtained. Certainty may work especially well as a measure of salience or its 
antecedents for opinion-based groups because it is natural to express certainty or 
doubts in relation to opinions (and this may flow on to opinion-based groups). 
Arguably, such certainty-based measures would not work well for social categories or 
other types of groups. For example, most people would express complete certainty 
about their gender or nationality on almost any occasion that they were asked and 
therefore their level of certainty in this case is not particularly informative in any way 
to the salience of these social categories. The strong relations might also have been 
shown, however, because opinion-based groups are highly relevant to the behaviour 
of their members. 
Given that such strong relations between the salience measure and collective 
behavioural intentions were found it is worth asking just how distinct these constructs 
are. Could it be that certainty about belonging to an opinion-based group and 
commitment to act in line with this opinions are the same thing? There are several 
reasons why they should not be equated. 
First, the measures of salience used (unlike some items commonly used to 
measure identification) made no reference to behaviours. It is not plausible therefore 
that behavioural intentions and certainty are the same thing. 
Second, there is strong evidence in Study 4 that opinion-based groups were 
perceived to be psychologically meaningful, and their members to share collective 
qualities. Thus, opinion group salience actually predicts other theoretically relevant 
182 
properties that real groups should have. In particular, people who define themselves in 
terms of opinion group membership, that is that particular membership is salient, were 
more likely to see the ingroup as being depersonalized (i.e., having collective 
qualities) and to explain similarity of behaviour in terms of these collective qualities 
(i.e., to make group attributions). 
Third, our behavioural intention measures were related to group action, rather 
than to individual commitment to act in a particular way (e.g., participating in a rally, 
expressing open support for a political party). Even voting can be seen not merely as 
an individual behaviour but as an individual's action aimed to change or preserve a 
collective situation. 
Conclusion 
This series of studies demonstrates that both identification in terms of political 
opinion-based groups and the salience of this group membership predict political 
behavioural intentions. However, the fact that the salience measure is a better 
predictor than the identification measure supports the argument that they are clearly 
distinct constructs. Importantly, in these studies a measure of salience in terms of 
certainty of opinion-based group membership was developed. We can be confident 
about this measure because of its strong relationship with collective qualities related 
to a salient social identity. There is more work to be done to investigate the scope of 
the relationships outlined so far. In particular, there is a need to determine the extent 
to which these findings can be replicated with other sorts of opinion-based groups that 
deal with supporting or opposing particular social changes or issues rather than 
political groupings. 
Thus, Studies 3 and 4 results point to the idea that group action seems to be 
taken not simply by committed group members but by people who currently see 
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themselves as members of normatively relevant groups defined by shared opinions. 
This observation is fully consistent with recent analyses of cases of actual emergent 
action (e. g., Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott, Hutchinson, & Drury, 1998). Bearing in 
mind the findings from these first four studies, a useful next step is to attempt to 
integrate them by investigating the relationship between self-definition as a opinion 
group member and group behaviours both in real opinion groups and in context where 
conflict is normative. This can be achieved by conducting a study where conflict is 
manipulated in real opinion-based groups. 
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CHAPTER9 
MANIPULATING INTERGROUP CONTEXT: INTERGROUP CONFLICT AND 
HOSTILITY: STUDY 5 
Introduction 
The focus of this chapter is to present a fifth study in which the relationship 
between self-definition as a group member and behavioural intention was again tested 
but additionally, the intergroup context was experimentally manipulated. The main 
objective of this fifth study was thus to investigate the relationship between subjective 
group membership and political behavioural intention in varying conditions of 
intergroup conflict. 
Study 5 
For this experiment opinion-based groups were formed around the 
participants' positions on financial reparation for the descendants of slaves in 
Holland. At the time when the study was conducted there was a debate in Dutch 
society on whether a financial restitution should be paid or not to the descendants of 
slaves from the colonial period. 
This study was also intended to allow an integration of the results of Studies I 
and 2 in which group validation was used in order to create conflict and Studies 3 and 
4 which used political opinion-based groups formed around a real societal issue. To 
this end, the main questions addressed here is whether the general relationship 
between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural 
intentions that was observed in Studies 3 and 4 is strengthened under conditions of 
conflict (which approach overt hostility). 
On the basis of the review, it would be expected that intergroup conflict would 
make the relationship between self-definition as a group member and behavioural 
intentions stronger. To test this, intergroup conflict was directly manipulated using 
real opinion-based groups (as opposed to minimal groups used in Studies I and 2). 
For this study the following hypotheses were formulated: 
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I. a) Consistent with the findings from previous studies (see Chapters 7 
and 8) the identification measure and the salience measure should be 
predictors of political behavioural intentions. Moreover, it is expected 
that, as in Studies 3 and 4, the salience measure will contribute to the 
prediction of political behavioural intentions over and above the 
identification measure. 
b) In addition, and consistent with the results of Study 4, perceived 
group depersonalization should be predicted by the salience measure, 
which in turn should predict group-based attributions of this 
depersonalization. 
2. Overall, intergroup conflict (and in particular intergroup hostility) 
should make the relationship between self-definition as an opinion-
based group member and behavioural intentions stronger. In other 
words, self-definition as an opinion-based group member will be more 
clearly associated with political behavioural intentions under 
conditions of high (hostile) intergroup conflict. 
Similarly to Study I and 2, different degrees of validation from the ingroup 
and the outgroup were used to create conflict. It was assumed that when there are two 
exclusively defined opinion groups which strongly validate their own position at the 
expense of the outgroup position, this should provide the preconditions for intergroup 
conflict. Conflict should be lower when both groups recognize that they have different 
positions but they "agree to disagree", so that they only weakly validate their own 
position. On the other hand, conflict should be further enhanced when strong 
validation is combined with derogation of the out group by the ingroup and of the 
ingroup by the outgroup. These three levels of conflict correspond to the three 
conditions of this study: 
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1. Weak conflict condition: both groups admit that they have different positions 
but they are equally good, they agree that it could be a different way of 
approaching things. This is analogous to the vague conflict condition in 
Studies 1 and 2. 
2. Strong conflict condition: where both groups strongly validated their own 
positions. This is analogous to clear conflict condition in Studies 1 and 2. 
3. Hostility condition: higher conflict and hostility are created through strong 
validation of group position and outgroup derogation. Thus, in addition to 
strong group validation both groups are informed about derogation of the other 
group. 
Method 
Overview 
The hypotheses were experimentally investigated using opinion-based groups 
formed around the issue of financial restitution to be paid by the govermnent to the 
descendants of slaves. Thus, as in Studies 3 and 4, the issue used for the formation of 
opinion-based groups is a real one in the society and was widely discussed at the time 
the data were collected. 
Participants 
A total of292 students from the University of Amsterdam participated in the 
study. They were enrolled in this study as part of their required yearly research 
participation. 
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Procedure 
First, participants read an introduction concerning the historical conditions of 
the slave trade involving Dutch ships in the colonial period and the current 
discussions on the issue: 
In 1635 the Dutch began to participate in the African slave trade. 
Dutch slave ships sailed to the coast of West-Africa, where they 
bought the slaves from traders who had bought or directly abducted 
these slaves in the interior of Africa. After this the ships sailed to 
Brazil or the Caribbean islands, where the slaves were sold to 
plantation owners. By 1800, the Dutch had traded around 300,000 
African slaves in this way. As a consequence of the UN conference 
against racism in South Africa, there are now some discussions in the 
Netherlands about the possibility of paying some financial reparation 
to descendants of the slaves by the Dutch government. This reparation 
would involve money to be paid to the Surinamese government in 
order to improve the general welfare system. 
Then, participants categorized themselves as being either in favour or against 
financial reparation being paid by the Dutch government. 
After this, a feedback stage followed where participants were informed about 
(a fictional) discussion between the two opinion-based groups on the financial 
reparation issue. Thus, the conflict between the two opinion-based groups was 
experimentally manipulated by providing participants with feedback from both 
ingroup and outgroup, corresponding to the three different conflict conditions. 
In the weak conflict condition participants were told that in previous research 
investigating perceptions of people who are in favour or against financial reparation 
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from the Dutch government, comments had emerged from group discussion. First 
people were informed that: 
Both groups (i.e., people who were in favour of financial reparation 
and people who were against financial reparation to be paid by the 
Dutch government) were confident that their position was different but 
not better than that of the other group. They both appreciated the other 
group's views. 
Then, fragments from a typical group discussion from our previous research 
between members of the two groups (reflecting the atmosphere of mutual 
relationships between the groups) were provided: 
"I don't agree with you but I can still see your point." 
"I know that my views are correct but you can also be right if you see things 
from your perspective". 
that: 
For the strong conflict condition, conflict was created by telling participants 
"Both groups were confident that their position was superior to that of the 
other group. They believed that their own position was correct and the other's 
group position was incorrect." 
In this case, the examples of a group discussion between the members of two 
groups were: 
"I can't believe you can possibly be right", 
" I strongly believe that our position is the one that any reasonable person 
should have". 
Finally, for the hostility condition participants were also informed about 
derogation from the out group, as the following sentence was added to the paragraph 
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from the strong conflict condition: "Moreover, each group thought that members of 
the other group misunderstood the issue, and did not know the facts on the matter". 
The fragments from a typical group discussion between members of the two groups 
(in which strong derogation was added) were: 
"I can't believe you could be so moronic to say this", 
"Your argument is really an aberration, the most stupid thing I've ever heard. 
You must be either crazy or very stupid to believe this". 
Then a number of measures were taken in order to check the categorization 
and conflict manipulation. Categorization was checked using the item "Where would 
you place your view on a scale from extremely against financial reparation to 
extremely in favour of financial reparation?". To check the manipulation of conflict, 
the items used involved perceptions of conflict and hostility between the two groups. 
The items were: "How much conflict do you perceive in the relations between 
members of the two groups?", and "How much hostility do you perceive in the 
relations between members of the two groups?". Finally, involvement in a potential 
discussion was used to assess involvement concerning the issue of financial reparation 
(i.e., "If you would participate in such group discussions how involved you would 
be?''). 
The main dependent variables measured were: identification, salience of 
opinion-based group membership, and likelihood of engaging in group behaviours 
(political behavioural intentions). Identification was measured by a four item scale 
(Doosje, 1995): "I identifY with other people who hold the same position as me on 
financial reparation", " I see myself as belonging to the group of people who hold the 
same position as me on financial reparation", "I am glad that I belong to the group of 
people who hold the same position as me on financial reparation", and "I feel strong 
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ties with other people who hold the same position as me on financial reparation". The 
same certainty and self-definition items that were used in Studies 3 and 4 were used to 
measure the salience of opinion-based group membership. 
Political behavioural intentions were measured by the following items: "How 
likely is that you will become a member of an organized group which shares your 
views on the financial reparation issue?", "How likely is that you will attend meetings 
of people who share your views on the financial reparation issue?", "How likely is 
that you will take part in actions to promote your views on the financial reparation 
issue?", and "How likely is that you will sign a petition supporting your position on 
the financial reparation issue?". The items used in Studies 3 and 4 suffered minor 
modifications in order to fit the less overtly political content of these groups and also 
two new items were included: "How likely is that you will express your views on the 
financial reparation issue in public?" and "How likely is that you will explain to your 
friends why you hold your views on the financial reparation issue?". 
As in Study 4, there were also items measuring perceived ingroup 
depersonalization and group attributions (the same items as in Study 4 were used). 
Finally, in order to explore the effects of intergroup conflict on other group variables 
were expected to vary according to different degrees of intergroup conflict, some 
supplementary items such as ingroup and outgroup perceived variability, and 
collective emotions were included. Analysis and discussion of these measures are 
beyond the scope of this thesis, but the items used can be seen in the Appendix. The 
scales for all items used seven points ranging from 1, not at all, to 7, very much. 
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Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
First, it is worth noting that 169 participants (57.7%) were in favour, and 106 
participants (32.6%) were opposed to financial reparation to be paid by the Dutch 
government. The next step was to compute all the scales used and to check their 
reliability. Except for the items used to asses perceived group depersonalization in the 
case of anti-financial reparation group (a = .42), all the other scales had reasonable 
Cronbach alpha coefficients: salience scale, a = .89, identification scale, a = .90, 
political behavioural intention scale, a= .71, and perceived group depersonalization 
scale (for in favour of financial reparation opinion-based group), a = .83. 
The manipulation of conflict was checked across the three experimental 
conditions. The data revealed that our manipulation of conflict was successful, as the 
variation of conflict across the three conditions, F(l, 292)= l31.69,p <.001, was 
significant (with the means being 2.55 in the weak conflict condition, 5.45 in the 
strong conflict condition, and 5.54 in the hostility condition, all significantly different 
from each other). 
Moreover, conflict strongly impacted upon hostility, F(l, 290) = 205.676, 
p<.OOI. The hostility mean for the weak conflict condition was 2.09, for the strong 
conflict condition was 5.1 0, and for the hostility condition, was 5.65, and they were 
all significantly different from each other. 
The scores for the two groups were analysed separately and compared in order 
to see if there were any differences between them. Significant differences in the 
identification and salience measures as well as political behavioural intentions 
between the two groups were observed, with the pro-financial reparation group having 
higher scores than the anti-financial reparation group (see Table 9.1). 
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Table 9.1. Means and standard deviation for identification, salience, political 
behavioural intention, perceived group depersonalization and group attributions in 
the two different groups. 
Identification 
Salience 
Political 
behavioural 
intentions 
Perceived 
group 
depersonalization 
Group 
attributions 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
M 
SD 
Pro-reparation 
group 
3.17 
1.49 
4.11 
1.30 
4.31 
1.12 
4.47 
1.09 
4.26 
1.26 
Anti-reparation 
group 
2.14 
1.19 
3.40 
1.27 
3.43 
1.26 
4.17 
1.02 
4.06 
1.21 
t 
5.96 
4.46 
6.21 
2.23 
1.31 
p 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.026 
.190 
Note: dfare 271 for all analyses except identification (270) and political behavioural 
intentions (249). 
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Although political behavioural intentions provided a reliable scale it was 
obvious on inspection that there were variations between the items in the extent to 
which they correlated with the predictors. As can be seen in the Table I 0.2 the 
correlations with the salience and identification measures were relatively strong for 
items 1 ("How likely is that you will become a member of an organized group which 
shares your views on the financial reparation issue?"), and 2 ("How likely is that you 
will attend meetings of people who share your views on the financial reparation 
issue?") and relatively weak for the other four items ("How likely is that you will 
express your views on financial reparation issue in public?", "How likely is that you 
will take part in actions to promote your views on financial reparation issue?", "How 
likely is that you will explain to your friends why you hold your views on the 
financial reparation issue?", and "How likely is that you will sign a petition 
supporting your position on financial reparation issue?"). 
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Table 9.2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations, for the salience and 
identification measures and political behavioural intentions (each individual item). 
M SD 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Political 4.01 1.84 .656** .026 .032 .059 .032 .479** .525** 435** 
behavioural 
intentions 1 
2. Political 3.77 1.87 .076 .081 .094 .143* .541 ** .562* .504** 
behavioural 
intentions 2 
3. Political 5.53 1.59 .330* .471 ** .376** .572** -.045 -.096 
behavioural 
intentions 3 
4. Political 3.35 1.90 .626** .772** . 750** .118 .202** 
behavioural 
intentions 4 
5. Political 4.00 2.03 .572** .748** .086 .152* 
behavioural 
intentions 5 
6. Political 3.18 1.76 .751** .195** 188** 
behavioural 
intentions 6 
7. Political 3.97 1.18 .384** 371** 
behavioural 
intentions 
8. Salience 3.84 1.32 .539** 
measure 
9. Identification 2.82 1.50 
measure 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the .01 level. 
It is worth noting that the overall scale correlation conceals wide variation in 
the individual items. For example, items 1 and 2 had moderate to high relationships 
with the identification and salience measures while the others had smaller 
relationships. 
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Main Analyses 
The hypothesis that self-definition as an opinion group member should predict 
behavioural intention was tested usiug a hierarchical regression analysis with the 
identification and salience measures as predictors and political behavioural intentions 
as criterion. It was expected that both identification and salience measures would 
predict behavioural intentions related to financial reparation issue but the salience 
measure would be a stronger predictor than the identification measure. It was found 
that, the identification measure (j3 = .232, p < .001) and the salience measure (j3 = 
.263, p < .001) predicted political behavioural intention but the salience measure was 
a better predictor than the identification measure (see Table 9.3). R 2 increased 
significantly when the salience measure was entered into the prediction model 
R'(change)=.050,p <.001. 
Table 9.3. Regression analyses for overall data with the identification and salience 
measures predicting political behavioural intentions and perceived group 
depersonalization. 
Political behavioural 
intentions 
Perceived group 
depersonalization 
Criterion 
Identification .372 
Identification .232 
Salience .263 
Identification .331 
Identification .135 
Salience .365 
Predictor B R' change 
.138 .000 
.050 .000 
.llO .000 
.094 .000 
p 
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These results are in line with hypothesis I a. It is worth noting that these 
relationships are almost entirely driven by two items, as four of the items were 
virtually unrelated to the predictors (see Table 9.2). Given this discrepancy the data 
were reanalysed using a two-item scale. The results of this analysis are reported at the 
end of this section. 
Given the differences between the means it was also interesting to consider 
each group separately. For the pro-reparation group, the salience measure was an even 
stronger predictor of political behavioural intentions (j3 = .361, p < .001), than the 
identification measure (j3 = .148, p < .09). When the salience measure was entered 
into the model, it significantly added to the predictive power of identification 
(R2(change) =.095, p <.001). On the contrary, in the anti-financial reparation group, 
neither identification (j3 = .122, ns.) nor salience measure (j3 = .123, ns.) predicted 
political behavioural intentions. This finding seems especially important in relation to 
the difference in the intentions to take action between the two opinion-based groups 
(the anti-reparation group expressed a much lower level of commitment to take 
action). 
Then, hierarchical regression analysis with identification and salience 
measures as predictors and perceived group depersonalization as the criterion was 
used again in order to test the hypothesis (I b) that salience should predict perceived 
group depersonalization which in turn predicts attribution of this depersonalization to 
group reality. The results show that for the pro-reparation group, perceived 
depersonalization for this group was more strongly predicted by the salience measure 
(j3 = .365, p < .001), than by the identification measure (j3 = .135, p < .05). However, 
in the case of the anti-reparation group, contrary to the hypothesis, the identification 
measure was a stronger predictor of perceived group depersonalization (j3 = .182, p < 
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.01) than the salience measure (/3 = .114, p < .09). As predicted, for both groups, 
perceived group depersonalization also predicted attribution of depersonalization to 
perceived group reality (/3 = .490, respectively j3 = .556,p < .001). 
Hypothesis 2 that intergroup conflict should make the relationship between 
self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural intentions 
stronger was also tested using standard regression in each condition with the 
identification and salience measures as predictors of political behavioural intentions. 
From Table 9.4 can be seen that the size of R2 is much the same in all three 
conditions. Although there is a slight increase in the strength of the relationship 
between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural 
intentions depending on the level of conflict, this is not significant, thus there is 
limited support for Hypothesis 2. 
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Table 9.4. Regression analysis across conditions with identification and salience 
measures predicting political behavioural intentions and perceived group 
depersonalization. 
Condition Criterion Predictor Jl R'change p 
Weak conflict Political behavioural Identification .395 .156 .000 
intentions 
Identification .296 
Salience .197 .029 .078 
TotalR'~ .185 
Perceived group Identification .370 .137 .000 
depersonalization 
Identification .129 
Salience .471 .164 .000 
Total R' ~ .301 
Strong Political behavioural Identification .278 .077 .008 
conflict intentions 
Identification .097 
Salience .356 .094 .002 
Tota!R'~ .171 
Perceived group Identification .274 .075 .006 
depersonalization 
Identification .059 
Salience .400 .114 .000 
TotalR'~ .189 
Hostility Political behavioural Identification .442 .195 .000 
intentions 
Identification .300 
Salience .245 .040 .045 
Total R' ~ .235 
Perceived group Identification .340 .115 .001 
depersonalization 
Identification .217 
Salience .217 .032 .074 
TotalR'~ .147 
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It is interesting though to consider separately the effects of both variables 
(identification and salience) in the overall predictive linlc For the weak conflict and 
hostility conditions, the salienee measure (/3 = .197, p < .I 0, andfi = .245, p < .05) 
seems to be a weaker predictor than identification (/3 = .296,p < .001, respeetively,fi 
= .300,p < .01). As a consequence, for these two conditions R2 change was modest 
when the salience measure was entered into the equation (R2(change) =.029,p <.10, 
andR2(change) =. 040,p <.05). 
However, the situation is rather different in the strong conflict condition 
where only the salience measure (/3 = .356, p < .001) is a significant predictor of 
political behavioural intentions. The link between identification and political 
behavioural intentions is not significant in this condition (/3 = .097, ns). In this case 
the change in R 2 for salience is .094 (p <.01) for the salience measure and .077 (p 
<.01) for the identification measure. 
Finally, given the different relationships between political behavioural 
intention items and the measures of salience and identification a scale with the most 
relevant behaviours regarding the opinion-based groups involved was computed. The 
scale comprised two items (i.e., "How likely is it that you will become a member of 
an organized group which shares your views on the financial reparation issue?", and 
"How likely is that you will attend meeting of people who share your views on the 
financial reparation issue?") and had a Cronbach's a of. 79. 
Following hierarchical regression analysis it was revealed that when the data 
were collapsed across conditions, the salience measure (/3 = .454, p < .001), was again 
a stronger predictor than the identification measure (/3 = .269, p < .001), and this was 
more pronounced than for the political behavioural measure based on all items. 
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Similarly, when the salience measure was entered into the model it added significantly 
to the predictive power of the identification measure, R2(change) =. 146,p < .001. 
Next, the data were analysed across conditions for the case when only highly 
normative behaviours were included in the political behavioural intention scale. For 
all three conditions the salience measure was a stronger predictor than identification. 
More specifically, for the weak conflict condition R 2 (change) was .162 when the 
salience measure was entered in the equation (j3 = .470, p < .001). For the strong 
conflict condition the same relationship held (j3 = .396, p < .001) but R 2 (change) was 
smaller than in the previous condition, R2(change) =. 112, p < .001. Finally, in the 
hostility condition, the relationship is the clearest. When the salience measure is 
entered in the model, the identification measure did not predict political behavioural 
intentions anymore (j3 = .509,p < .001 decreasing to ji = .167, ns.). Thus, it is 
noteworthy that in this case the relationship between identification and political 
behavioural intentions is actually mediated by the salience measure. In this case R2 
(change) is also bigger than in all previously analysed case, R2(change) =. 176, p 
<.001). 
Discussion 
It is noteworthy that again self-definition as an opinion group member 
(including both identification and salience measures) was an excellent predictor of 
political behavioural intentions. Moreover, an overall analysis of the data reveals that, 
as predicted, the salience measure is a stronger predictor of political behavioural 
intentions than the identification measure. 
The fact that the salience measure in this study again (as in Study 4) predicted 
perceived ingroup depersonalization supports the idea that the salience measure used 
is valid. More specifically, salient opinion-based group membership was associated 
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with participants perceiving their own group as sharing common ideals, values and 
goals. Moreover, common behaviours by ingroup members were attributed to those 
shared ideals, values and goals. In short, those people who saw their group 
membership as salient saw their group as more real as acting for real reasons. 
It is also noteworthy, however, that the results show little variation in the 
strength of the relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member 
and political behavioural intentions as a function of the level of the manipulated 
intergroup conflict. Perhaps, the relative weakness of such effects can be explained by 
the potential meaning, or more exactly lack of meaning, of the conflict in the current 
context. 1n particular, in this specific context, conflict and hostility might have been 
perceived by participants as inappropriate responses. The reason for this might be that 
the perceived degree of opposition between the two opinion-based groups used was 
not as high as in the political groups investigated in Studies 3 and 4. That is, there 
may not be a very high perception of conflict between the two groups, and neither 
group probably sees the outgroup as threatening. It is perhaps slightly implausible that 
an actual conflict would be generated in regard to this issue and even if some degree 
of hostility might exist, this would not be of great intensity. 
It is also interesting to consider the two predictors, the identification and the 
salience measures in relation to their link to political behavioural intentions across 
conditions. One noteworthy aspect is that salience seems to be a stronger predictor 
than identification but only in the strong conflict condition. This can be explained by 
the fact that this condition might have been perceived by the participants as the most 
realistic one. 1n the weak conflict condition a weaker relationship would be expected 
anyway, but the weaker effect in the hostility condition could be due to the fact that 
the experimental manipulation might not be totally credible in the real social context. 
Although the issue of financial reparation was a frequent topic of discussion at the 
time when the study was conducted, it is possible that angry rhetoric about the 
outgroup created low fit between the norms of these groups and the observed 
behaviour. 
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Another important aspect is the fact that the results were clearer and stronger 
in the case of pro-reparation group than in the case of the anti-reparation one. The 
results may have been generally weaker in the anti-financial group because this 
opinion-based group does not really exist in a form that could be expected to be 
associated with action. The salience and identification measures revealed lower levels 
of both salience and identification for this group. It is perhaps unlikely that they 
would consider taking action in relation to their position. People with such opinions 
that reflect the status quo may inly rarely form intentions to take actions in line with 
their views and they are an example of what politicians refer to as "the silent 
majority'' (Price, 1989) - whether or not they are a majority in practice. This term was 
used to define that part of a population formed by people who share an opinion but 
perhaps without real consensus that would motivate them to act in order to support 
that opinion or view. 
Moreover, the meaning of these groups is probably not oppositionally defined 
in the same way as support for political parties is defined. Most probably, supporters 
and opponents of reparation do not see themselves as engaged in a political or 
ideological struggle. High conflict and hostility are probably inappropriate in terms of 
the social meaning of these groups (such behaviour would reduce normative fit). 
Exhibiting open hostility and derogation toward the outgroup might not be seen as 
normative for prototypical group members. This observation is consistent with 
research done by Noel, W ann, and Branscombe (1995) which suggested that more 
'peripheral' group members are likely to show derogation toward the outgroup (in 
order to enhance their low status), rather than 'core' members. 
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More importantly, the fact that the relationship between the salience measure 
and political behavioural intentions was only strong in restricted circumstances (e.g., 
when only two political behavioural intentions items were considered) demonstrates 
the importance of intergroup conflict but also points out another factor that must be 
taken into consideration. This return us to the degree of normativeness of intergroup 
behaviour discussed in Chapter 4. 
According to self-categorization theory, when a certain group membership is 
salient, group members come to perceive themselves in a depersonalised manner and 
this leads them to follow behaviours which are highly in line with group norms 
(Turner, 1991). Thus, when the salience of self-categorization is high, clearly 
normative group behaviours will be also present. There is a considerable body of 
research investigating related ideas (e.g., Marques et a!., 1998; Terry et a!., 1996, 
1999; Wellen eta!., 1998; White et al., 1994) and these results seem to follow the 
same line as previous research. Importantly, they also suggest the next empirical 
aspect to focus on here and this is the role of group behaviour normativeness in the 
process. More specifically, it is of interest here to further explore how behaviours 
which are perceived as more normative by group members are more likely to be 
followed by them when that specific group membership is salient. 
Finally, considering the results from Studies 3, 4 and 5, both identification and 
salience measures seem overall good predictors of political behavioural intention but 
it is quite difficult to empirically differentiate the exact role played by each of the 
variables in the process of predicting behavioural intentions. Theoretically, from a 
self-categorization theory perspective, there are three main constructs involved in this 
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process. These are identification, perceiver readiness, and salience (see Chapter 2). In 
Study 3, identification had an explicit measure and salience a potential measure. In 
Studies 4 and 5, in order to get a more complete picture of the variables involved, 
measures of perceived group depersonalization were added. The measure of perceived 
group depersonalization was not intended to capture the actual process of 
depersonalization (which would constitute yet a more difficult task), but to validate 
the salience measure. 
Perceiver readiness was not explicitly measured in any of these studies but it is 
plausible that aspects of perceiver readiness are actually captured by the certainty 
items and this is why they are so close of salience (perceiver readiness being a main 
determinant of salience, Oakes, 1997, see also McGarty, 1999a). However, although 
in theory there is a clear separation between the constructs, when they are empirically 
measured there may always be some degree of overlap between these measures, as 
can be seen in Figure 9 .1. 
Identification 
Theoretical constructs 
Perceiver 
readiness 
Identification 
measure 
Salience 
measure 
Salience 
Corresponding measures for the theoretical constructs 
? 
Figure 9.1. The overlap between the different measures and the corresponding 
theoretical constructs 
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Thus, a standard measure of identification probably captures the theoretical 
construct of identification more accurately than it captures anything else, but in 
practice it might also capture, to a lesser degree, perceiver readiness and salience. 
Similarly, the salience measure seems to capture salience better than do identification 
measures, but we cannot tell whether it achieves this by capturing determinants of 
salience (perceiver readiness) or is a direct indicator of salience. Due to the 
complexity and fluidity of these constructs it is difficult to find or devise measures 
which would perfectly match the respective theoretical constructs. Thus, what the 
results of these three studies might actually suggest is that empirically it is useful to 
refer to a general construct such as self-definition as an opinion-based group member 
(which includes the theoretically latent constructs of identification and salience but 
also perceiver readiness and depersonalization), which predicts political involvement. 
However, when the components of this construct are measured separately, it is likely 
that they will overlap as in the case of the identification and salience measures. 
Importantly, in spite of the overlap between measured constructs and the difficulty of 
measurement, the results have shown that the salience measure consistently predicted 
political behavioural intentions over and above identification, and the only plausible 
conclusion that is consistent with the theorising here is that the salience measure is a 
better predictor because it is measuring a construct that is closer to salience than 
identification measures alone. 
Conclusion 
This study shows once again the consequences of perceiving oneself as an 
opinion-based group member on intention to engage in relevant group action. This is 
an important finding (in the context of this thesis) as well as in relation to real social 
behaviour. The results of these studies have provided a potential fruitful insight on the 
mechanisms involved in the relationship between holding and sharing a certain 
opinion and political engagement. 
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Rather than intergroup conflict alone being an important determinant of 
intentions to take relevant group action, group norms need to be considered. Of 
course, it cannot be ruled out the possibility that conflict could have substantial effects 
on the relationship in some settings. However, the study also suggested a higher 
variation in the strength of the relationship on the basis of the normativeness of 
behaviours and the content of the group identity. Certain behaviours may be 
considered more or Jess appropriate depending on the defining features of group 
membership (the content of the social identity). In some situations out group 
derogation and intense intergroup conflict could be considered to be inconsistent with 
a particular group identity (e.g., pro-peace activist) and in others it can be highly 
consistent (e.g., as a KKK supporter). Consequently, in the next chapter I will explore 
the effects of normativeness of group behaviour as another enhancer of the 
relationship between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political 
behavioural intentions. 
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CHAPTER 10 
INVESTIGATING THE ROLE OF NORMATIVENESS OF GROUP BEHAVIOUR 
IN OPINION-BASED GROUPS: STUDY 6 
Introduction 
Although the results of Study 5 do not suggest that conflict has clear effects 
they do imply that there is another factor which affects the relationship between self-
definition as an opinion-based group member and behavioural intentions. This factor 
is the degree of normativeness of certain group behaviours. The relationship between 
self-definition as an opinion-based group member and behavioural intentions seems 
particularly clear for some behaviours. It is plausible that these are the most 
normatively relevant behaviours for the groups in question. This would be consistent 
with previous research exploring the role of group norms in predicting behaviours 
(Terry et al., 1999, 2000; Wellen et al., 1998, see Chapter 4). These authors argue that 
some behaviours become normative when they characterize a particular group 
membership, in other words, people with a salient identity behave in a way which is 
consistent with the respective group norms. 
Thus, the main question addressed in this chapter is whether the relationship 
between self-definition as a group member and political behavioural intentions is 
stronger for behaviours, which are normative for the group concerned. There are good 
reasons to believe it should be based on the research reviewed in Chapter 4 and the 
results of Study 5. However, the key problem with Study 5 is that it cannot be directly 
inferred that the two behaviours that stood out in that study were in fact normative. 
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Study 6 
To address this problem a sixth study was conducted where the normativeness 
of behaviour was directly manipulated by providing ingroup consensual validation of 
some behaviours. The expectation was that, if the certainty measure really is a 
measure of salience, then its predictive power relative to the identification measure 
should be enhanced for behaviours that are consensually validated as norms of the 
relevant ingroup. That is salient group identity will only predict normative behaviours 
(i.e., those behaviours consistent with the social meaning of the group). It is easy to 
derive this prediction from self-categorization theory which argues that when a social 
identity becomes salient, depersonalization of self-perception will result in highly 
normative behaviour: "It is assumed that depersonalization, ( ... ) leads to more 
consensual behaviour in terms of the norms and values that define one's group( ... )" 
(Turner, 1991, p.16). In line with this, the hypotheses formulated were: 
1. Self-definition as an opinion-based group member should predict 
political behavioural intention but the salience measure should be a 
particularly good predictor of political behavioural intentions for 
clearly defined group normative behaviours. 
2. The salience measure should be a superior predictor (when 
compared to the identification measure) of perceived group 
depersonalization which in turn will predict attribution of common 
behaviours to group reality. 
The main objective of this study was to show the effects of manipulating the 
perceived normativeness of group behaviours. Such a manipulation of group 
behaviour normativeness should provide a clear test of the ideas suggested by the 
theoretical review in Chapter 4 which took a clear shape at the end of Chapter 9. In 
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particular, it is important to explore the relationship between self-definition in terms 
of an opinion-based group membership and relevant political behaviours, but in 
conditions in which these behaviours are highly consistent with the normative content 
of the respective group membership. 
Considering the important role played by consensus in the opinion-based 
group formation, the manipulation of group behaviour normativeness consisted of a 
validation manipulation. More specifically, behaviours on which group members 
agree that they are highly normative should increase the likelihood that these 
particular behaviours will be adopted. In other words, group members come to 
perceive relevant behaviours as highly normative if they are previously 
consensualized. Self-categorization theorists (Turner et al., 1987), relate normative 
behaviour directly to the salience of self-categorization (through normative fit) and 
they also point out to the high influential power of ingroup validation in this process 
(see Turner, 1991). 
One key question, however, was how to manipulate consensual validation. 
Study 5 shown that there were differences between groups in terms of their support 
for group membership and action. Given the plausibility of such differences in this 
study I decided to manipulate validation by providing consensual feedback from the 
ingroup and outgroup that some behaviours were more normative than others for both 
groups in this context. In the terms used by McGarty (1999a) this involved an attempt 
to establish a shared normative framework for these two groups (on this particular 
matter). 
In order to test these hypotheses, exclusively defined opinion-based groups 
were created. The groups were formed using participants' position regarding proposed 
changes to an existing law about homosexual behaviour. More specifically 
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participants had to indicate if they were in favour or against proposals aimed to update 
legislation in Romania so as to fit European Union standards. The old article 
concerning homosexual relations was perceived by many people as highly 
discriminatory against the homosexual population, but this view was rejected by many 
others. At the time of conducting this study, there was a lively dispute in Romania 
about the necessity of changing the existing law, so this created the necessary 
conditions for the spontaneous formation of the two different opinion-based groups 
(e.g., pro-legislative change and anti-legislative change) regarding the issue. 
Method 
Design 
The experiment involved a 2 (validation) x 2 (behaviour) design with repeated 
measures on the second factor. The hypotheses involved exploring the relationships 
between the identification, salience and behavioural intentions measures in these four 
settings rather than variations in the means. The design is shown in Table I 0.1. 
Table 10.1. Experimental design of Study 6. 
Normativeness of group behaviours based on pre-test (within-
subjects) 
Ingroup endorsement Less normative Highly normative 
of group behaviours behaviours ( 4 items) behaviours ( 4 items) 
(between-subjects) Control condition (no weakest relationship moderate relationship 
manipulation) expected expected 
Experimental moderate relationship strongest relationship 
condition expected expected 
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Pretesting of Norms 
In a pretest using 80 participants from "A.I.Cuza" University ofiasi, Romania, the 
normativeness of group behaviours of each of the two opinion-based groups (i.e., pro-
legislative change and anti-legislative change) was measured. Participants had to rate 
ten behaviours in terms of their perceived normativeness on a seven point scale (see 
Appendix). More specifically, after participants categorized themselves depending on 
their position regarding the proposal as either in favour or against oflegislative 
change, they were asked "How likely is that you will adopt the following behaviours 
to support your position regarding this matter?". The pretest indicated that participants 
preferred certain behaviours to others. The four behaviours that were indicated as 
most normative by the participants were: 
• To join an organized group which reflects their view (M = 3.10, SD = 
1.90); 
• To become actively involved in the promotion of the position they 
support (M = 2.78, SD = 1.81); 
• To sign a petition to show support or opposition (M = 3.81, SD = 
1.97); 
• To try to persuade other people about their position (M = 3.38, SD = 
1.90). 
The four least normative behaviours were: 
• To try to stop the supporters on the other side from expressing 
their views (M = 1.90, SD = 1.57); 
• To participate in a counter-demonstration when the other side 
demonstrates (M = 2.35, SD = 1.82); 
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• To actively participate in the organization of a rally (M = 2.25, 
SD = 1.62); 
• To write letters to newspapers to show support for their 
position (M = 2.18, SD = 1.63). 
The following two behaviours with moderate ratings were dropped: to express 
views reflecting their position in public (M = 2.47, SD = 1.68) and to participate in an 
organized rally in order to support their position (M = 2.60, SD = 1.80). Three of the 
behaviours indicated as less normative by the pretest sample would be classed by 
many as indicators of real activism. Results of this pre-test were used to manipulate 
group behaviour normativeness in the current study. 
Participants 
Participants were I 00 psychology students at A.I.Cuza University of Iasi, 
Romania in their first or second year of study and who participated in this experiment 
as part of their practical classes. Participants were randomly allocated to the two 
conditions of the study. 
Procedure 
First, participants received an introduction where they were informed that 
there is a proposal (called in Romania a "law project") which aims to replace the old 
article concerning homosexual relations and to modify other articles from the penal 
code concerning "sexual crimes" in such a way that there would be only one law for 
both homosexuals and heterosexuals. Participants were also informed about the 
existence of two main organizations or activist groups (already quite well-known in 
Romania), which either support or reject this new law project. They were also told 
that"( ... ) generally, supporters and opponents of this law project represent two 
different currents of opinion regarding this issue. Supporters believe that Romanian 
society needs this law in the new form. Opponents don't agree and believe that the 
law should not be modified". 
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Next, participants indicated whether they were in favour or against this 
proposal. Thus, they categorized themselves either as belonging to "in favour of the 
proposal" or "against the proposal" opinion-based groups. As in Study 5, the 
categorization was checked using the item: "Where would you place your view on this 
issue from a scale from 1 (total disagreement) to 7 (total agreement)?". 
Then, the manipulation stage followed where the normativeness of group 
behaviours was manipulated by asking participants in the experimental condition to 
read a paragraph. The manipulation consisted of giving participants information 
stating that in a survey previously conducted using the same type of sample 
(psychology students from the same university), it was found that even if supporters 
and opponents disagreed about their position they both strongly agreed that there are 
some actions that are the most important to take and some others that are less 
important for members. 
The manipulation was conducted in this way because we did not know in 
advance which group participants belonged to. This information would have been 
required to give individualised feedback on the position of each group (without also 
giving potentially inconsistent and confusing feedback about the outgroup norms). 
Given the fact that activist groups supporting both positions were taking action in the 
Romanian society at the time that broadly matched the range of behaviours included 
here, this strategy seemed reasonable. 
Participants then read a list of four actions that had been most strongly 
endorsed at the pretest (i.e., "To join an organized group which reflects their view", 
"To become actively involved in the promotion of the position they support"; "To 
214 
sign a petition to show support or opposition"; 'To try to persuade other people about 
their position"). 
Then, they were told that participants in this survey also agreed that some 
actions were less likely to be taken or less appropriate (i.e., less normative) and the 
less normative behaviours indicated in the pretest were presented to the participants 
(i.e., "To try to stop the supporters on the other side from expressing their views"; "To 
participate in a counter-demonstration when the other side demonstrates"; "To 
actively participate in the organization of a rally"; "To write letters to newspapers to 
show support for their position"). It was expected that after reading this paragraph 
group normative behaviours would be perceived as more normative than in the control 
condition where participants did not learn anything about the previous survey. 
Dependent measures 
The normativeness of group behaviour was checked by asking participants to 
rate all eight behaviours. More specifically, they answered the question "How 
appropriate do you consider the following behaviours for the supporters of one of the 
positions?" (these and all other items used seven point scales). 
Then, participants completed the same salience measures as in previous 
surveys (i.e., certainty of self-definition as an opinion group member, certainty about 
the correctness of own position, certainty about the fact that they are real supporters or 
opponents of the proposal, and certainty that holding this particular position really 
reflects their views). In order to better reflect the dynamic nature of the construct of 
salience the word "at the moment" was added for some of the salience measures. It is 
argned that salience indicates the extent to which people come to see themselves as 
members of a particular group at a certain moment in time, so this change in the items 
should capture this temporally varying aspect of salience. Participants were reminded 
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that on the front page they indicated their position regarding the proposal (in favour or 
against). They were asked next to rate the following statement: "I define myself as 
holding this position at the moment", "I am confident that my ideas regarding this 
proposal are the right ones", " I am confident that I am a real supporter/opponent of 
this proposal", and "I am confident that holding this position really reflects my views 
and beliefs at the moment". 
Identification with the opinion-group was measured using the same four item 
scale as in Study 5 (i.e., "I identify with other people who hold the same position as 
me about this proposal", "I see myself as belonging to the group of people who hold 
the same position as me about this proposal", "I am glad that I belong to the group of 
people who hold the same position as me about this proposal", and "I feel strong ties 
with other people who hold the same position as me about this proposal"). Then, the 
same items used in Study 5, the same items were used to measure perceived ingroup 
depersonalization and attribution of common behaviours to group reality were 
included. 
Finally, political behavioural intentions were measured by the following items: 
"How likely is it that you will become a member of an organized group which shares 
your views on the proposal?", "How likely is it that you will become actively 
involved in the promotion of the position you support?, "How likely is it that you will 
sign a petition or something similar supporting your position?", "How likely is it that 
you will try to persuade other people about the correctness of your position?", "How 
likely is it that you will try to stop the supporters of the other side to express their 
views?", "How likely is it that you will participate in a counter-demonstration when 
the other side demonstrates", "How likely is it that you will participate in the 
organization of a rally?", and, "How likely is it that you will write letters to 
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newspapers to show support for your position?". All the measures in this study were 
answered on seven-point scales. At the end of the questionnaire, participants provided 
demographical information about their age and gender. 
Results 
Preliminary Analyses 
First several scales such as identification of four items (a= .85), salience of 
three items (a= . 67), highly normative behaviours of four items (a= .86) and less 
normative behaviours of four items (a= .86) were formed. 
Concerning self-categorization in the two available opinion-based groups, 
72% of the participants were in favour of the new law project and 28% against. The 
manipulation check revealed a significant difference in the means of the perceived 
normativeness of highly normative behaviours and less normative behaviours (MS = 
4.49, and 3.43, t(l, 99) =25.17,p < .001). The correlations between the main 
variables (salience, identification and political behavioural intentions) as well as the 
means and standard deviations are presented in Table 10.2 below. There are no 
significant differences between the experimental and control conditions in the means 
for any of the variables. It is worth noting that normative behavioural intensions seem 
to be more strongly correlated with both the identification and the salience measures 
than the less normative items. 
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Table 1 0.2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations, for the salience and 
identification and political behavioural intention measures. 
M SD I 2 3 4 
1. Political 3.22 1.51 .699** .356** .445** 
behavioural 
intentions 
(normative 
items) 
2. Political 2.29 1.30 .255* .371 ** 
behavioural 
intentions 
(less normative 
items) 
3. Salience 4.48 1.33 .396** 
measure 
4. Identification 3.86 1.49 
measure 
Note: ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
Main Analyses 
The hypotheses were tested using four hierarchical regression analyses with 
the identification and salience measures as predictors and political behavioural 
intentions (highly normative political behavioural intentions and less normative 
political behavioural intentions) as criterion, one for each cell of the 2 x 2 design (see 
Table 10.3). 
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Table I 0.3. Regression analyses for each cell at the 2 x 2 design in Study 6 
Condition Criterion Predictor j3 R'change p 
Control Political behavioural Identification .606 .367 .000 
intentions 
(normative items) Identification .637 
Salience -.058 .002 .675 
Total R' ~ .369 
Political behavioural Identification .548 .301 .000 
intentions (less 
normative items) Identification .540 
Salience .014 .000 .926 
TotaiR'~ .301 
Perceived ingroup Identification .686 .471 .000 
depersonalization 
Identification .562 
Salience .239 .042 .056 
Total R'~ .513 
Experimental Political behavioural Identification .245 .060 .100 
intentions 
(normative items) Identification .127 
Salience .442 .181 .003 
Total R' ~ .242 
Political behavioural Identification .203 .041 .170 
intentions (less 
normative items) Identification .159 
Salience .167 .026 .275 
Total R' ~ .067 
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Perceived ingroup Identification .500 .250 .000 
depersonalization 
Identification .364 
Salience .508 .240 .000 
Total R' ~ .490 
In the control condition, the identification measure was a significant predictor 
for less normative behavioural intentions (fJ = .540, p < .001) but the salience 
measure did not add significantly to prediction. A similar pattern occurred with the 
more normative behaviours (fJ = .637, p < .001) with a nonsignificant change when 
the salience measure was added. 
In the experimental condition neither the identification nor the salience 
measures were significant predictors for the less normative items. For the normatively 
validated items, however, the salience measure (fJ = .442, p < .005) was a stronger 
predictor than the identification measure (fJ = .127, p < .005) and it also added 
significantly to prediction. 
The link between the self-definition as an opinion-based group member and 
perceived group depersonalization (Hypothesis 2) was tested next. In the control 
condition, the identification measure (fJ = .562,p < .001) was a stronger predictor 
than the salience measure (fJ = .239, p < .05). In the experimental condition, the 
results were consistent with the prediction, the salience measure (fJ = .508, p < .001) 
being a stronger predictor of perceived group depersonalization than the identification 
measure (fJ = .364, p < .001) and added significantly to prediction. 
Finally, the link between perceived group depersonalization and attribution to 
common behaviours to a group shared reality was investigated. For the overall data 
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set, consistent with the hypothesis, perceived group depersonalization (/3 = .637, p < 
.001) strongly predicted attribution of common behaviors. The relationship was 
stronger in the control (/3 = .747, p < .001) than the experimental condition (/3 = .486, 
p < .001). 
Discussion 
Results of this study show that the construct of self-definition as an opinion 
group member is, on the whole, a good predictor of political behavioural intentions. 
This finding is consistent in Studies 3, 4, and 5 and, also with a whole body of 
research on the link between group self-definition and relevant group behaviours 
Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simonet a!., 1998, 2000; Stiirmer, et al., 2003; Terry, et 
al., 2000; de Weerd and Klandermans, 1999) 
However, the two components of the self-definition as an opinion-based group 
member, which are opinion-based group identification and the salience, seem to play 
different roles in predicting relevant political behavioural intentions. That is, their 
predictive power seems to vary depending on the contextual changes imposed by the 
experimental manipulation. 
It was found that that when neither normative nor less normative behaviours 
are endorsed (control condition), the best predictor of both types of behaviours was 
opinion-based group identification. The salience measure did not add substantially to 
prediction for either set of behaviours. 
In line with predictions, when certain behaviours were normatively validated 
the situation changed dramatically. In this case, the salience measure was a better 
predictor of normative behaviour than the identification measure. In fact, for clearly 
normative endorsed behaviours the salience measure was the only significant 
predictor of political behavioural intentions. This is an important finding suggesting 
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that, by manipulating the perceived degree of group behaviour normativeness, the link 
between salient self-perception and intentions to participate in relevant actions can be 
improved. This means that by validating certain behaviours, people might become 
more ready to take action in relation to their ideas. This finding is significant in 
relation to work on collective action participation that shows that self-definition in 
terms of an activist identity predicts intentions to participate in relevant collective 
action (Simonet al., 1998, 2000; Sti.irmer, et al., 2003) and also actual participation 
(de Weerd and Klandermans, 1999; Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995), but it suggests that it 
may be possible to improve this link by using ingroup validation strategies. 
However, where the normative behaviours were endorsed, neither 
identification nor the salience measures predicted less-normative behaviours. That is, 
the link between self-definition as an opinion-based group member and political 
behavioural intention was actually eliminated when participants were made aware that 
these particular behaviours were not highly normative. Although this is a more 
extreme finding than anticipated, it is still consistent with the initial predictions. 
Taken together these findings have important implications for understanding 
the relationship between subjective group membership and the mobilization of group 
action (assuming all along that intentions do provide useful indications of potential for 
action). Making it clear that certain actions are normative was not more likely to lead 
people to intend to take those actions, but is was found that those who strongly 
defined themselves as members of the relevant opinion-based groups were more likely 
to support normative actions but no more likely to take less normative actions. This 
was despite the fact that some ofthe "less normative" actions were things that real 
committed activists do actually do. This is also consistent with studies showing that 
high identifiers act in one way, and low identifiers in another (e.g., Doosje, Ellemers, 
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& Spears, 1999; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002; Veenstra & Haslam, 2000), but 
the current research extends and qualifies the previous work by pointing to the 
importance of the normatively validated character of the behaviour. 
To sum up, the results support the initial hypothesis that the link between the 
salience measure and political behavioral intention is stronger when the behaviours 
involved are validated as highly normative. This finding is highly consistent with 
previous social identity research on the influence of group norms on behaviours 
(Jetten eta!., 1997, 1996; Wellen at a!., 1998) but in particular with studies showing 
that normative group behaviour is more positively evaluated by members and 
consequently more likely to be adopted by group members than is behaviour 
perceived as non-normative behaviour (e.g., Marques eta!, 1998; McAuliffe eta!., 
2003). It is also worth mentioning that in research conducted by Terry, Hogg, and 
McKimmie (2000; see Chapter 4) it was found that participants exposed to an 
incongruent norm displayed greater attitude-behaviour inconsistency than those 
exposed to a congruent ingroup norm. Their results suggested additionally that 
perceived group identification moderated the influence of norms on attitude-behaviour 
consistency. Although the present study does not directly focus on the attitude-
behaviour relationship, the specific finding that the salience measure is a particular 
good predictor of political behavioural intentions when behaviours involved are 
highly normative is clearly consistent with Terry and colleagues work 
Secondly, it was expected that the salience measure would be a stronger 
predictor of perceived group depersonalization than the identification measure. This 
was indeed the case on average, but only (strongly so) in the experimental condition. 
This could be explained in terms of the effect of the validation manipulation making 
the salient identity more relevant to a broader range of consequences of 
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depersonalization. When people are told that some behaviours are endorsed by their 
groups then the salience of their group membership should also be more relevant to 
explaining common behaviours in terms of collective identities and emerging 
consensus. 
Finally, the last prediction that perceived group depersonalization should 
predict attribution of common behaviours to group reality held in both conditions. 
This result has emerged in a consistent way in Studies 4, 5, and 6. In all cases there is 
evidence of perceived group depersonalization which means the relevant social 
identity has been made salient. 
It is important to note the role played by ingroup validation in this study. 
According to self-categorization theory, consensus within a relevant group leads to 
external attribution of the shared response, that is ingroup validated responses are 
perceived as more correct and appropriate. The behaviour of other group members 
"provides information about appropriate attitudes and actions in so far as it 
exemplifies the norms of some reference group (an ingroup self-category)" (Turner et 
a!, 1987, p. 72). This was exactly the process which made the normativeness 
manipulation used here so effective. As self-categorization theory argues, when 
ingroup members learn the stereotypical norms of their group they also discover that 
some behaviours within a certain group are seen as more appropriate, expected or 
desirable because they are highly consistent with the group norms. When they 
internalize and assign these norms to themselves, their behaviour becomes more 
normative as their category membership becomes salient (Turner eta!, 1987). 
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Conclusion 
The main finding of this study was that the link previously found between the 
salience measure and political behavioural intentions varies with the normative 
validation of certain behaviours. Thus, when the context is highly normative for 
ingroup members and the relevant group behaviour is made salient and easy to detect, 
the salience measure overtook the predictive power of the identification measure. This 
result provides very strong support for the empirical strategy of introducing the 
salience measure. It also demonstrates the importance of the normativeness of group 
behaviour as a contextual factor affecting the relationship between group self-
definition and political behavioural intentions. 
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CHAPTER 11 
THE ROLE OF SELF-DEFINITION AS AN OPINION-GROUP MEMBER IN 
PREDICTING POLITICAL INVOLVEMENT 
Main Questions and Summary of the Theoretical Review 
Initially, the main general question addressed in this thesis was when do 
people decide to take politically relevant action in relation to shared ideas. The social 
identity approach offers the general answer to this question that collective behaviour 
is determined by people's self-definition as group members in a given social context. 
A more refined general question was then, in which conditions is the relationship 
between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour the strongest. The 
literature review in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 provided two general answers to this 
question. 
The first answer is that, it seems that the relationship between self-definition 
as a group member and relevant group behaviour should be stronger in conditions of 
intergroup conflict. As detailed in Chapter 3, according to social identity theory 
intergroup group should make group members see themselves more in terms of their 
group membership rather then in terms of individual entities, and consequently 
behave more in line with their group membership as a function of this membership 
(Tajfel & Turner, 1986). As self-categorization theory further explains, during overt 
and intense intergroup conflict, group memberships become salient and then, 
individuals' self-perception tends to become depersonalized. As the social identity 
becomes salient, people come to act in terms of this social identity, so the likelihood 
of adopting group normative behaviour is increased (Turner et al., 1987). 
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Intergroup conflict Self-definition in Group behaviour 
terms of a social 
r-------- identity 
Figure 11. 1. Relating intergroup conflict, collective self-definition and group 
behaviour 
In spite of the importance ofthe topic at the broader societal level, at the 
moment, there is surprisingly little modem social psychological research on the direct 
effects of conflict. However, recent research focused mostly on exploring the role of 
conflict in the relationship between group identification and ingroup bias or negative 
racial attitudes (Jackson, 2002; Stephan eta!., 2002). 
Intergroup conflict can also take the form of a threat to social identity. There is 
an extensive body of research to support the idea that, under identity threat the 
relationship between identification and different forms of group behaviour (e.g., 
ingroup bias, derogation, coping strategies, etc) is stronger (Branscombe & Wann, 
1994; Crocker & Luhtanen, 1990; Dietz-Uhler & Murrell, 1998; Ellemers et al.1993; 
Grant, 1993; Grant & Brown, 1995; Spears et al., 1997). 
Finally, another important stream of research focused on intergroup conflict by 
particularly investigating explanations of collective disorder through self-
categorization processes (Reicher, 1996; Stott et al., 2001; Stott & Reicher, 1998). 
These authors argue that crowd disorder is better explained in a dynamic, intergroup 
manner that considers the interplay between perceptions and self-categorization of 
both groups in conflict. As detailed in Chapter 3, these authors argue that, to the 
227 
extent to which the opposing group (e.g. police, army, etc.) perceives the crowd as a 
homogenous threat, their consequent behaviour toward the crowd will be determined 
by this perception. Next, crowd members come to perceive the outgrop behaviour as 
oppressive and illegitimate and this alters their self-perception from seeing themselves 
as separate individuals in the crowd. Thus, crowd members come to see themselves as 
sharing a common group membership, and even more, an illegitimate and repressive 
common fate, which makes the (potentially violent) resistance to the opposing group 
to be perceived as an appropriate response. As the authors noted, the conflictual 
relations become more intense as "even if the violence of some in the crowd may 
provoke police action, this action is a necessary component of processes of escalation 
( ... )."(Stott & Reicher, 1998, p.359). In brief, this account approaches the intergroup 
conflict in a dynamic way, emphasizing the role played perceptions of groups in 
conflict on group self-definition and normative behaviour of group members which 
finally impact upon the way intergroup conflict itself develops. In Stott and Reicher' 
view, there is a cyclic dynamic between social identity, group behaviour and conflict 
as intergroup conflict impacts upon the relationship between self-definition as a group 
member and group behaviour which in tum impacts upon the intergroup conflict itself 
by increasing its intensity. 
The second answer provided by the literature as detailed in Chapter 4 is that 
the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour 
should be stronger when the relevant group behaviour is clearly normative for the 
in group members. That is, people tend to be more likely to follow behaviours which 
are highly normative for the group they are strongly committed to, thus, the predictive 
power of self-definition as a group member for relevant group behaviours should be 
higher when the behaviours involved are highly consistent with group norms. 
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According to self-categorization theory, when a social identity becomes salient, 
depersonalization of self-perception will result in behaviours which are highly 
normative (Turner, 1991). Thus, salience of self-categorization should lead through 
depersonalization to highly normative behaviours. 
Salience of self- Depersonalized self- Highly normative 
categorization f------. perception f------. behaviours 
Figure 11.2. Relating salince of self-categorization, depersonalized self-perception 
and highly normative behaviours 
The idea is that when a particular social identity is salient people are more 
likely to conform to group norms, so that highly normative behaviours are preferred to 
less normative ones) was further explored by researchers such as Terry, Hogg, and 
White (Terry et al., 1999; Terry & Hogg, 1996; Wellen et al., 1998; White et al., 
1994). They argue that the attitude-behaviour link (see Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975; 
Ajzen, 1991) was not consistently found as strong as expected because the content of 
group norms was not appropriately considered. That is, in situations where behaviours 
are congruent with group norms, attitudes should more strongly predict group 
behaviours. 
Other researchers focused on the influence of norms on the relationship 
between group identification and discriminatory attitudes (Jetten et al., 1997, 1996). 
They investigated the idea that high identifiers will be more likely to display such 
discriminatory attitudes but only if they are in line with group norms. 
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Finally, there is another line of research on the influence of group norms on 
behaviours (McAuliffe eta!., 2003; Marques eta!., 1998). These researchers tested the 
idea that normative behaviours are more positively evaluated, thus more likely to be 
adopted by group members than are non-normative ones. 
In brief, all of this research points out the crucial role played by group norms 
in the link between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour. In order 
to make accurate predictions about behaviours, it does not seem sufficient to take into 
consideration only variables such as attitudes and group identification, but also it 
seems important to explore how group norms come into the process. It was suggested 
that the picture would not be complete if the normative context is not taken into 
account, and in particular the meaning of norms for group members when they are 
prescribed by a certain group membership and they are context-relevant. 
The body of literature summarized up to this point suggested that the two main 
enhancers of the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group 
behaviour are intergroup conflict and normativeness of group behaviour. That is, the 
relationship should be stronger when the context involves intergroup conflict and 
where the behaviours are highly normative in relation to the respective group 
membership. 
Relevance of Opinion-based Groups for Predicting Political Involvement 
The final fundamental idea explored in this thesis was that the relationship 
between self-definition as a group member and group behaviour should be especially 
clear in opinion-based groups. It was argued in Chapter 5 that in opinion-based 
groups the existence of the other two factors that are considered to enhance the 
relationship, intergroup conflict and high normativeness of investigated group 
behaviour, are easy to detect. More specifically, in opinion-based groups the 
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relationship between self-definition as group member and group behaviour is 
particularly clear, partly because to the extent that such groups are oppositionally-
defined they will often be engaged in social conflict, and partly because these groups 
have features which make it easy for group behaviour to be defined as normative. 
Opinion based-groups are particularly relevant in relation to political 
involvement and action, and this is because many collective forms of behaviour are 
driven by views on societal issues which for different reasons have a high relevance 
for people that come to be involved in such actions (Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; 
Simonet a!., 1998, 2000; Stiirmer eta!., 2003). In other words, with whom people 
stand is informative about who they are and what they are going to do about the issues 
involved. When people come to express their opinions through support or opposition 
to these groups, they actually come to define themselves in terms of support or 
opposition in relation to the respective issue (Price, 1998). Shared support for, or 
opposition to, a particular cause, or in other words, self-definition as an opinion-based 
group member will determine which course of action is taken by such members. Thus, 
opinion-based group membership becomes crucial for predicting imminent group-
relevant behaviours. 
Individuals' opinions depend not only on their own cognitive framework (i.e., 
previous experiences, own beliefs, values, expectations, ideas, goals, etc.) but also on 
surrounding issues from the broad social context. Consequently, the social identities 
formed around these opinions usually relate to issues of high interest at some moment 
in time in some societal context. This high level of interest means that the opinions 
are more likely to be perceived as shared with other people and this gives the 
prospective activist nature of opinion-based groups. If an opinion is seen to be 
associated with at least some interest on the part of others in a society, then this 
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increases the plausibility that it will be shared with other people, but it also increases 
the potential dynamism of the opinion in the sense that. others may take action in 
relation to it. If we know that there is little interest in, say getting drivers in the UK or 
Australia to drive on the right hand side of the road, then there is little chance that we 
will encounter like-minded others who will attempt to turn this idea into a political 
program. In other words, when opinion-based groups are formed around issued of 
interest of the broad society level, they are usually likely to become activist groups or 
even social movements having as their objective either to achieve social change or to 
preserve the status-quo (see Chapter 5) and this is why they seem to be especially 
suitable for exploring political involvement. 
Given the relevance of opinion-based groups for action in general, and for the 
relationship between people's self-definition as group members and group behaviour 
in particular, all the empirical work conducted involved opinion-based groups. Thus, 
all social identity constructs used for exploring group processes in general, were 
applied to opinion-based groups. The opinion-based groups employed ranged from 
minimal opinion-based groups to strictly political ones (as such made up of supporters 
and opponents of some political parties) or opinion-based groups formed around other 
salient societal issues in different cultures (e.g., financial reparation in Netherlands 
and implementation of a law reform against gay discrimination in Romania). It is 
important to state again that the term 'political' was used in a broad sense here, 
comprising not only purely political behaviours such as voting or supporting a 
particular party, but also behaviours which are usually associated with various activist 
groups formed to support or oppose different social issues. Thus, 'political 
involvement' refers here to all behaviours which are likely to be adopted by people 
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supporting or opposing to some current of opinion, in other words behaviours specific 
to activists involved in political or social movements. 
Summary of Studies 1 and 2 
The objective of the first two studies was to address the basic effects of 
subjective intergroup conflict (as opposed to competition over resources) on group 
self-definition and subsequent behaviours. In order to do that subjective conflict was 
manipulated in minimal opinion-based groups. Ingroup favouritism was assessed as 
the most relevant form of group behaviour which can occur in such groups. The 
hypothesis investigated here was that, consistent with self-categorization theory, 
conflict should lead to salient self-categorization at the group level, and according to 
McGarty (1999) this should be followed by: 
d) stronger expressions of identification with the group; 
e) stronger certainty about ingroup position; and 
f) stronger ingroup favouritism. 
Thus, in these studies I was primarily interested in variations in the mean level 
of responses. Experimental designs were therefore used to attempt to produce these 
variations. 
In relation to the predictions the conclusions drawn from these studies were as 
follows. Measures of expressed identification did not seem to be particularly sensitive 
to contextual manipulations. Contrary to suggestions by McGarty (1999a) and others, 
such measures are probably not good indicators of salience. 
Certainty that the ingroup position was correct did increase under conditions 
of intergroup conflict when a more comprehensive measure of certainty was used in 
Study 2. This finding suggested that certainty-based measures were well worth 
exploring further in relation to self-definition as a group member. 
Finally, ingroup favouritism varied in much the same way, as did certainty 
measures in Study 2. It increased when there was clear intergroup conflict. 
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Studies I and 2 offered a good platform for the subsequent studies which were 
primarily conducted in order to explore the relationship between self-definition as a 
group member and behavioural intentions for political opinion-based groups rather 
than differences in the mean levels of responses. The objective was to further explore 
the dynamics involved in predicting different forms of political involvement using this 
particular type of group which was expected to be highly relevant for political action. 
Measuring Self-definition as an Opinion-based Group Member. Summary of 
Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6 
Given existing concerns with establishing the relationship between self-
definition as an opinion-based group member and political involvement a key point 
was to find the best way to measure self-definition as an opinion-based group 
member. Two candidate measures were employed, an identification measure based on 
standard identification items and a salience measure based on items which reflected 
the certainty of self-definition. These two measures were used to address the two 
more refined questions of the thesis: 
1. Which of the measures (identification or salience) is a better predictor of 
political behavioural intentions? and, 
2. What is the effect of independent variables (i.e., intergroup conflict and 
normativeness of group behaviour) on the relationship between self-
definition as an opinion group member and political behavioural intentions? 
In order to be able to answer these questions, one empirical challenge was to 
find the most valid way of capturing the theoretical constructs involved. The relatively 
stable nature of identification should make it less difficult to capture empirically. 
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Indeed, in the social psychological literature it is relatively easy to find a number of 
different social identification scales (e.g., Brown, Condor, Mathews, Wade & 
Williams, 1986; Doosje, Ellemers, & Spears, 1995; Ellemers, Kortekaas, & van 
Ouwerkerk, 1999; Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999; Karasawa, 1991; Mae! 
& Ashforth, 1992; see Haslam, 2001, for a summary), but perhaps because of its 
elusive nature it is harder to find well-established measures of salience. However, as it 
was argued in Chapter 5, measuring certainty of self-definition seems to be a plausible 
way of capturing the salience of group membership in opinion-based groups. It was 
argued that certainty of self-definition in terms of holding a particular opinion should 
be the closest indicator of salience but this was true exclusively for opinion-based 
groups (in the case of social categories or other types of groups certainty does not 
need to be related to salience in any way). 
A number of hypotheses were formulated which built on the self-
categorization theory argument that the most proximal predictor of group behaviour is 
not identification but salience of self-categorization, through the process of 
depersonalization which is " ( ... ) the basic process underlying group phenomena" 
(Turner eta!, 1987, p.50). Salience of self-categorization was captured by a series of 
certainty items. Secondly, intergroup conflict and group normativeness as contextual 
enhancers of the relationship between self-definition as a group member and group 
behaviour were also considered. The hypotheses were: 
1. Certainty should predict political behavioural intentions over and above 
identification because certainty measures are more closely related to (if not 
direct indicators of) salience. 
2. If this is true, the salience measure should also be a better predictor of 
perceived group depersonalization. 
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3. The relationship between the salience measure and political behavioural 
intention should be strongest for the clearly group normative behaviours. 
4. Finally, intergroup conflict should make the relationship between self-
definition as an opinion group member and political behavioural intentions 
stronger. 
These hypotheses were tested across four studies (two experimental studies 
and two surveys) involving different types of opinion-based groups. All of the studies 
involved different types of political opinion-based groups which were formed around 
various issues. 
The hypothesis that the salience measure predicted political behavioural 
intentions over and above identification was consistently supported across the studies 
(see Table 11.1). 
Table 11.1. Hierarchical regression for Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6 with the identification 
and salience measures as predictors of political behavioural intentions. 
Study Criterion Predictor j3 Change in R' p 
Study 3 Political behavioural Identification .595 .354 .000 
intentions 
Identification .224 
Salience .628 .256 .000 
Study 4 Political behavioural Identification .676 .457 .000 
intentions 
Identification .232 
Salience .584 .144 .000 
Study 5 Political behavioural Identification .395 .156 .000 
intentions (weak conflict) 
Identification .296 
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Salience .197 .029 .078 
Political behavioural Identification .278 .077 .008 
intentions (strong 
conflict) Identification .097 
Salience .356 .094 .002 
Political behavioural Identification .442 .195 .000 
intentions (hostility) 
Identification .300 
Salience .245 .040 .045 
Study 6 Highly normative 
political behavioural Identification .606 .367 .000 
intentions/ control 
condition Identification .637 
Salience -.058 .002 .675 
Less normative 
political behavioural Identification .548 .301 .000 
intentions/control 
condition Identification .540 
Salience .014 .000 .926 
Highly normative 
political behavioural Identification .245 .060 .100 
intentions/expe-
rirnental condition Identification .127 
Salience .442 .181 .003 
Less normative 
political behavioural Identification .203 .041 .170 
intentions/expe-
rimental condition Identification .159 
Salience .167 .026 .275 
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Results from the whole set of studies indicated that the salience measure 
generally predicted political behavioural intention better than the identification 
measure (larger ps) and in most cases added to prediction over and above the 
identification measure. This suggests that standard identification measures are good 
predictors of political behavioural intentions for opinion-based groups as also showed 
by research on political participation (e.g., Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995, Simonet a!., 
1998, 2000; Stiirmer et al., 2003), but that the accuracy of prediction can be improved 
by including the salience measure. 
The most interesting point is that, in Study 6, the salience measure only added 
to prediction for highly normative and validated items (in the experimental condition). 
Thus, the hypothesis that the relationship between the salience measure and political 
behavioural intentions should be the strongest for the clearly group normative 
behaviours was supported by the results of Study 6. That is, the salience measure was 
a particularly good predictor of political behavioural intentions for highly normative 
behaviours that were also normatively validated by the ingroup. This represents strong 
support for self-categorization theory argument that when a social identity becomes 
salient, depersonalization of self-perception will result in behaviour which is highly 
normative. As Turner (1991) noted: 
It is assumed that depersonalization, the creation of mutually perceived 
similarity between group members, ( ... ) leads to more consensual 
behaviour in terms of the norms and values that define one's group 
( ... ). (p.16) 
Thus, salience though the process of depersonalization, should directly predict 
behaviour which is highly consistent with the norms of the respective group. This was 
exactly what Study 6 results revealed in line with other research reviewed in Chapter 
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4 on the influence of norms for the relationship between group self-definition and 
relevant behaviours 
Across the set of studies the situation where the salience and identification 
measures provided the weakest prediction of political behavioural intentions was in 
the experimental condition of Study 6 for the less nonnative items. This is an 
interesting finding in itself, indicating that even though salience did not vary across 
the conditions, that its predictive power was affected by the normativeness 
manipulation. In particular, it seems that the salience measure almost completely lost 
its predictive power in relation to behaviours that came to be perceived as less 
nonnative for members in a given context. Importantly, the experimental 
manipulation shows that the absence of a relationship was not due to the behaviours 
per se but to the explicit invalidation of these possible actions. 
In addition, the hypothesis that the salience measure should be a stronger 
predictor of perceived group depersonalization was consistently supported in that the 
salience measure was indeed a better predictor of perceived group depersonalization 
than the identification measure in most of the conditions across studies (see Table 
11.2). 
Table 11.2. Hierarchical regression for Studies 4, 5 and 6 with the identification and 
salience measures as predictors of perceived group depersonalization. 
Study Criterion 
Study 4 Perceived ingroup 
depersonalization 
Study 5 Perceived ingroup 
depersonalization 
(weak conflict) 
Predictor 
Identification 
Identification 
Salience 
Identification 
Identification 
Salience 
fi Change in R' 
.504 .254 
.259 
.322 .. 044 
.370 .137 
.129 
.471 .164 
p 
.000 
.016 
.000 
.000 
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Perceived ingroup Identification .274 .075 .006 
depersonalization 
(strong conflict) Identification .059 
Salience .400 .114 .000 
Perceived ingroup Identification .340 .115 .001 
depersonalization 
(hostility) Identification .217 
Salience .217 .032 .074 
Study 6 Perceived ingroup Identification .686 .471 .000 
depersonalization 
(control condition) Identification .562 
Salience .239 .042 .056 
Perceived ingroup Identification .500 .250 .000 
depersonalization 
(experimental Identification .364 
condition) Salience .508 .240 .000 
Although the perceived group depersonalization measure was not designed to 
actually capture the process of depersonalization itself (which would necessitate a 
much complex set of measures which would constitute a interesting and difficult 
pursuit in itselfbut was not within the scope of this thesis), it was used to establish the 
validity of the salience measure. The reasoning was that when a group membership 
was salient perceivers would be more likely to attribute depersonalization to their 
group. That is, they would be more likely to perceive their own group members as 
sharing goals, ideals and values and they would also be more likely to explain 
identical behaviours in terms of common group membership (Tumer et a!., 1987). The 
fact that the salience measure was more closely related to perceived group 
depersonalization than the identification measure, represents another indication to 
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support the argument that the certainty items were indeed closer to salience than any 
other related construct. 
On the other hand, the hypothesis investigating the effects of intergroup 
conflict on the relationship between self-definition as a group member and political 
behavioural intentions was not supported by the results of Study 5. More specifically, 
explicit conflict or hostility did not serve to strengthen the overall relationship 
between group self-definition and political behavioural intentions. As discussed at the 
end of Chapter 9, this finding suggests that intergroup conflict might not be as 
relevant for the relationship between self-definition as a group member and political 
behavioural intentions as the review suggested. 
As results of Study 6 suggest, the extent to which relevant group behaviours 
are perceived as highly normative by members in a given social context seems to play 
a much more important role (see also, Terry, Hogg, & White, !999; Wellen, Hogg, & 
Terry, 1998; Terry & Hogg, 1996; White, Terry, & Hogg, 1994). This is a crucial 
finding for this thesis, but its power strongly relies on the validity of the salience 
measure employed. 
Although a reasonable confidence can be expressed regarding the validity of 
the salience measure used in the six studies, there might still be some concerns related 
to the fact that the certainty measures used are really the closest to salience and they 
do not better reflect some other related constructs. It will be argued next that the 
measure of salience used is best at capturing the theoretical construct of salience 
rather than other related constructs. 
Further Considerations Regarding the Salience Measure 
According to self-categorization theory (Turner, 1985; Turner eta!., 1987), a 
category is salient when it is cognitively prepotent or switched on at some moment in 
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time in a given context. From this, it can be implied that in order to be salient the 
perception of the category has to be strong and powerful. Arguably, the clearest 
definition of a strong perception is one that the perceiver is certain about. The fact that 
in opinion-based groups, group formation is actually based on a set of beliefs or 
shared ideas, suggests that certainty in relation to that particular opinion should be the 
most direct way to capture salience. The certainty about correctness of this opinions 
as well as certainty of self-definition seem to be the best candidates for capturing 
important aspects of salience. It is important to note, though that such measures can 
probably only be applied to opinion-based groups, as certainty is probably not at all 
that informative in relation to social categories or even other types of groups. As 
discussed in Chapter 5, these arguments would not hold in other sorts of groups or 
social categories (e.g., people's certainty about their gender is not going to reflect the 
salience of their gender identity). 
Theoretically, according to self-categorization theory, the constructs which are 
most directly involved in predicting collective behaviour are group identification, 
salience of self-categorization, perceiver readiness and fit. These include proximal 
predictors of salience such as perceiver readiness and fit, and more distal ones such as 
long-term identification. To the extent to which the most proximal predictors are 
measured, they are going to be better measures of salience (see Figure 11.3). 
Self-categorization constructs predicting group behaviour 
Long-term 
identification 
Perceiver 
readiness 
Fit 
Salience 
Measures of these self-categorization constructs used in this thesis 
Social identification 
scale 
Certainty of self-
definition scale 
Figure 11.3. Self-categorization constructs involved in predicting group behaviour 
and the measures employed in Studies 3, 4, 5, and 6 
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As previously discussed (see the end of Chapter 9), from a theoretical point of 
view all of these constructs are highly related. For example, as McGarty (1999a) 
explains perceiver readiness (together with fit) is a pre-determinant of salience, which 
through depersonalization impacts upon long-term identification. At the same time, 
long-term identification "the degree of internalization of or identification with an 
ingroup-outgroup membership, the centrality and evaluative importance of a group 
membership in self-definition" Turner, 1987, p. 55) is considered to be one of the 
determinants of perceiver readiness. Matters are furthers complicated because: 
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Group formation proceeds on the basis of the interaction of perceiver 
readiness and fit but once groups are formed the strength of 
identification and the degree of internalization of that group become 
determinants of future readiness to perceive oneself in terms of that 
categorization. (McGarty, 1999a, p.l91) 
This example illustrates the great complexity of the dynamics in which these 
constructs are involved and their interrelated nature. More specifically, there is a 
complex causal chain in which long-term identification is both a consequence and an 
antecedent of salience (see Figure 9.1, McGarty, 1999a, p.l91). At the empirical level 
of measuring these constructs, we would also expect a high overlap between the items 
design to capture them (see Chapter 9). It is plausible then, that the certainty measures 
captured not only salience but also aspects of these related constructs. However, it is 
argued here that although it is possible that the certainty measures reflect, to some 
degree other related constructs (the best candidates are identification and perceiver 
readiness), they mostly capture salience for the particular case of opinion-based 
groups. 
Given the pattern of the results, there are only really three logical possibilities: 
I. The certainty measures might reflect another construct drawn from self-
categorization theory (e.g., better measures of identification, or perceiver 
readiness); 
2. They might reflect another construct which does not have anything to do 
with self-categorization theory (e.g., certainty as an individual 
characteristic related to self-advocacy, self-awareness, etc.); 
3. They might really reflect salience. 
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Considering the first of these, there is the possibility that the certainty 
measures might reflect one of the other main self-categorization theory constructs, 
and the likely candidates are identification or perceiver readiness. Given the original 
definition of identification as intemalisation of individuals' group membership as an 
aspect of their self-concept, that is individuals should be subjectively identified with 
the relevant ingroup (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), certainty about the group position does 
not seem immediately related to identification. 
However, if we consider identification as "the extent to which individuals 
identify and commit themselves to a social category as a whole" (Spears et al., 1997a, 
p.541 ), the possible connection between certainty and identification becomes more 
evident. In particular, commitment to an opinion-based group might be related, to 
some extent, to certainty about group position and self-definition as a group member, 
but clearly, the concept of commitment has a much broader scope. Given the three-
dimensional model of social identity (Ellemers, et al., 1999), which distinguishes 
between self-categorization (cognitive component), commitment to the group 
(affective component) and group self-esteem (evaluative component), the certainty 
items might also reflect cognitive aspects of commitment (i.e., self-definition in terms 
of holding one position). However, it is more difficult to argue for any relation with 
the other two components of this construct (the affective and evaluative), which are 
probably much more accurately captured by standard identification scales. In short, it 
is surely possible that the certainty items capture to some degree aspects of 
identification. 
Secondly, as advanced in Chapters 8 and 9 it is plausible that the certainty 
items do capture some more enduring aspects of salience which are mostly related to 
the perceiver readiness construct. Perceiver readiness is considered to help to 
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improve the veridicality of perception and its basic effects are summarized by Oakes 
et a!. (1994) as follows: 
1. Through the influence of perceiver readiness stimuli are elaborated in 
terms of categories provided by one's own past experience and the 
body of ideas, theories, and knowledge acquired from one's culture (a 
perceiver not primed in this way is one who has literally learnt nothing 
and categorized in ignorance). 
2. Perceiver readiness lends to the selective categorization of the world in 
a way that is meaningful, relevant, and useful in terms of the needs, 
goals, and purposes of the perceiver. 
3. It ensures that the categories used by the perceiver evaluate reality 
from the perspective of his or her own standards, norms and values. 
4. It represents and judges reality from the vantage point of one's own 
place in it, from the perspective provided by one's own particular 
position. (p.201) 
Given the importance of perceiver readiness for how people come to perceive 
the social world and how they consequently organize their behaviours in relation to 
this, it is essential to find possible ways of capturing it. Aspects of perceiver readiness 
as "the tendency for certain ways of categorizing to be more accessible as a function 
of the perceiver's expectations, motives, values and goals" (Oakes eta!., 1994) might 
be well captured by the certainty items used. For example, it is likely that certainty 
about self-definition as holding some opinion to be a result of perceiver's past 
experience, beliefs, values and expectancies. In this case, the certainty items may have 
been successful in capturing those aspects of perceiver readiness given by perceiver's 
past experience, beliefs, values and expectancies. That is, certainty items reflect 
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salience to the extent to which they capture some of the more enduring aspects of the 
perceiver readiness construct. Perceiver readiness is one of the most important 
determinants of salience, so items capturing this construct should also be accurate 
indicators of salience. 
To draw an analogy which illustrates a similar dynamic, we can consider 
working conditions as a predictor of job satisfaction which is itself a direct predictor 
of desire to stay in a job. If we have a measure of working conditions then we can 
predict desire to stay in a job but we will have an even better predictor of desire to 
stay in a job if we instead measure job satisfaction in some valid and reliable way. 
Of course, in measuring working conditions, job satisfaction, and desire to 
stay in the job, we might find that there was overlap between the constructs. Perhaps 
people who were dissatisfied come to see their conditions less favourably. Those who 
decide to leave may then become dissatisfied. 
Similar possibilities may apply here. The current salience measure might pick 
up perceiver readiness and identification, and the current identification measure might 
pick up perceiver readiness and salience. It is nevertheless easy to see, on the basis of 
these results, that the salience measure is closer to the salience, rather than the 
identification, end of the causal chain. This is because the salience measure is a better 
predictor of behavioural intentions (especially in Study 6 group-normative and 
validated behavioural intentions), and it is a better predictor of perceived group 
depersonalization- a variable that should be more closely related to salience than 
identification. 
If we accept these argrnnents it is difficult to come to any conclusion other 
than that the salience measure is more closely related to salience than identification 
measures are, at least for opinion-based groups. In practice, it might not matter much 
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whether the actual construct measured is more closely aligned to perceiver readiness 
or salience, as the measures seem to be such good predictors at this level of generality. 
That being the case, it is still certainly possible in principle that the salience 
measure used here instead captures some other construct that has not been anticipated 
in self-categorization theory. Given the focus of this thesis on clarifYing the social 
identity approach to political activism I will not address this idea in detail. Suffice it 
to say that it appears that any theory that attempted to reconcile the three constructs 
that have been measured here would probably need to share quite a few details with 
self-categorization theory. 
To sum up, it is very likely that the certainty measures do reflect salience. 
Probably, the most plausible interpretation is that the salience measure is a good 
indicator of salience for opinion-based groups because certainty of self-definition 
captures the construct of perceiver readiness which is considered by self-
categorization theorists to be a direct determinant of salience. 
Implications and Future Directions of Research 
Before considering possible directions of research opened by the present work, 
I will summarise the most important findings here and their implications. Firstly, it 
was found that commitment to opinion-based groups is an excellent predictor of 
political behavioural intentions. When measured by certainty of self-definition items, 
it seems to be a better predictor of such intentions than previous research indicated 
(see the literature review in Chapter 2). This is especially true for Studies 3 and 4, 
where the effect sizes were very large (W = .61, and R 2 = .60). In addition, the 
salience measure tends to be a much better predictor than the identification measure. 
Secondly, the relationship between the salience measure and political behavioural 
intentions holds especially well for normatively validated items, but there is no 
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evidence that conflict per se increases the strength of the relationship (which is not to 
say that there are not other circumstances where it might). 
The main implications of these findings are firstly that opinion-based groups 
are certainly worth studying in relation especially with political participation (see 
also, Kelly & Breinlinger, 1995; Simonet a!., 1998; 2000, Stiirrner et al., 2003). 
Secondly, certainty of self-definition measures are much closer to the self-
categorization theory construct of salience than standard identification items. Using 
such measures might improve the prediction accuracy of group behaviours in general. 
Finally, given the excellent prediction of behavioural intentions, it would be worth 
looking at actual behaviours in relation to commitment to opinion-based groups. It is 
also crucial to explore commitment to activism and the way in which politicized 
collective identities are related to political participation (see Simon & Klandermans, 
2001). 
Despite an impressive body of research consistent with the social identity 
approach, the field has struggled to demonstrate the relevance of identity-based 
concepts for predicting collective action (Turner & Reynolds, 2000). The current body 
of research suggests a series of promising directions for future enquires. 
Firstly, a further exploration of the salience measure seems like the most 
logical direction to be pursuit next. Although this measure was repeatedly used in four 
studies in the context of this thesis, it is important to find new ways of examining the 
more dynamic aspects of salience. For example, a longitudinal design could provide 
useful insights and a strong additional test of this salience measure. Specifically, in 
order to more clearly differentiate the salience and identification constructs, it would 
be particularly informative to measure more collective self-definition constructs (i.e., 
identification and salience) at multiple points in time, and then to assess the more 
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dynamic aspects of these constructs again in the moment when decisions about action 
are made, together with the intentions to take action or even the actual action. 
Given the weak effect of the intergroup conflict manipulation from Study 5, an 
additional challenge would also be to find particular contexts where conflict, and 
perhaps even hostility, are perceived as more normative. One possibility would be to 
investigate these processes in opinion-based groups actually formed around a highly 
conflictual issue and using group members who are more likely to accept conflict as 
normative (e.g., activist members rather than mere opinion-based group members). 
More work need to be done in order to be able to further develop and test the 
opinion-based account which only started to take shape in this thesis. It would be 
useful broaden the area of investigation, by considering different types of groups or 
social categories. A comparative investigation at this point including opinion-based 
groups, other types of groups and social categories might be especially informative in 
terms of strengthen or moderating the claims in relation to this account. Further 
explorations of the relation between opinion-based groups and relevant activist groups 
might help us to better understand and predict political involvement. In particular, 
studying how the opinion-based group idea relates to the Simon and Klandermans' 
model of politicized collective identity might prove especially useful for the 
understanding of mechanisms involved in real political struggles, in situations in 
which there not only two oppositionally defined groups but also third parties (e.g., 
government or other authorities) becomes involved in the struggle (see Simon & 
Klandermans, 2001). 
In none of the studies here were people recruited on the bases of activism or 
other features that would indicate the existence of a politicized collective identity for 
any significant sub-sample. Nevertheless, we found strong relationships between self-
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definition as an opinion-based group member and political behavioural intentions for 
these non-activist groups. This implies that, if we choose the right type of group 
membership and measure self-definition in the right way, we can obtain strong 
relationships suggesting the potential emergence of politicized collective identity 
without explicitly consider some of the preconditions specified by Simon and 
Klandermans such as engagement in the power struggle or involvement of a third 
more powerful parties. 
Of course, we do not know whether the participants in the present set of 
studies (even the highly committed ones) actually followed up their behavioural 
intentions with the genuine forms of activism that Simon and Klandermans are 
interested in. So, perhaps a better way to interpret the current results is that they show 
the ways in which ordinary non-active subjectively committed supporters of a cause 
come to develop intentions to take action which might transform into real activism at 
some later stage. The results therefore suggest some implications for broadening the 
base for activist movements. 
Finally, assessing the actual behaviours rather than behavioural intentions in 
relation to different opinion-based groups should also prove to be a fruitful direction 
of research considering the present broad political context. Although there is a large 
body of research showing that behavioural intentions are good predictors of a variety 
ofbehaviours (e.g., Bagozzi & Warshaw, 1990; Bassili, 1995; Calantone, & Joyce, 
1986; Conner & Sparks, 1996; Manstead & van Eekelen, 1998; Norman eta!., 1999; 
Norman & Smith, 1995; Sheeran & Orbell, 2000; Warshaw & Davies, 1984), it is still 
important to explore how commitment to opinion-based groups would predict actual 
behaviours. 
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Conclusion 
To return to the example of the collapse of the communist regime in Romania 
from the beginning of Chapter 1, it can be concluded that the identification-salience-
political involvement account of opinion-based groups seems to make a great deal of 
sense. This observation is fully consistent with recent analyses of cases of actual 
emergent action (e. g., Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott, Hutchinson, & Drury, 1998). 
Large social movements take place when people come to perceive themselves as 
sharing a collective social identity and to consequently act in terms of this common 
social identity. In addition, the range of behaviours adopted by participants in such 
movements highly depends on the content and meaning of the relevant social category 
in a given intergroup context. That is the content of crowd behaviour will be limited 
by the nature of the relevant social category (Reicher, 1987, 1984). In addition, the 
treatment received from the opposed group can be perceived as unfair and illegitimate 
by the members of the group involved in collective action and in this case the conflict 
suddenly increases. The opposed group action is then "a necessary component of 
processes of escalation( ... )" (Stott & Reicher, 1998, p.359). As in the case of the 
downfall of Ceausescu regime in Romania, people involved in the violent action 
preceding its collapse perceived themselves as holding a shared opinion (i.e., that the 
Ceausescu regime must go) and a collective social identity but it was not until the 
police and army forces brutally stoped a relatively small anti-Ceausescu rally that the 
'Romanian revolution' begun. The violent and illegitimate action of authorities was 
responsible for the strong and widespread collective action that followed and 
culminated in the collapse of the regime. 
As McGuire (1997) notes, social psychological research often confronts the 
frustrating truth that it can be very difficult to find more than weak evidence for ideas 
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that seem obviously true. The measurement technique that was used here, along with 
the theoretical refinement offered by the idea of opinion-based groups, may offer 
intergroup social psychology the sort of strong empirical platform for the systematic 
research that it needs to answer many questions of interest in the field. 
This systematic research is necessary in part because we live in an age of 
opinion-based groups. In the days following September 11, 200lleaders of the USA 
and other nations exclusively defined every person on the planet as a supporter of the 
War against Terror or as a supporter of terrorism, explicitly ruling out the prospect of 
distinguishing between those who carry out terrorist attacks and those who support 
them. The war against terror, we are told, is not a war between countries or religions. 
If this is true it is hard to see what it could be other than a war between opinion-based 
groups. 
Finally, the research conducted here confirms the fact that group action will be 
taken not simply by committed group members but by people who currently see 
themselves as members of normatively relevant groups defined by shared opinions, 
and where that action is normatively endorsed as relevant and appropriate by the 
group they belong to, that is, it is consistent with the social meaning of the group. It 
is crucial though when researching different forms of involvement in political action 
to consider the roles of opinion-based group, not least because it is clear that we have 
a productive way of measuring commitment to and self-definition in terms of these 
groups. 
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APPENDIX I QUESTIONNAIRES 
Study 1 Questionnaire (trauslated from Romauiau) 
Attitude Statement Classification Task 
Questionnaire on attitudes toward other ethnic groups in Romania 
Please read carefully all the statements below aud then sort them into two classes 
labelled A aud B. You will need to choose one or the other of the following 
classification schemes: 
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Classification 1: The statement is about Hungarians (A) or not about Hungarians (B) 
or 
Classification 2: The statement is favourable towards minorities (A) or unfavourable 
towards minorities (B). 
First indicate which of the classifications you prefer by circling one of them. 
Classification 1 
Classification 2 
Now please label each statement A orB according to your classification. 
Ethnic minorities are very important for the cultural diversity of our country. 
Answer. ... 
2. Hungariaus from Trausylvauia could never be loyal to Romauiau state. 
Answer. ... 
3. Ethnic minorities have to have more rights thau the majority in order to help them 
to preserve their own cultural heritage. 
Answer. ... 
4. Hungariaus are more chauvinist thau Romaniaus. 
Answer .... 
5. Members of minority groups are far more likely to break the law of our country. 
Answer .... 
6. Hungarians from Transylvania should have an educational system in their own 
language. 
Answer. ... 
7. Ethnic minorities cause a lot of harm to political stability of our country. 
Answer .... 
8. It is a good thing that Hungarian minority is well represented in the Romanian 
Parliament. 
Answer .... 
Pre-test questionnaire 
1. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of the 
classification you have chosen. 
1 ___________ 100 
extremely the best 
poor 
Answer .... 
2. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of the 
alternative classification. 
1 ___________ 100 
extremely the best 
poor 
Answer. ... 
3. Please write down the number that corresponds best to your feeling about how 
certain you are that your group's categorization is the best categorization 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all extremely 
certain certain 
Answer. ... 
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3. How well do you think your group performed the classification task? 
1 ___________ 100 
extremely the best 
poor 
Answer .... 
4. Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling of 
belongingness to this group. 
1 __________ 100 
not at all very much 
Answer. ... 
5. I identify with other members of this group. 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all very much 
Answer. ... 
6. Being a member of a group is an important part of how I see myself at this 
moment. 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all very much 
Answer. ... 
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7. Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling about yourself 
as a member of this group. 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all very much 
Answer. ... 
8. My membership in this group is important to me. 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all 
Answer. ... 
very much 
9. Please write down the number that corresponds best to your perception of how 
similar you are to other members of your group. 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all very much 
Answer. ... 
3. Feedback stage sheets for each condition. 
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1. Condition 1: clear conflict (strong ingroup position validation I strong outgroup 
position validation) 
Your own rating of your own group was ... . 
Your own rating of the other group was ... . 
The average rating of your own group classification by your group was 85 points. 
The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification by the other group was 83 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 53 points. 
2. Condition 2: vague conflict (weak ingroup position validation /weak outgroup 
position validation) 
Your own rating of your own group was ... . 
Your own rating of the other group was ... . 
The average rating of your own group classification was 55 points. 
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The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 52 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification was 53 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 50 points. 
3. Condition 3: out group superiority claim (weak ingroup validation! strong 
outgroup validation) 
Your own rating of your own group was ... . 
Your own rating of the other group was ... . 
The average rating of your own group classification was 55 points. 
The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification was 83 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 54 points. 
4. Condition 4: ingroup superiority claim (strong ingroup position validation! weak 
outgroup position validation). 
Your own rating of your own group was ... . 
Your own rating of the other group was ... . 
The average rating of your own group classification was 85 points. 
The average rating of your own group classification by the other group was 54 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification was 53 points. 
The average rating of the other group classification by your own group was 51 points. 
3. Post-test questionnaire 
We would now like to answer to the following questions. Please take your time to 
consider answers. 
1. Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling of 
belongingness to this group. 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all very much 
Answer. ... 
2. I identify with other members of this group. 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all very much 
Answer. ... 
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3. Being a member of a group is an important part of how I see myself at this moment. 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all very much 
Answer .... 
4. Please write down the number that best corresponds to your feeling about yourself 
as a member of this group. 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all very much 
Answer. ... 
5. My membership in this group is important to me. 
" ____________ ,00 
not at all 
Answer. ... 
very much 
5. Please write down the number that corresponds best to your perception of how 
similar you are to other members of your group. 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all very much 
Answer .... 
6. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of the 
classification you have chosen: 
1 ___________ 100 
extremely the best 
poor 
Answer .... 
7. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of the 
alternative classification. 
1 ___________ 100 
extremely the best 
poor 
Answer. ... 
9. Please write down the number that corresponds best to your feeling about how 
certain you are that your group's categorization is the best categorization 
1 ___________ 100 
not at all extremely 
certain certain 
Answer. ... 
I 0. How well do you think your group performed the classification task? 
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1 ___________ 100 
not at all extreme! y 
certain certain 
Answer. ... 
Please finally indicate: 
Your gender: Male Female 
The age category you belong to: 1)18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6) 
65-
Study 2 Questionnaires (translated from Romanian) 
I. Attitude Statement Classification Task 
Questionnaire on attitudes toward other ethnic groups in Romania 
Please read carefully all the statements below and then sort them into two classes 
labelled A and B. You will need to choose one or the other of the following 
classification schemes: 
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Classification I: The statement is about Hungarians (A) or not about Hungarians (B) 
or 
Classification 2: The statement is favourable towards minorities (A) or unfavourable 
towards minorities (B). 
First indicate which of the classifications you prefer by circling one of them. 
Classification I 
Classification 2 
Now please label each statement A orB according to your classification. 
1. Ethnic minorities are very important for the cultural diversity of our country. 
Answer. ... 
2. Hungarians from Transylvania could never be loyal to Romanian state. 
Answer .... 
3. Ethnic minorities have to have more rights than the majority in order to help them 
to preserve their own cultural heritage. 
Answer. ... 
4. Hungarians are more chauvinist than Romanians. 
Answer. ... 
5. Members of minority groups are far more likely to break the law of our country. 
Answer. ... 
6. Hungarians from Transylvania should have an educational system in their own 
language. 
Answer. ... 
7. Ethnic minorities cause a lot of harm to political stability of our country. 
Answer. ... 
8. It is a good thing that Hungarian minority is well represented in the Romanian 
Parliament. 
Answer. ... 
2.Pre-test questionnaire 
8. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of 
classifications: 
a) Statements about Hungarians 
I 100 
extremely the best 
poor 
Answer. ... 
b) Statements about minorities in general 
• ______________________ .00 
extremely 
poor 
Answer. ... 
the best 
9. How sure are you that your classification is the best? 
1 100 
not sure 
Answer. ... 
very sure 
10. How accurate do you think your option/answer is? 
I 100 
not accurate 
Answer. ... 
extremely accurate 
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11. How well have you understood the instructions? 
I 100 
not at all 
Answer. ... 
very well 
12. How difficult do you consider the task? 
I 100 
very easy 
Answer .... 
3. Feedback stage sheets 
very difficult 
Condition I: clear conflict (strong ingroup position validation I strong outgroup 
position validation) 
Your group considered its own classification to be 32 points better than the other 
group's. 
The other group considered its own classification to be 27 points better than your 
group's. 
Condition 2: vague conflict (weak ingroup position validation /weak outgroup 
position validation) 
Your group considered its own classification to be 2 points better than the other 
group's. 
The other group considered its own classification 5 points better than your group's. 
Condition 3: out group supremacy claim (weak in group validation/ strong outgroup 
validation) 
Your group considered its own classification to be 2 points better than the other 
group's. 
The other group considered its own classification to be 27 points better than your 
group's. 
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Condition 4: ingroup supremacy claim (strong ingroup position validation! weak 
outgroup position validation). 
Your group considered its own classification to be 32 points better than the other 
group's. 
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The other group considered its own classification 5 points better than your group's. 
3.Post-test questionnaire 
We would now like to consider the two groups. The group which made the same 
response as you and the group which made the opposite response. 
1. Please indicate which group you see yourself as most similar to: 
1 100 
Extremely similar 
to other group 
Answer. ... 
2. Which group do you most identify with? 
Extremely similar 
to own group 
1 _____________________________________ 100 
Strongly identify with 
other group 
Answer .... 
Strongly identify 
with own group 
3. Which group do you feel that you belong to more strongly? 
1 ____________________________________ 100 
strongly belong to strongly belong to 
other group own group 
Answer. ... 
4. Which group is more important to you at the moment? 
1 100 
other group own group 
extremely important 
Answer .... 
5. Which group are you more committed to? 
extremely important 
1 _____________________________________ 100 
extremely committed to extremely committed to 
other group own group 
Answer .... 
6. Which group do you think that you would enjoy meeting and talking to? 
1 100 
much more likely to enjoy 
other group's company 
Answer .... 
much more likely to enjoy 
own group's company 
7. Which group do you think should feel more pleased about its performance? 
I 100 
other group should 
be much more pleased 
Answer .... 
own group should 
be much more pleased 
8. If you had the choice again which group would you prefer to be a member of? 
I 100 
much prefer to be in 
other group 
Answer .... 
much prefer 
to be in own group 
9. Finally, please write down three words to describe members of the other group. 
10. Please also write down three words to describe members of your own group. 
Other group Own group 
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1. 
2. 
3. 
13. Please write down the number that best corresponds to the quality of 
classifications: 
c) Statements about Hungarians 
1 100 
extremely the best 
poor 
Answer. ... 
d) Statements about minorities in general 
I 100 
extremely 
poor 
Answer. ... 
the best 
14. How sure are you that your classification is the best? 
I 100 
not sure 
Answer. ... 
very sure 
15. How accurate do you think your option/answer is? 
I 100 
not accurate 
Answer .... 
extremely accurate 
16. How well have you understood the instructions? 
I 100 
not at all 
Answer .... 
very well 
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17. How difficult do you consider the task? 
1 ___________ 100 
very easy 
Answer. ... 
Please finally indicate: 
Your gender: 
very difficult 
Male Female 
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The age category you belong to: 1)18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6) 
65-
Study 3 Questionnaire (translated from Romanian) 
Opinions about Romanian political parties 
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This research is being conducted as part of a doctoral program at the Australian 
National University. This research is only for academic purposes and it is not 
associated with any political party. It involves answering questions about your 
opinions of Romanian Political groups. The questionnaire will take about five minutes 
to complete. 
In November 2000 there will be a general election. At this election will you be a 
supporter of the Government in power or will you be a supporter of one of the 
Opposition parties? Please tick one of the choices below (if you are undecided please 
tick the political group you favour most): 
I am a supporter of the Government. D 
D I am a supporter of one of the Opposition parties. 
If you are a supporter of the government please complete the items in Column A. If 
you are supporter of an opposition party, please complete the items in Column B. For 
each item circle the response that best reflects your view. 
A B 
It is important to me to be a supporter of It is important to me to be a supporter of 
the government. the opposition parties. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Supporting the government is the best 
political option. 
notatall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I define myself as a supporter of the 
government. 
notatall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
It is likely that I will become a member 
of one of the parties from the 
government. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
Supporting the opposition parties is the 
best political option. 
notatall I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I define myself as a supporter of the 
opposition parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
It is likely that I will become a member of 
one of the opposition parties. 
not at aJI 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
It is likely that I will attend a meeting to 
support the government. 
not at all 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
It is likely that I will explain to my 
friends why I support the government. 
not at all 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
I am similar to other people who are 
supporters of the government. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I identify with other people who are 
supporters of the government. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I feel good about being a supporter of the 
government. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I have little respect for other people who 
are supporters of the government. 
not at an 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I think that people who are supporters of 
the government have little to be proud of. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
not at aU 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
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It is likely that I will attend a meeting to 
support the opposition parties. 
not at all 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
It is likely that I will explain to my friends 
why I support the opposition parties. 
not at all 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
I am similar to other people who are 
supporters of the opposition parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I identify with other people who are 
supporters of the opposition parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I feel good about being a supporter of the 
opposition parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I have little respect for other people who 
are supporters of opposition parties. 
not at a1l 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I think that people who are supporters of 
the opposition parties have little to be 
proud of. 
I would rather not tell others that I am a 
supporter of the govermnent. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
Being a supporter of the govermnent 
really reflects who I am. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I will continue to support the govermnent 
in future elections (after 2000). 
not at an 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I am confident that I really am a 
supporter of the govermnent. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I am confident that it is important to be a 
supporter of the government. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I am confident that being a supporter of 
the govermnent really reflects who I am. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I am confident that supporting the 
govermnent really reflects my political 
opmtons. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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not at a11 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I would rather not tell others that I am a 
supporter of the opposition parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
Being a supporter of the opposition 
parties really reflects who I am. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I will continue to support the opposition 
parties in future elections (after 2000). 
not at an 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I am confident that I really am a supporter 
of the opposition parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I am confident that it is important to be a 
supporter of the opposition parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I am confident that being a supporter of 
the opposition parties really reflects who I 
am. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I am confident that supporting the 
opposition parties really reflects my 
political opinions. 
not at an 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
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Finally we would like to ask you a few demographic questions. Please circle 
the appropriate response in each case. 
What is your sex? Male Female 
Which age category do you belong to: 1)1 8-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-
65; 6) 65-
Study 4 Questionnaire 
Opinions about Australian political parties 
We would like you to think about the current Federal Parliament. Currently the 
Government is made up of a Coalition of the Liberal Party and the National Party. 
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In 2001 there will be a Federal election. At this election will you be a supporter of 
the Coalition or will you be a supporter of one of the non-government parties 
(such as the Labor Party and the Australian Democrats)? Please tick one of the 
choices below (if you are undecided please tick the political group you favour most): 
I am a supporter of the Coalition. 
I am a supporter of one of the non-government parties. 
If you are a supporter of the Coalition please complete the items in Column A. If you 
are supporter of a non-government party, please complete the items in Column B. For 
each item circle the response which best reflects your view. 
A B 
It is important to me to be a supporter of It is important to me to be a supporter of 
the Coalition. the non-government parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
Supporting the Coalition is the best 
political option. 
notatall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I define myself as a supporter of the 
Coalition. 
notatall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
It is likely that I will become a member 
of one of the parties from the Coalition. 
not at all 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
notatall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
Supporting the non-government parties is 
the best political option. 
notatall 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I define myself as a supporter of the non-
government parties. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
It is likely that I will become a member of 
one ofthe non-government parties. 
not at all 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
It is likely that I will attend a meeting to 
support the Coalition. 
not at all 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
It is likely that I will explain to my 
friends why I support the Coalition. 
not at all 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
I am similar to other people who are 
supporters of the Coalition. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I identify with other people who are 
supporters of the Coalition. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I feel good about being a supporter of the 
Coalition. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I have little respect for other people who 
are supporters of the Coalition. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I think that people who are supporters of 
the Coalition have little to be proud of. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
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It is likely that I will attend a meeting to 
support the non-government parties. 
not at all 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
It is likely that I will explain to my friends 
why I support the non-government 
parties. 
not at all 
likely 
2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
likely 
I am similar to other people who are 
supporters of the non-government parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I identify with other people who are 
supporters of the non-government parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I feel good about being a supporter of the 
non-government parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I have little respect for other people who 
are supporters of the non-government 
parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I think that people who are supporters of 
the non-government parties have little to 
be proud of. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I would rather not tell others that I am a 
supporter 
of the Coalition. 
not at aU 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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I would rather not tell others that I am a 
supporter of the non-government parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Being a supporter of the Coalition really Being a supporter of the non-government 
reflects who I am. parties really reflects who I am. 
not at a11 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I will continue to support the Coalition in I will continue to support the non-
future elections (after 2001). government parties in future elections 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I am confident that I really am a 
supporter of the Coalition. 
not at aU 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
(after 2001). 
not at alJ 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I am confident that I really am a supporter 
of the non-government parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I am confident that it is important to be a I am confident that it is important to be a 
supporter of the Coalition. supporter of the non-govermnent parties. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I am confident that being a supporter of 
the Coalition really reflects who I am. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I am confident that supporting the 
Coalition really reflects my political 
opinions. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I expect to agree with other Coalition 
supporters on political issues. 
notatall 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I am confident that being a supporter of 
the non-government parties really reflects 
who I am. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I am confident that supporting the non-
government parties really reflects my 
political opinions. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
I expect to agree with other non-
government party supporters on political 
I expect to agree with Coalition 
supporters on non-political issues. 
notatall 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
On political issues I expect to be able to 
convince Coalition supporters that my 
views are correct. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
On political I expect to be able to 
convince non-government party 
supporters that my views are correct. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Coalition supporters share a sense of 
identity. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
Coalition supporters share common 
ideals or values. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Coalition supporters share common 
goals. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
Where Coalition supporters behave in the 
same way on relevant issues this is 
usually because of their shared identity. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
issues. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
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I expect to agree with non-government 
party supporters on non-political issues. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
On political issues I expect to be able to 
convince non-government party 
supporters that my views are correct. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
On political issues I expect to be able to 
convince Coalition party supporters that 
my views are correct. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Non-government party supporters share a 
sense of identity. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
Non-government party supporters share 
common ideals or values. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Non-government party supporters share 
common goals. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
Where non-government party supporters 
behave in the same way on relevant issues 
this is usually because of their shared 
identity. 
not at all 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
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Where Coalition supporters behave in the Where non-government party supporters 
same way on relevant issues this is 
usually because of their shared ideals or 
values. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
behave in the same way on relevant issues 
this is usually because of their shared 
ideals or values. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
Where Coalition supporters behave in the Where non-government party supporters 
same way on relevant issues this is 
usually because of their common goals. 
not at all 2 3 4 56 7verymuch 
Coalition supporters share a sense of 
pride in the achievements of the 
Coalition. 
notatall I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
behave in the same way on relevant issues 
this is usually because of their common 
goals. 
notatall I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
Non-government party supporters share a 
sense of pride in the achievements of the 
non-government parties. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Finally we would like to ask you a few demographic questions. Please circle 
the appropriate response in each case. 
What is your sex? Male Female 
Which age category do you belong to: 1)18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-
65; 6) 65-
Study 5 Questionnaires 
(the final version of this questionnaire was translated in Dutch) 
Pre-manipulation questionnaire 
Questionnaire about attitudes on financial reparation to be paid by the Dutch 
government to the descendents of slaves 
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In 1635 the Dutch began to participate in the African slave trade. Dutch slave 
ships sailed to the coast of West-Africa, where they bought the slaves from traders 
who had bought or robbed these slaves in the interior of Africa. After this the ships 
sailed to Brazil or the Caribbean, where the slaves were sold to plantation-owners. By 
1800, the Dutch had traded around 300.000 African slaves in this way. As a 
consequence of the UN conference against racism in South Africa, there are some 
discussions now in Netherlands about the possibility of paying some financial 
reparation to descendants of the slaves by the Dutch government. This reparation 
would involve money to be paid to the Surinamese government in order to improve 
the general welfare system. 
Which of the following best describes you? Please tick one. 
I am a in favour of financial reparation to be paid by the Dutch government. 
I am against financial reparation to be paid by the Dutch government. 
(If you are not clearly either tick the one towards which you lean.) 
Where would you place your views on a scale from extremely against reparation to 
extremely in favour of financial reparation? 
extremely against I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely in favour 
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Feedback manipulation sheets for each condition. 
1. Weak conflict: weak ingroup validation x weak outgroup validation (decrease of 
conflict) 
In a previous research investigating perceptions of people who are in favour of 
financial reparation from the Dutch government about themselves and about the 
people who are not in favour of such reparation, and vice-versa (perception of people 
who are against financial reparation about themselves and about the people who are in 
favour), we found: 
Both groups (e.g. people who were in favour of financial reparation and people who 
were not in favour of financial reparation to be paid by Dutch government) were 
confident that their position was different but not better than that of the other group. 
They both appreciated the other group's views. 
Fragments from a typical group discussion from our previous research between 
members of the two groups (reflecting the atmosphere of mutual relationships 
between the groups): 
"I don't agree with you but I still can see your point." 
"I know that my views are correct but you can be also right if you see things from 
your perspective ... " 
2. High conflict: ingroup validation x outgroup validation (strong disagreement) 
Both groups (e.g. people who were in favour of financial reparation and people who 
were not in favour of financial reparation to be paid by Dutch govermnent) were 
confident that their position was superior to that of the other group. They believed that 
their position was correct and that the other's group position was incorrect. 
Fragments from a typical group discussion from our previous research between 
members of the two groups (reflecting the atmosphere of mutual relationships 
between the groups): 
e.g. "I don't believe you can possibly be right!" 
"I strongly believe that our position is the one that any reasonably people should 
have" ... 
3. Hostility: strong ingroup validation x strong outgroup validation (increase of 
conflict/active opposition+ derogation) 
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Both groups (e.g. people who were in favour of financial reparation and people who 
were not in favour of financial reparation to be paid by Dutch government) were very 
confident that their position was superior to that of the other group. They strongly 
believed that their position was correct and that the other's group position was 
incorrect. 
Moreover each group thought that members ofthe other group misunderstood the 
issue, and did not know the fact on the matter. 
Fragments from a typical group discussion from our previous research between 
members of the two groups (reflecting the atmosphere of mutual relationships 
between the groups): 
e.g. "I can't believe you can be so moronic to say this ... " 
"Your argument it's really an aberration, the most stupid thing I've ever heard ... You 
should be crazy or very stupid to believe this ... " 
Post-manipulation questionnaire 
How much conflict do you perceive in the relations between members of the two 
groups? 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
How much hostility do you perceive in the relations between members of the two 
groups? 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
How true are the following statements? 
Reading about the other group position made me feel angry. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Reading about my group position made me feel proud. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
If you would participate in the group discussion described above you would feel: 
a) pride 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
b) anger 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
c) fear 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
If you would participate in such group discussions how involved would you be? 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
How good is to be in favour of financial reparation? 
extremely 
bad 
I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
good 
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How good is to be against financial reparation? 
extremely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
bad good 
How confident are you that your position is correct? 
not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident 
I am confident that holding this position really reflects my values and beliefs. 
not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident 
I am confident that it is important to hold this position. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I am confident that holding this position group really reflects who I am. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I am confident that an organized group which share my views on the financial 
reparation issue would be the right place for me to express myself. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I am confident that my ideas regarding the financial reparation issue are the right 
ones. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I define myself as holding this position. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
To what extent do you agree with the following statements? 
People who are in favour of financial reparation are intelligent. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are against financial reparation are intelligent. 
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not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are in favour of financial reparation are well informed. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are against financial reparation are well informed. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are in favour of financial reparation are conscientious. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are against financial reparation are conscientious. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are in favour of financial reparation are too emotional. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are against financial reparation are too emotional. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are in favour of financial reparation are too rational. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are against financial reparation are too rational. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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On financial reparation-relevant issues I expect to be able to convince people who are 
AGAINST pro-reparation that my views are correct. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
On financial reparation-relevant issues I expect to be able to convince people who are 
IN FAVOR of reparation that my views are correct. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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People who are in favour of financial reparation share a sense of identity or solidarity. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are against financial reparation share a sense of identity or solidarity. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are in favour of financial reparation share common values and goals. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
People who are against financial reparation share common values and goals. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Where people who are in favour of financial reparation behave in the same way this is 
usually because of their shared sense of identity and solidarity. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Where people who are against financial reparation behave in the same way this is 
usually because of their shared sense of identity and solidarity. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Where people who are in favour of financial reparation behave in the same way on 
relevant issues this is usually because of their shared values and goals. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Where people who are against financial reparation behave in the same way on 
relevant issues this is usually because of their shared values and goals. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I think the Dutch people should feel guilty about the negative things they did to 
African slaves during the slave trade period. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I think the Dutch people should feel regret for their group's harmful actions toward 
African slaves during the slave trade period. 
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not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I think the Dutch people should feel regret about things their group did to the African 
slaves during the slave trade period. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I think the Dutch people should feel guilty about the bad outcomes received by the 
African slaves which were brought about by Dutch during slave trade period. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
How similar do you think members of your group are? 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
How similar do you think members of the other group are? 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
To what extend do you think your group forms a cohesive solid block? 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
To what extend do you think the other group forms a cohesive solid block? 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I identifY with other people who hold the same position as me on financial reparation. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I see myself as belonging to the group of people who hold the same position as me on 
financial reparation. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I am glad that I am belonging to the group ofpeop1e who hold this position on 
financial reparation. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
I feel strong ties with other people who hold the same position as me on financial 
reparation. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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How likely is it that you will become a member of an organized group which shares 
your views about the financial reparation issue? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
How likely is it that you will attend meetings of people who share your views about 
the financial reparation issue? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
How likely is it that you will express your views about the financial reparation issue 
in public? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
How likely it is that you will take part in actions to promote your views about the 
financial reparation issue? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
How likely it is that you will explain to your friends why you hold your views about 
the financial reparation? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
How likely is that you will sign a petition supporting your position on financial 
reparation? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
Which age category do you belong to: 1) 18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-
65; 6) 65-
What is your gender: Male Female 
Study 6 Questionnaires (translated from Romanian) 
Pilot Study questionnaire 
308 
Attitudes toward modification of article 200 (concerning homosexual behaviour) 
questionnaire 
There is a law project in Romania aimed to abrogate Article 200 (concerning 
homosexual relations) and to modifY other articles concerning "Sexual crimes", in 
such a way that there will be only one law for homosexuals and heterosexuals. The 
main organizations supporting and opposing this law project are respectively 
ACCEPT and ASCOR. In general, supporters and opponents of this law project 
represent two distinct current of opinion on this matter. Supporters believe that 
Romanian society needs this law to be changed. Opponents disagree with this and 
believe the law should not be changed. 
Please now take a moment to think about your position regarding this matter 
and then indicate your position by ticking one option 
0 
I am in favour of this law project 
I am against this law project 0 
1. Where would you place your views on a scale from extremely against this law 
project to extremely in favour of it? 
extremely against 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely in favour 
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2. How likely is that you will adopt the following behaviours to support your position 
regarding this matter? 
• to join an organized group which reflects your view 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
• to participate in a rally organized by such organizations 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
• to express views in public 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
• to become actively involved in promoting the position you support 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
• to sign a petition to show support for your position 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
• to try to persuade other people about the correctness of your position 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
• to write letters to newspapers in order to show support for your position 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
• to actively participate in organizing a rally 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
• to participate in a counter-demonstration 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
• to try to stop the supporters of the other position to express their views 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
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3. Please now indicate your position regarding the following statements. If you are a 
supporter of the law project please fill in column A, and if you are an opponent of the 
law project, in B. 
A. 
I define myself now as a supporter of this law 
project. 
B. 
I define myself now as an opponent of this law 
project. 
notatall I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch notatall I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I am confident that my ideas regarding this law 
project are the right ones. 
I am confident that my ideas regarding this law 
project are the right ones. 
notatall l 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch notatall I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
I am confident that I am a real supporter of this 
law project. 
I am confident that I am a real opponent of this 
law project. 
notatall l 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch notatall I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymnch 
I am confident that being a supporter of 
this law project really reflects ideas. 
notatall I 2 3 4 5 6 7 verymuch 
4. Finally, please indicate: 
I am confident that being an opponent of 
this law project really reflects ideas. 
not at all l 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
Which age category do you belong to: 1) 18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-
65; 6) 65-
What is your gender: Male Female 
Version I of the questionnaire (control condition) 
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Questionnaire on attitudes about changing article 200 from Penal Code 
There is a new law project in Romania which aims to abrogate article 200 (concerning 
homosexual relations) and to modify other articles concerning "Sexual crimes" in 
such a way that there is going to be only one law for both homosexuals and 
heterosexuals. The main organizations which support this new law is ACCEPT and 
the one that rejects this is AS COR. Generally, supporters and opponents of this law 
project represent two different currents of opinion regarding this issue. Supporters 
believe that the Romanian society needs this law in the new form. Opponents don't 
agree and believe that the law should not be modified. 
Please indicate your position regarding this issue. 
I am in favour of this new law project D 
I am against this new law project. D 
Where would you place your views on this issue on a scale from !(total disagreement) 
to 7 (total agreement)? 
total disagreement 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 total agreement 
1. How appropriate do you consider the following behaviours are for the supporters or 
opponents? 
• To join an organized groups which reflect their views 
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not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To become actively involved in the promotion ofthc position you support 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To sign a petition to show support or opposition 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To try to persuade other people about their position 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To try to stop the supporters from the other side expressing their views 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To participate in a counter-manifestation 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To actively participate in the organization of a rally 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To write letters for newspapers to show support for their position 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
2. On the front page you indicated your position regarding the Law project (in favour 
or against). To what extent do you define yourself as holding this position at the 
moment. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
3. I am confident that my ideas regarding this law project are the right ones. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
4. I am confident that I am a real supporter/ opponent of this law project. 
not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident 
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5. I am confident that holding this position really reflects my values and beliefs at the 
moment. 
not at all confident I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident 
6. People who have the same view as me on this law project share a sense of identity 
or solidarity. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
7. People who have the same view as me on this law project share common values and 
goals. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
8. People who have the same view as me on this law project behave in the same way 
this is usually because of their shared sense of identity and solidarity. 
Do not agree I 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree strongly 
9. People who have the same view as me on this law project behave in the same way 
on relevant issues. This is usually because of their shared values and goals. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
10. I identify with other people who hold the same position as me about this law 
project. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
11. I see myself as belonging to the group of people who hold the same position as me 
about this law project. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
12. I am glad that I belong to the group of people who hold the same position as me 
about this law project. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
14. I feel strong ties with other people who hold the same position as me about this 
law project. 
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not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
15. How likely is it that you will become a member of an organized group that shares 
your views on this law project? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
16. How likely is it that you will become actively involved in the promotion of the 
position you support? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
17. How likely is that you will sign a petition or something similar supporting your 
position on this law project? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
18. How likely is that you will try to persuade other people about the correctness of 
your position? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
19. How likely is that you will try to stop the supporters from the other side 
expressing their views? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
20. How likely is that you will actively participate in the organising of a rally? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
21. How likely is that you will write letters for newspapers to show support for your 
position? 
not at all likely 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
Finally please indicate: 
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The age category you belong to: 1)18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6) 
65-
Gender: F M 
Version 2 of the questionnaire (experimental condition) 
Questionnaire on attitudes about changing article 200 from Penal Code 
There is a new law project in Romania which aims to abrogate article 200 (concerning 
homosexual relations) and to modifY other articles concerning "Sexual crimes" in 
such a way that there is going to be only one law for both homosexuals and 
heterosexuals. The main organizations which support this new law is ACCEPT and 
the one that rejects this is ASCOR. Generally, supporters and opponents of this law 
project represent two different currents of opinion regarding this issue. Supporters 
believe that the Romanian society needs this law in the new form. Opponents don't 
agree and believe that the law should not be modified. 
Please indicate your position regarding this issue. 
I am in favour ofthis new law project D 
I am against this new law project. D 
Where would you place your views on this issue on a scale from !(total disagreement) 
to 7 (total agreement)? 
total disagreement I 2 3 4 5 6 7 total agreement 
In a survey previously conducted using psychology students we found that 
even if supporters and opponents disagreed about their position they both strongly 
agreed that the most important actions to take to support their position were: 
• To join an organized group which reflect their views 
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• To become actively involved in the promotion of the position they support 
• To sign a petition to show support or opposition 
• To try to persuade other people about their position 
They agreed that the less important actions they could take to support their 
position were: 
• To try to stop the supporters on the other side from expressing their views 
• To participate in a counter-demonstration when the other side demonstrates 
• To actively participate in the organising of a rally 
• To write letters to newspapers to show support for your position 
Please now indicate your position by circling a number for the following questions 
and statements: 
1. How appropriate do you consider the following behaviours are for the supporters or 
opponents? 
• To join an organized groups which reflect their views 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To become actively involved in the promotion of the position you support 
not at ail 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To sign a petition to show support or opposition 
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not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To try to persuade other people about their position 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To try to stop the supporters from the other side expressing their views 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To participate in a counter-manifestation 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To actively participate in the organization of a rally 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
• To write letters for newspapers to show support for their position 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely 
2. On the front page you indicated your position regarding the Law project (in favour 
or against). To what extent do you define yourself as holding this position at the 
moment. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
3. I am confident that my ideas regarding this law project are the right ones. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
4. I am confident that I am a real supporter/ opponent of this law project. 
not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident 
5. I am confident that holding this position really reflects my values and beliefs at the 
moment. 
not at all confident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely confident 
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6. People who have the same view as me on this law project share a sense of identity 
or solidarity. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
7. People who have the same view as me on this law project share common values and 
goals. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
8. People who have the same view as me on this law project behave in the same way 
this is usually because of their shared sense of identity and solidarity. 
Do not agree 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 Agree strongly 
9. People who have the same view as me on this law project behave in the same way 
on relevant issues. This is usually because of their shared values and goals. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
10. I identify with other people who hold the same position as me about this law 
project. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
11. I see myself as belonging to the group of people who hold the same position as me 
about this law project. 
not at all 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
12. I am glad that I belong to the group of people who hold the same position as me 
about this law project. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
14. I feel strong ties with other people who hold the same position as me about this 
law project. 
not at all I 2 3 4 5 6 7 very much 
15. How likely is it that you will become a member of an organized group that shares 
your views on this law project? 
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not at all likely I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
16. How likely is it that you will become actively involved in the promotion of the 
position you support? 
not at all likely I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
17. How likely is that you will sign a petition or something similar supporting your 
position on this law project? 
not at all likely I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
18. How likely is that you will try to persuade other people about the correctness of 
your position? 
not at all likely I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
19. How likely is that you will try to stop the supporters from the other side 
expressing their views? 
not at all likely I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
20. How likely is that you will actively participate in the organising of a rally? 
not at all likely I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
21. How likely is that you will write letters for newspapers to show support for your 
position? 
not at all likely I 2 3 4 5 6 7 extremely likely 
Finally please indicate: 
The age category you belong to: I) 18-25; 2) 26-35; 3) 36-45; 4) 46-55; 5) 56-65; 6) 
65-
Gender: F M 
STATISTICAL APPENDIX (II) 
Study 1 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: IDENTIFICATION change score 
Type III Sum 
Source ofSauares Df Mean Sauare F Si•. 
Corrected Model 643.326(a) 3 214.442 1.970 .126 
Intercept 347.818 I 347.818 3.195 .078 
IGPVAL !96.719 I 196.719 1.807 .183 
OGPVAL 
.496 I .496 .005 .946 
IGPVAL*OGPVAL 475.564 I 475.564 4.368 .040 
Error 7620.897 70 108.870 
Total 8643.361 74 
Corrected Total 8264.223 73 
a R Squared~ .078 (Adjusted R Squared- .038) 
Note: IGPV AL is ingroup position validation, OGPV AL is outgroup position 
validation. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: CERTAINTY change score 
Type III Sum 
Source ofSouares df Mean Sauare F Sig. 
Corrected Mode! 2368.013(a) 3 789.338 3.160 .030 
Intercept !30.999 I 130.999 .524 .471 
IGPVAL 1583.514 I 1583.514 6.339 .014 
OGPVAL 671.883 I 671.883 2.689 .106 
IGPV AL * OGPV AL 5.891 I 5.891 .024 .878 
Error 17487.622 70 249.823 
Total 20047.000 74 
Corrected Total 19855.635 73 
a R Squared- .119 (Adjusted R Squared- .082) 
Note: IGPV AL is ingroup position validation, and OGPV AL is outgroup position 
validation. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: POTTEST IN GROUP FAVOURITISM 
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Partial Eta 
Souared 
.078 
.044 
.025 
.000 
.059 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
.119 
.007 
.083 
.037 
.000 
Type III Sum 
Source of Sauares df Mean Sauare F Sig. 
Corrected Model 2569.652(a) 3 856.551 1.583 .201 
Intercept 40824.105 I 40824.105 75.464 .000 
IGPVAL 779.109 I 779.109 1.440 .234 
OGPVAL 44.851 I 44.851 .083 .774 
IGPV AL * OGPV AL !856.783 I 1856.783 3.432 .068 
Error 37868.362 70 540.977 
Total 81023.000 74 
Corrected Total 40438.014 73 
a R Squared= .064 (Adjusted R Squared= .023) 
Note: IGPV AL is ingroup position validation, and OGPV AL is outgroup position 
validation. 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: IN GROUP FAVOURITISM change score 
Source 
Type III Sum I 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Corrected Model 3547.767(a) 3 1182.589 2.999 .036 
Intercept 4107.862 I 4107.862 !0.419 .002 
IGPVAL !064.314 I 1064.314 2.699 .105 
OGPVAL 596.450 I 596.450 ' 1.513 .223 
IGPV AL * OGPV AL 2059.844 I 2059.844 5.224 .025 
Error 27599.585 70 394.280 
Total 35662.000 74 
Corrected Total 31147.351 73 I 
a R Squared~ .114 (Adjusted R Squared~ .076) 
Note: IGPV AL is ingroup position validation, OGPV AL is outgroup position 
validation, and IGFl is pretest ingroup favoritism. 
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Partial Eta 
Souared 
.114 
.130 
.037 
.021 
.069 
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Study 2 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable· IDENTIFICATION 
Type III Sum Partial Eta 
Source of Squares df Mean Square F Sio. Squared 
Corrected Model 1223.083(a) 3 407.694 2.126 .107 .099 
Intercept 356807.379 1 356807.379 1860.550 .000 .970 
IGPVAL 74.517 I 74.517 .389 .535 .007 
OGPVAL 568.015 I 568.015 2.962 .091 .049 
JGPV AL * OGPV AL 519.144 I 519.144 2.707 .105 .045 
Error 11122.962 58 191.775 
Total 372341.516 62 
Corrected Total 12346.046 61 
a R Squared~ .099 (Adjusted R Squared~ .052) 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable' CERTAINTY change score 
Type III Sum Partial Eta 
Source of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. Squared 
Corrected Model 3234.36l(a) 3 1078.120 5.519 .002 .222 
Intercept 316.990 I 316.990 1.623 .208 .027 
JGPVAL 1182.046 I 1182.046 6.051 .017 .094 
OGPVAL 324.028 I 324.028 1.659 .203 .028 
IGPV AL * OGPV AL 1554.407 I 1554.407 7.958 .007 .121 
Error 11329.591 58 195.338 
Total 14996.438 62 
Corrected Total 14563.953 61 
a R Squared- .222 (AdJusted R Squared- .182) 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Deoendent Variable: CERTAINTY change score for the single item 
Type Ill Sum Partial Eta 
Source ofSouares df Mean Square F Si~. Squared 
Corrected Model !3497.236(a) 3 4499.079 7.079 .000 .268 
Intercept 406.312 I 406.312 .639 .427 .011 
IGPVAL 4187.524 1 4187.524 6.589 .013 .102 
OGPVAL 1712.784 I 1712.784 2.695 .106 .044 
IGPV AL * OGPV AL 6854.966 1 6854.966 !0.786 .002 .!57 
Error 36862.651 58 635.563 
Total 51051.000 62 
Corrected Total 50359.887 61 
a R Squared~ .268 (Adjusted R Squared- .230) 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects 
Dependent Variable: POSTTEST IN GROUP FAVOURITISM 
Type III Sum I I 
Source of Squares df Mean Square ' F Sig. 
Corrected Model 4834.050(a) 3 1611.350 3.561 .020 
Intercept 446.084 I 446.084 .986 .325 
!GPVAL 2289.915 I 2289.915 5.061 .028 
OGPVAL 197.248 I 197.248 .436 .512 
IGPV AL * OGPV AL 2!17.701 I 2117.701 4.680 .035 
Error 26244.918 58 452.499 
Total 31686.000 62 
Corrected Total 31078.968 61 
a R Squared~ .156 (Adjusted R Squared~ .112) 
Note: IGPV AL is ingroup position validation, and OGPV AL is outgroup position 
validation 
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Partial Eta 
Squared 
.156 
.017 
.080 
.007 
.075 
Study 3 
Model Summary 
Std. Error of 
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Model R I M~~" ~-~~R~~quar<:__ uare the Estimate Change Statistics ~-
' 
R Square I 
' 
Change FChange Sig. F Change 
I .595(a) .354 .348 1.15383 .354 54.319 .000 
2 
.781(b) .610 .602 .90121 .256 64.282 .000 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c) 
I Sum of I Model Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 72.316 I 72.316 54.319 .OOO(a) 
Residual 131.801 99 1.331 
Total 204.116 100 
2 Regression 124.523 2 62.262 76.661 .OOO(b) 
Residual 79.593 98 .812 
Total 204.116 100 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Model Coefficients Coefficients t Sig. 
B Std. Error Beta 
I (Constant) 
-.047 .484 -.097 .923 
IDENTIF 
.848 .115 .595 7.370 .000 
2 (Constant) -.629 .385 -1.634 .106 
IDENTIF 
.319 .112 .224 2.857 .005 
SAL 
.477 .060 .628 8.018 .000 
a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Model R R Square Square the Estimate Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change Sig. F Change 
I 
.592(a) .351 .344 1.52141 .351 53.446 .000 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
ANOVA(b) 
Sum of 
Model Squares Df 
I Regression 123.711 I I 
Residual 229.154 
991 
Total 352.865 100 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Dependent Variable: SALIENCE 
Mean Square 
123.711 
2.315 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardizcd Standardized 
f-------_g~~[ficien ts Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta 
I (Constant) 1.220 .639 
IDENTIF 1.110 .152 • .592 
a Dependent Vanable: SALIENCE 
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F Sig. 
53.446 .OOO(a) 
I 
t Sig. 
1.911 .059 
7.311 .000 
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Study4 
Model Summary 
' Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Model R R Square the Estimate Change Statistics Sguare 
. 
I 
;:h=rSig F Change 
R Square 
Change 
1 .676(a) .457 .451 1.05944 
2 
.775(b) .601 .592 .91329 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c) 
Sum of 
Model Squares Df 
1 Regression 92.531 1 
Residual 109.997 98 
Total 202.528 99 
2 Regression 121.619 2 
Residual 80.908 97 
Total 202.528 99 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENT, SAL 
Mean Square 
92.531 
1.122 
60.810 
.834 
.457 
.144 
F 
82.439 
72.904 
c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t 
I (Constant) ·1.278 .460 ·2.780 
!DENT 
.992 .109 .676 9.080 
2 (Constant) ·.645 .411 .J.570 
IDENT 
.341 .145 .232 2.347 
SAL 
.558 .095 .584 5.905 
a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
82.439 .000 
34.874 .000 
Sig. 
.OOO(a) 
.OOO(b) 
Sig. 
.007 
.000 
.120 
.021 
.000 
Model R R Square Square the Estimate Change Statistics 
R Square 
Change F Change Sig. F Change 
1 
.76l(a) , .578 .574 .97562 .578 134.481 .000 
a PrediCtors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
ANOVA(b) 
I Sum of ! Model Squares df I Mean Square 
I Regression 128.003 I 128.003 
Residual 93.279 98 .952 
Total 221.282 99 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Dependent Variable: SALIENCE 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
. 
Model B Std. Error Beta 
1 (Constant) -1.134 
.4231 
!DENT 1.167 .1 01 .761 
a Dependent Vanable: SALIENCE 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
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! I I F Sig. 
134.481 .OOO(a) 
t Sig. 
-2.679 .009 
11.597 .000 
Model R R Square Square the Estimate Chan_ge Statistics 
--
R Square 
I Change F Change Sig. F Change 
1 
.504(a) .254 
.2471 1.06465 .254 33.072 .000 
2 
.546(b) .298 .283 1.03827 .044 5.993 .016 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B I Std. Error Beta t Sig. I 
1 (Constant) 1.626 .462 3.517 .001 
!DENT 
.633 .110 .504 5.751 .000 
2 (Constant) 1.925 .467 4.121 .000 
!DENT 
.326 .165 .259 1.971 .052 
SAL 
.263 .108 .322 2.448 .016 
a Dependent Variable: PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
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Model Summary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of I 
Model R R Square Square the Estimate Change ;>tatistics 
I 
R Square 
Change F Change 
1 
.780(a) .609 .605 .81423 .609 152.723 
a Predtctors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
ANOVA(b) 
I Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 101.251 1 101.251 152.723 .OOO(a) 
Residual 64.971 98 .663 
Total 166.222 99 I 
a Predtctors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
b Dependent Variable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) .683 .291 2.349 .021 
DEPERS 
.822 .067 .780 12.358 .000 
a Dependent Vanable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS 
Sig. F Change 
.000 
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Study 5 
Model Summary 
I 
Adjusted R i Std. Error of I I 
Model R R Square Sg_l:Jare -~!!_~_Kstimate Change Statisti~s 
R Square 
' I Change F Change Sig. F Change 
1 
.372(a) .138 .135 !.09408 .138 4!.940 
2 
.434(b) .188 .182 !.06408 .050 15.928 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c) 
I Sum of Mean Square I Model Squares df F Sig. 
1 Regression 50.203 1 50.203 4!.940 .OOO(a) 
Residual 312.422 261 1.197 
Total 362.625 262 
2 Regression 68.238 2 34.119 30.133 .OOO(b) 
Residual 294.388 260 1.132 
Total 362.625 262 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
I I Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 3.158 .143 22.059 .000 
!DENT 
.292 .045 .372 6.476 .000 
2 (Constant) 2.587 .200 12.952 .000 
!DENT 
.182 .052 .232 3.527 .000 
SAL 
.230 .058 .263 3.991 .000 
a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
Model Summary 
Std. Error of 
L.M=o::;de::.l _._~R'-----'---===---L- '-"="------L--"'the. Estimate Chan e Statistics 
.000 
.000 
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~~----r~-----1 ~ ~~~ ~ ~-I i R Square 
I Change , F Change Sig_ F Change 
I 331(a) 
.110 1 .107 1.03799 .110 35.020 .000 
2 A52(b) .zo4 1 .199 .98313 1 .094 33.581 1 .000 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c) 
i 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 37,731 I 37J31 35.020 .OOO(a) 
Residual 305.987 284 1.077 
Total 343.718 285 
2 Regression 70.189 2 35.094 36.309 .OOO(b) 
Residual 273.529 283 .967 
Total 343.718 285 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
- . 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
I (Constant) 3.685 .131 28.033 .000 
!DENT 
.243 .041 .331 5.918 .000 
2 (Constant) 2.952 .178 16.629 .000 
!DENT 
.099 .046 .135 2.142 .033 
SAL 
.297 .051 .365 5.795 .000 
a Dependent Variable: PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Model R R Square Sauare the Estimate Chan!!e Statistics 
R Square 
Change FChange Sig. F Change 
1 
.539(a) .290 .288 1.13729 .290 116.094 .000 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
ANOVA(b) 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square 
l Regression 150.158 I I 150.158 I 
Residual 367.332 284 1.2931 
Total 517.490 285 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Dependent Variable: SALIENCE 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta 
I (Constant) 2.467 .144 
!DENT 
.485 1 .045 .5391 
a Dependent Vanable: SALIENCE 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
331 
F Sig. 
Il6.094 .OOO(a) 
t Sig. 
]7.125 1 .000 
1o.m I .000 
Model R R Square Sou are the Estimate ChaJ!.ge Statistics 
·-
·~ . 
I 
R Square I Change F Change 1 
I .913(a) .834 I .834 .51384 .834 1445.555 1 
a Predictors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
ANOVA(b) 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 381.677 I 381.677 1445.555 .OOO(a) 
Residual 75.778 287 .264 
Total 457.455 288 
' 
a Predictors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
b Dependent Variable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS 
Sig. F Change 
.000 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
I 
Model B ' Std. Error Beta 
' 
I (Constant) 
-.386 i .124 
in favour group i 
perceived 1.050 .028 .913 
depersonalization 
a Dependent Vanable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS 
Model Summary 
Adj Std. Error of 
Model R R' R' the Estimate Change Statisti~s 
COND~ 1 R Square 
(Selected) Change F Change 
1 
.395(a) .156 .147 1.07419 .156 16.680 
2 
.431 (b) .185 .167 1.06145 .029 3.175 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c,d) 
I Sum of Model Squares Df Mean Square F 
1 Regression 19.247 1 19.247 16.680 
Residual 103.850 90 1.154 
Total 123.097 91 . 
2 Regression 22.823 2 11.412 1o.129 I 
Residual 100.273 89 1.127 
Total 123.097 91 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
d Selecting only cases for which COND = I (WEAK CONFLICT) 
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I 
i 
t Sig. 
-3.100 .002 
38.020 .000 
Sig. F Change 
.000 
.078 
Si2. 
.OOO(a) 
.OOO(b) 
Coefficients(a,b) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients 
' 
Coefficients 
~~~ 
Model B Std. Error Beta t 
1 (Constant) 3.113 .233 13.344 
!DENT 
.303 .074 .395 4.084 
2 (Constant) 2.639 .352 
' 
7.493 
!DENT 
.2271 .0851 .2961 2.678 
SAL 
.180 .101 .197 1.782 
a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
b Selecting only cases for which COND = 1 (WEAK CONFLICT) 
Model Summary 
I Adj Std. Error of 
Model R R' R' the Estimate Change Stati~tics 
COND~ 2 I R Square I (Selected) Change F Change 
1 
.278(a) .077 .066 I 1.1388o I .077 7.266 
2 
.413(b) .171 .1521 1.08560 I .094 9.735 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c,d) 
I Sum of Model Squares df Mean Souare F 
1 Regression 9.423 1 9.423 7.266 
Residual 112.827 87 1.297 
Total 122.250 88 
2 Regression 20.896 2 10.448 8.865 
Residual 101.353 86 1.179 
Total 122.250 88 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
d Selecting only cases for which COND = 2 (STRONG CONFLICT) 
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Sig. 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.009 
.078 
Sig. F Change 
.008 
.002 
Si". 
.008(a) 
.OOO(b) 
Coefficients(a,b) 
Unstandardized I Standardized ! 
I Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t 
I (Constant) 3.371 .262 12.866 
!DENT 
.231 .086 .278 2.696 
2 (Constant) 2.674 .335 7.976 
!DENT 
.081 .095 .097 .852 
SAL 
.304 .098 .356 3.120 
a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
b Selecting only cases for which COND = 2 (STRONG CONFLICT) 
Model Summary 
Model R R' 
Adj J Std. Error of 
R2 the Estimate Change Statistics 
T r COND~ 3 ! R Square 
(Selected) I Change F Change 
I 
.442(a) .195 .185 1.08580 .195 19.382 
2 
.485(h) .235 .216 1.06502 .040 4.152 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c,d) 
I Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F 
I Regression 22.851 I 22.851 19.382 
Residual 94.316 80 1.179 
Total 117.167 81 
2 Regression 27.560 2 13.780 12.149 
Residual 89.607 79 1.134 
Total 117.167 81 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
d Selecting only cases for which COND = 3 (HOSTILITY) 
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Sig. 
.000 
.008 
.000 
.397 
.002 
Sig.F 
Change 
.000 
.045 
Sig. 
.OOO(a) 
.OOO(b) 
Coefficients( a,b) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
I -~ Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta I t 
l (Constant) 2.987 .256 11.679 
!DENT 
.337 .077 .442 4.403 
2 (Constant) 2.439 .368 I 6.629 
!DENT 
.229 
.0921 .300 2.493 
SAL 
.215 .106 .245 1 2.038 
a Dependent Variable: POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL INTENTIONS 
b Selecting only cases for which COND = 3 (HOSTILITY) 
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Sig. 
.000 
.000 
.000 
.015 
.045 
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Study 6 
Model Summary 
Adjusted R I Std. Error of 
Model R I R Square S<jllare 1 the Estimate 
I 
' I 
R Squar~L~ Stati~--­
Change ' F Change I Sio. F Change 
I 
.452(a) .204 .193 1.36259 
2 
.475(b) .226 .204 1.35362 
' 
.204 18.481 I .000 
.021 1.957 .166 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c) 
I Sum of I Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 34.312 I 34.312 18.481 .OOO(a) 
Residual 133.678 72 1.857 
Total 167.990 . 73 
' 
2 Regression 37.897 2 18.949 10.342' .OOO(b) 
Residual 130.092 71 1.832 
Total 167.990 73 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error I Beta t Sig. ' 
I (Constant) 1.469 .422 3.485 .001 
!DENT 
.438 .102 .452 4.299 .000 
2 (Constant) .811 .630 1.288 .202 
!DENT 
.392 .106 .405 3.689 .000 
SAL 
.187 .134 .154 1.399 .166 
a Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
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Model Summary 
Adjusted R Std. Error of 
Model R R Square Square the Estimate Change Statistics 
-
' ' R Square I 
Change F Change 
I 
.394(a) . .156 .144 1.11462 .156 13.079 
2 408(b) 1 .167 .143 l.ll5ll .011 .9371 
a Pred1ctors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c) 
Sum of I 
Model Sauares df Mean Square F ' Sig. 
I Regression 16.249 I 16.249 13.079 .OOI(a) 
Residual 88.208 71 1.242 
Total 1044571 72 
2 Regression 17414 2 8.707 ' 7.002 .002(b) 
' Residual 87.044 70 1.243 
Total 104.457 72 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
Coefficients( a) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients -~ 
. 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
I (Constant) 1.035 .348 2.973 .004 
!DENT 
.303 .084 .394 3.616 .001 
2 (Constant) .662 .519 1.276 .206 
!DENT 
.275 .088 .358 3.108 .003 
SAL 
.108 .112 .112 .968 .336 
a Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
-~ 
Sig. F Change 
.001 
.336 
Model Summary 
I 
Std. Error I 
Adj. ofthe 1 
Model R R' R' Estimate Change Statistics 
. 
I 
I 
VERSION~ 
exp condition I 
(manipulation) R Square Sig. F 
(Selected) I Change FChange Change 
1 
.203(a) I .041 .004 1.35467 .041 1.114 .301 
2 
.426(b) .181 .116 1.27668 ' .140 4.273 .0491 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c,d) 
I I Sum of Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 2.043 I 2.043 1.114 .30l(a) 
Residual 47.713 I 26 1.835 
Total 49.757 27 
2 Regression 9.009 2 4.504 2.764 .082(b) 
Residual 40.748 25 1.630 
Total 49.757 27 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
d Selecting only cases for which VERSION = exp condition (manipulation) 
Coefficients( a,b) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 2.068 .625 3.309 .003 
!DENT 
.165 .156 .203 1.055 .301 
2 (Constant) ·.046 1.180 ·.039 .970 
!DENT 
.143 .148 .175 .966 .343 
SAL 
.485 .235 .375 2.067 .049 
a Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
b Selecting only cases for which VERSION= exp condition (manipulation) 
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Model Summary 
Model R R' 
Adj I Std. Error of I 
R2 the Estimate Change Statistics 
VERSION-
control cond 
(no rnanip) R Square Sig. F 
(Selected) Change F Change Change 
I 
.590(a) 
.3481.333 1.2644! .348 23.490 .000 
2 
.590(b) .348 .318 1.27902 .000 .001 .982 
a Pred1ctors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c,d) 
I Sum of Model Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 37.554 I 37.554 23.490 .OOO(a) 
Residual 70.344 44 1.599 
Total 107.898 45 
2 Regression 37.555 2 18.778 I 1.478 .OOO(b) 
Residual 70.343 43 1.636 
Total 107.898 45 
a Pred1ctors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
d Selecting only cases for which VERSION= control cond (no manip) 
Coefficients( a,b) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
I (Constant) 1.047 .528 1.983 .054 
!DENT 
.606 .!25 .590 4.847 .000 
2 (Constant) 1.036 .694 1.494 .!43 
!DENT 
.604 .!41 .589 4.284 .000 
SAL 
.004 .157 .003 .023 .982 
a Dependent Variable: HIGHLY NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
b Selecting only cases for which VERSION= control cond (no manip) 
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Model Summary 
I 
' Std. Error 
Adj. of the 
Model R R' R' Estimate Change Statistics 
VERSION-
' 
-~ 
exp condition 
(manipulation) I R Square Sig.F (Selected) 
' 
I Change FChange Change 
I 
.203(a) ' 
.041 1.005 !.28688 .041 l.I23 .299 
2 
.292(b) .085 .012 1.28205 .044 l.I97 .284 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c,d) 
Sum of 
Model Squares Df Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 1.860 I 1.860 1.123 .299(a) 
Residual 43.058 I 26 1.656 
Total 44.9171 27 
2 Regression 3.826 2 1.913 l.I64 .329(b) 
Residual 41.091 25 1.644 
Total 44.917 27 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
d Selecting only cases for which VERSION= exp condition (manipulation) 
Coefficients( a,b) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficien!§l~ 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
I (Constant) 1.524 .594 2.568 .016 
!DENT 
.157 .148 .203 1.060 .299 
2 (Constant) .401 l.I85 .339 .738 
!DENT 
.145 .148 .188 .981 .336 
SAL 
.258 .236 .21o 1 1.094 .284 
a Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
b Selecting only cases for which VERSION = exp condition (manipulation) 
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Model Summary 
I 
Adj Std. Error of 
Model R R' R' the Estimate ~~~· '""···· .I ~--~~-f---C~~ ~ -·~~ VERSION~ 
' 
~~~~~-, ~~---r-
control cond 
(no manip) 
I 
R Square Sig. F 
(Selected) Change FChange Change 
I 
.532(a) .283 .266 .99255 .283 16.940 .000 
2 
.532(b) .283 .249 1.00420 ' .000 i .008 .930 
a Pred1ctors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c,d) 
Sum of 
Model Squares df 
' 
Mean Square F Sig. 
I Regression 16.689 I 16.689 16.940 .OOO(a) 
Residual 42.361 43 .985 
Total 59.050 1 44 ! 
2 Regression 16.697 2 8.348 8.279 .OOI(b) 
Residual 42.353 421 1.008 
Total 59.050 44 1 
a Pred1ctors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
c Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
d Selecting only cases for which VERSION= control cond (no manip) 
Coefficients( a,b) 
Unstandardized Standardized ' 
' 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error Beta t Sig. 
I (Constant) .641 .422 1.519 .136 
!DENT 
.408 .099 .532 4.116 .000 
2 (Constant) .671 .545 1.231 .225 
!DENT 
.413 .114 .538 3.620 .001 
SAL ~.011 
.127 ~.013 -.088 .930 
a Dependent Variable: LESS NORMATIVE POLITICAL BEHAVIOURAL 
INTENTIONS 
b Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip) 
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Model Summary 
I I 
Adj Std. Error of 
Model R R' R' the Estimate Change Statistics 
VERSION-
control cond 
(no manip) I R Square 
(Selected) Change 
I 
.444(a) .197 .179 1.22945 .197 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
ANOVA(b,c) 
Sum of 
Model I Squares Df Mean Square 
I Regression 16.302 l 
Residual 66.508 44 
Total 82.810 45 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTITIFICATION 
b Dependent Variable: SALIENCE 
16.302 I 
I 
1.5121 
-r 
I 
I 
FChange 
10.785 
F 
l 0.785 
c Selecting only cases for which VERSION= control cond (no manip) 
Coefficients( a,b) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error : Beta t 
l (Constant) 2.825 .513 5.504 
!DENT 
.399 .122 .444 3.284 ' 
a Dependent Vanable: SALIENCE 
b Selecting only cases for which VERSION= control cond (no manip) 
Model Summary 
Adj Std. Error of 
Model R R' R' the Estimate Change Statistics 
VERSION-
control cond 
(no manip) R Square 
(Selected) Change F Change 
I 
.674(a) .454 .442 1.06272 .454 35.805 I 
2 
.7l4(b) .510 .486 1.01948 .055 4.7251 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
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I 
I 
I 
Sig. F 
I Change 
.0021 
Sig. 
.002(a) 
Sig. 
.000 
.002 
Sig.F 
Change 
.000 
.035 
Model Summary 
I 
' Adj Std. Error of 
Model R R' R' the Estimate Change Statistics i 
.. T:~-:---, VERSION~ I control cond 
(no manip) 
I 
I R Square 
I (Selected) I Change 
I 
.444(a) .197 .179 1.22945 .197 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
ANOVA(b,c) 
Sum of 
Model Squares Df Mean Square 
1 Regression 16.302 I 
Residual 66.508 44 
Total 82.810 45 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTITIFICATION 
b Dependent Variable: SALIENCE 
16.302 ' 
1.512 
FChange i 
ro.n5 1 
F I 
10.785 
c Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip) 
Coefficients(a,b) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B I Std. Error 
' 
Beta t 
I (Constant) 2.8251 .513 5.5041 
!DENT 
.399 .122 .444 3.284 
a Dependent Vanable: SALIENCE 
b Selecting only cases for which VERSION= control cond (no manip) 
Model Summary 
Adj Std. Error of 
Model R R' R' the Estimate Change Statistics 
VERSION-
control cond 
(no manip) R Square 
(Selected) Change F Change 
I 
.674(a) .454 .442 1.06272 .454 35.805 
2 
.714(b) .510 .486 1.01948 .055 4.725 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
Change 
.002 
Sig. 
.002(a) 
Sig. 
.000 
.002 
Sig.F 
Change 
.000 
.035 
342 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
ANOVA(c,d) 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square 
I Regression 40.437 I 40.437 
Residual 48.563 43 1.129 
Total 89.000 I 44 
2 Regression 45.348 2 22.674 
Residual 43.652 42 1.039 
Total 89.000 44 i 
a Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION 
b Predictors: (Constant), IDENTIFICATION, SALIENCE 
I 
F Sig. 
35.805 .OOO(a) 
21.816 .OOO(b) 
c Dependent Variable: PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
d Selecting only cases for which VERSION = control cond (no manip) 
Coefficients( a,b) 
Unstandardized Standardized I I 
Coefficients Coefficients ' 
·~·~·~ .. 
Model B Std. Error Beta t 
I (Constant) 2.089 .459 4.551 
!DENT 
.644 .108 .674 5.984 
2 (Constant) 1.321 .565 2.339 
!DENT 
.536 .115 .561 4.674 
SAL 
.272 .125 .261 2.174 
a Dependent Variable: PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
b Selecting only cases for which VERSION= control cond (no manip) 
Model Summary 
I 
! 
Adj Std. Error of I 
Model R R' R' the Estimate Change Statistics 
VERSION~ 
control cond 
(nomanip) R Square 
(Selected) Change F Change 
I 
.747(a) .557 .548 .93308 .557 57.941 
Sig. 
.000 
.000 
.024 
.000 
.035 
Sig. F 
Change 
.000 
a Predictors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
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ANOVA(b,c) 
Sum of 
Model Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
1 Regression 50.446 1 50.446 57.941 . .OOO(a) 
Residual 40.049 
461 .871 
Total 90.495 47 
a Predictors: (Constant), PERCEIVED GROUP DEPERSONALIZATION 
b Dependent Variable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTIONS 
c Selecting only cases for which VERSION= control cond (no manip) 
Coefficients( a,b) 
Unstandardized Standardized 
Coefficients Coefficients 
Model B Std. Error . Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) .934 .478 1.954 .057 
NF 
.739 .097 .747 7.612 .000 
a Dependent Vanable: COLLECTIVE ATTRIBUTION 
b Selecting only cases for which VERSION= control cond (no manip) 
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